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INTROjJliC ·rI ON 
Pero Lopez de Ayala (1332-1407) has traditionally 
been considered to be Castile's first great historian in 
the modern sense--a pre-Humanist, whose historical veracity 
and innovations in style paved the way for a new era in 
Spanish historiography. 
But despite his high reputation, Ayala and his 
chronicles have mostly been written about in general 
histories or in histories of literature; few critics have 
dealt with him exclusively or in detail. It is my in-
tention, therefore, to present a thorough study of the 
four chronicles--La Cr6nica del Rey Don Pedro! (1350-1369), 
La Cr6nica del Rey Don .t:i:nrique II (1369-1379), La Cr6nica 
del Hey Don Juan~ (1379-1390), and La Cr6nica del Rey 
Don ~nrique III (1390-1396), in order to evaluate the 
chronicler and his work from both the historical and 
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The years between 1350 and 1396, which Ayala describes, 
represent a fascinating and extremely complex phase of 
Castilian history. The Reconquest came to a standstill 
because of the intense power struggle between Castile, 
Aragon and Portugal for control of the Iberian Peninsula. 
Castile itself became a battleground for the bitter strug-
gle between those who advocated a strong centralized 
monarchy and those who favored the signorial rule of a 
powerful nobility. The entire peninsula was involved in 
the intermittent conflicts between England and France 
known as the Hundred Years' War. Since the chief prize 
at stake was the royal fleet of Castile, the main efforts 
of both English and French diplomacy were concentrated on 
the central kingdom in particular. 
Castile 
Four monarchs ruled Castile between 1350 and 1396 -
Pedro I (1350-69), Enrique II (1369-79), Juan I (1379-
90), and Enrique III (1390-1406). Pedro I attempted to 
establish a centralized, personal monarchy and was 
defeated by .ti:nrique of Trastarn.ara, his half-brother, 
whose usurpation of the crown of Castile placed the 
Trastamaran family on the throne. Enrique 1 s victory 
represents the triumph of signorial control over the 
personal authority of the monarch, although succeeding 
monarchs attempted to centralize the kingdom's rule. 
In foreign policy the Trastamarans were allieci closely 
to France. 
Aragon 
Pere IV of Aragon (1336-87) lmown as En Pere or 
El Ceremonioso, was a realistic monarch, who attempted 
to improve Aragon•s position in the Iberian peninsula 
by seizing as much of Castile's eastern frontier area as 
possible. During the years of struggle between Pedro I 
and Enrique de Trastamara, En Pere actively collaborated 
with the usurper with the condition that he be rewarded 
with large portions of Castilian territory. This agree-
ment was never fulfilled by Enrique after his accession 
to the throne, but En Pere, due to internal difficulties 
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in Aragon and the threat of France, was in no position to 
use force against his former ally. Whereas the Trastamarans 
were pro-French, En Pere guided Aragon toward a neutral 
position in the Anglo-French struggle. 
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Portugal 
Under Alfonso IV (1325-57) and Pedro I (1357-67), 
Pedro of Castile's grandfather and uncle respectively, 
Portugal maintained amicable relations with Castile. 
Fernando I (1367-83) tried to seize territories from 
Castile's western frontier during the reign of Enrique II, 
but was defeated by the Castilian monarch and forced to 
sign the humiliating peace treaty of Santarem in 1373. 
Relations between Portugal and Castile again became 
strained when Juan I of Castile tried to claim the Portu-
guese throne upon the death of Fernando I in 1383. He was 
opposed by the popular and powerful Maestre D 1Avis, 
Fernando's illegitimate brother, who had himself declared 
king of Portugal in 1385 as Joao I and ruled until his 
death in 1433. After the Castilian defeat at the battle 
of Aljubarrota (1385), peace treaties most unfavorable to 
Castile were signed, their terms extending into the reign 
of Enrique III. 
Navarre 
This small kingdom, under the rule of Carlos II, el 
Malo (1332-1387), and Carlos III, el Noble (1387-1425), 
spent most of its energies in diplomatic intrigue in 
order to avoid being incorporated by the other kingdoms 
of the Iberian peninsula or by France. Navarre was 
regarded as an untrustworthy ally under Carlos II, because 
of the facility with which el }1alo changed sides during 
the wars between Castile and Aragon. However, in spite 
of the uncomplimentary name given to this wily ruler by 
his enemies, he seems to have been popular in Navarre, 
which of all the kingdoms in the peninsula was probably 
the most stable. 
Granada 
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Granada was saved from the Reconquest because of the 
disorders in Castile and Aragon. Pedro I of Castile was 
forced to make treaties with lv.i:ohammed V, and gained a 
trustworthy ally in the Moslem ruler by helping him defeat 
Abu Said, el Rey Bermejo, a usurper who had seized the 
throne of Granada. Peace was maintained between Castile 
and Granada until the end of Enrique Ill's reign, when a 
resurgence of crusading fervor appeared in Castile. This 
was due in part to Christian reaction against a new wave 
of Islam under the domination of the rising Ottoman Empire 
and also to the accession to the throne of Granada of 
Mohammed VII, who abandoned his father's pacifism to preach 
against the Christian rulers. 
England, France and the Hundred Years War 
This name, a misleading one, is the 6eneral title 
giv·en to the series of intermittent wars fought oetween 
~ngland and France from 1337 to 1453. The basic cause for 
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this struggle was Prench resentment against the possession 
by the English of lands in France. Edward Ill of ~ngland 
(1327-77) claimed the French throne when the Capetian male 
line ended in 1328. An important economic factor and the 
one which actually precipitated hostilities was French 
restriction of English wool trade in Flanders. 
At the peace treaty of Bretigny in 1360, ~dward III 
renounced his claim to the French throne and to Normandy, 
but retained full sovereignty over Poitou, Guyenne, 
Gascony and Calais. In general, the English held the upper 
hand at this time. However, the situation reversed itself 
between 1369 and 1380, when the Prench, led by Bertrand du 
Guesclir:~ ejected the ~nglish from all but a string of 
seaports; among those remaining in English hands were 
Bordeaux and Calais. This series of victories was largely 
due to the energy of Charles V, le Sage (1364-1380), who 
had ruled as regent during the captivity of his father, 
Jean (1350-1364), before becoming monarch of France. 
Charles VI (1380-1422) was less successful than his father, 
due to intermittent attacks of insanity which incapacitated 
him for months at a time. 
Castile and the Iberian peninsula were drawn into the 
conflict in 1366, when Enrique de Trastamara invaded Castile 
with Bertrand du Guesclin and the group of mercenary 
soldiers, known as the White Companies, which had pre-
viously been commissioned by Charles V to fight against 
the English. Pedro I sought help from Edward, Prince of 
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Wales, better known as the Black Prince, who was governor 
of English territory in France. Pedro and the Prince routed 
Enrique and the Companies at the Battle of Najera in 1367, 
thus recovering the kingdom of Castile. However, disagree-
ment between the two allies caused the English to withdraw 
their t'orces t'rorn Castile, whereupon .l!:nrique and tt10 
Companies were able to destroy Pedro's forces; Enrique 
eventually killed the monarch himself in 1369. 
Castile, under the Trastamarans, placed itself directly 
in the French camp. English attempts to regain a foothold 
in the Iberian peninsula were led by the Black Prince's 
brother, John of Gaunt, Duke of Lancaster. Lancaster 
married Pedro l's daughter, Constanza, and claimed then 
to be king of Castile. His pretensions to the Castilian 
throne were not very enthusiastically supported by the 
English until the Franco-Castilian alliance completely 
monopolized the trade routes to Flanders. Lancaster made 
a treaty with the Maestre D 1Avis to invade Castile in 
1385, but the Anglo-Portuguese invasion of the following 
year failed because of a plague which decimated the in-
vading troups. The result of this failure was the Treaty 
of Bayonne between Lancaster and Juan I, signed in 1388, 
in which it was agreed that Juan I's first-born son, Enrique, 
marry Catalina, daughter of Lancaster and Constanza. 
The last few years of Juan l's reign and the years of 
Enrique Ill's reign represent a general period of peace 
in all of Europe. Truces signed between Spain and Portugal 




France's control of the Papacy between 1309 and 1377 
has been referred to as the Babylonian Captivity of the 
church, because the Papal capital was removed from. Rome 
and placed in Avignon. Upon the death of Gregory XI in 
1378, one Pope, Urban VI, was elected in Rome, and a rival 
Pope, Clement VII, was elected in France. Thus, the 
Babylonian Captivity evolved into a schism which was to 
split Christendom un ti 1 1417. The .2;ngli sh supported 
Urban VI, while the French backed Clement VII. In spite 
of the attempts of En Pere of Aragon to keep the peninsula 
neutral, all of the Iberian kingdoms eventually followed 
Clement VII. The situation was complicated even further 
by the death of Clement VII in 1394. The Cardinals of 
Avignon agreed to elect an Aragonese Pope, Benedict XIII, 
whom they later tried to remove from the Papacy when he 
insisted on moving the Papal Seat back to Rome. 
By the end of the fourteenth century, Europe was 
exhausted from years of continual warfare. It was hoped 
that a meeting in 1396 between the Black Prince's son, 
Richard II of England (1377-99), and Charles VI of France 
at·calais would form the basis for perpetual peace between 
the two countries, and aid in putting an end to the dis-




PEHO LOPEZ DE AYALA 
Pero L6pez de Ayala (1332-1407) w&s born in Alava, 
the son of a Basque nobleman. His father, Ferrand Perez 
de Ayala, was a loyal vassal of Alfonso XI. He convinced 
his fellow Basque nobles to turn Alava over to Castile, 
served as ambassador to France and Aragon, and was with 
Alfonso XI during the siege of Gibraltar against the Moors, 
during which the Castilian monarch died in 1350. During 
the reign of Pedro I, Ferrand Perez was sent to pacify the 
rebellious nobles of Vizcaya, and accompanied the king to 
Soria to establish a peace treaty with the Aragonese. The 
first evidence of disloyalty to Pedro was in 1354, when 
Ferrand Perez acted as spokesman for the group of rebellious 
nobles who gathered to plead with Pedro I to abandon his 
mistress, Maria de Padilla, and live with his French queen, 
Blanca de Borbon. Ferrand Perez was with Pedro I when the 
king abandoned Burgos in 1366 upon the invasion of Enrique 
and the White Companies. He joined Enrique's forces in 
Toledo in the same year, rejoined Pedro in 1368, then followed 
Enrique after Pedro's death at Montiel in 1369. He died 
in 1385, after spending the last ten years of his life as 
a monk. 1 
Not much is known about Ayala's early upbringing. 
It is supposed that his uncle, Pero Barroso, Cardinal of 
Spain, had a substantial influence in his education. 
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Rafael Floranes believes that Ayala was educated at home, 
but admits that the Cardinal's influence would explain 
the chronicler's inclination to courtly life. 2 Meregalli 
suggests that Ayala spent time in Toledo, where he had 
relatives, and that his translations were a result of his 
contact with this cultural center. He also mentions the 
possible influence of another cultural center, Palencia, 
where Ayala might have spent time in the court of Pedro I.3 
Lozoya mentions the possibility of his having spent some 
years at the Papal court in Avignon with his uncle, learning 
courtly manners, French, Latin and the art of subtle 
reasoning.4 This would explain Ayala's Francophile posi-
tion and pro-Avignon affiliation during the Papal Schism. 
Meregalli rejects this theory, since the Cardinal died in 
1345, when Ayala was only thirteen years old, and because 
Ayala's poor knowledge of Latin does not seem to be in 
accord with an education at the Papal court.5 
The first official record of Ayala comes from his 
own chronicles. In 1353 he, as Doncel of Don Pedro, was 
sent to tell a rebellious noble, Pedro Carrillo, to remove 
the sign of La Orden de la Banda which this knight had 
recieived from Alfonso XI. 6 In 1354, Ayala served as Doncel 
to Pedro's cousin, the Infante Don Ferrando of Aragon.? 
In 1359 Ayala was made captain of Pedro's fleet in Seville, 
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which was being prepared to attack a rebel faction pro-
tected by the king of Aragon. 8 Furtner news of Ayala comes 
in 1360, when, as Alguac i 1 Mayor of rroledo, he was ordered 
to send the Archbishop of Toledo, Don Vasco Ferrandez, into 
exile for suspected treason against the king. 9 It is 
believed that Ayala served Pedro I until the latter left 
Toledo in 1366.10 Although many nobles hated the monarch, 
Ayala was possibly influenced in his antipathy to him by 
an event which touched him more closely; this was the 
scandal caused when the chronicler's niece, Teresa de 
Ayala, gave birth to an illegitimate child which was 
generally believed to be Pedro 1 s. 11 
During Enrique II 1 s reign, Ayala began to climb in 
his political career. At the Cortes of Toro in 1371, 
~nrique II confirmed Ayala's position as Alf~rez Mayor 
del Pendon de la 0rden de la Bancia, a title which Ayala 
had received under the usurper in 1367 before Pedro's 
death. In 1374 Ayala was named Merino of Vitoria, and in 
1375 became Alcalde Mayor of Toledo. Ayala's international 
career began in 1376, when he was sent as ambassador to 
Aragon; in the following year he was ambassador to France. 12 
During the reign of Juan I, Ayala served as ambassador 
to both France and Portugal. he was sent by the king to 
Nuno Alvarez Pereyra, Constable of Portugal, in order to 
attempt a settlement of differences between Castile and 
Portugal. He failed in this effort to preserve peace, and 
was consequently taken prisoner after the Portubuese vie-
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tory at the Battle of Aljubarrota in 1385. He was 
probably in prison until 1388, since he did not reappear 
at the Castilian court until the beginning of 1389. 1 3 
The chronicler's detailed description of the Cortes of 
Guadalajara in 1390 indicates his presence there as one 
of the king's advisers. He was obviously one of those 
opposed to Juan I's Quixotic plan of giving up the crown 
of Castile for the whim of becoming king of Portuga1. 14 
Under Enrique III, Ayala fought for a council of 
regency rather than individual regents and tutors, and 
was one of the youthful king's first advisers. In 1392 
he was again ambassador to Portugal, and in 1394 took part 
in the renewal of alliances with France. The extensive 
report of the Papal dispute in 1395 indicates Ayala's 
presence at Avignon, while the isolated chapter of the 
meetings between Richard II of England and Charles VI of 
France at Calais in 1396, described in great detail, in-
dicate his presence there also. By the middle of 1399 
Ayala was Canciller Mayor of Castile, a position which 
he held until his death in 1407.1 5 
The most complete description of Ayala can be found 
in Fernan Perez de Guzman's Generaciones Semblanzas: 
"Fue este don Pero L6pez de Ayala alto de cuerpo e delgado 
e de buena persona •••• Fue de muy dul9e condi9ion e de 
buena conversa9i6n e de grant con9ien9ia, e que temia 
mucho a Dios. Am6 mucho la 9ien9ia, di6se mucho a los 
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libros e estorias, tanto que coma quier que el fuese 
asaz cavallero e de grant discre9i6n en la platica del 
mundo, pero naturalmente fue muy inclinado a las 9ien9ias 
econ esto grant parte del tiempo ocupava en el ler e 
estudiar, non obras de derecho sinon filosofia e 
estorias •••• Am6 mucho mugeres, masque a tan sabio 
cavallero come else convenia. 1116 
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CHAPTER III 
LA CRONICA DEL BEY DON PEDRO I 
Many writers have been interested in Pedro I of 
Castile, and have had to base most of their research on 
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the chronicles of Pero Lopez de Ayala, whether they were 
attacking or defending Ayala's viewpoint. Other Castilian 
sources are very scanty, while Aragonese, French and Italian 
sources have a distinct anti-Pedro bias. The basic 
problem which concerns us here is the degree of objectivity 
with which Ayala recorded the events of Pedro's reign. 
After presenting the facts in a cold, withdrawn style, 
Ayala still leaves the reader with the impression that 
Pedro I was a cruel and unjust tyrant, defeated at last 
by God through the instrument of his illegitimate brotner, 
Enrique. Is his attitude toward Pedro a reasonable one, or 
is it a result of the fact that Ayala himself defected in 
1J66 to Enrique and therefore was rationalizing his own 
actions? Was Ayala guilty of subjectivity by omission? 
To answer these questions one must study Pedro's family 
relationships, his relationship to those in his realm and 
finally his relationship to those countries involved in 
Castilian politics during his reign. 
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Pedro I and his Family 
First we will take up the question of Pedro's family, 
which consisted of Dona Maria de Portugal, Pedro's mother; 
Dona Leonor de Guzman, Pedro's step-mother, and her 
illegitimate sons, known as the Trastamarans; Dofia Leonor 
de Castilla, Pedro's aunt, and her sons, the Infantes de 
Aragon; and finally, Pedro's French wife, Dofia Blanca de 
Borb6n. 
Pedro's mother, Dona Maria de Portugal, daughter of 
Alfonso IV of Portugal, and wife of Alfonso XI of Castile, 
seems to have been a reasonably good mother and queen; 
she gave Pedro a careful education, witn works such as 
Guido de Colonna•s famous De Regimine Principwn as his 
guide. Juan Alfonso de Alburquerque, a Portuguese noble-
man and relative of the queen, was young Pedro's tutor and 
later chief adviser. There is no evidence that Dona Maria 
was a particularly cruel person, even though some writers 
suggest that Pedro was tutored in cruelty by her. 1 Ayala 
censors only her responsibility in the assassination of 
Leonor de Guzman, Alfonso's mistress. Ayala goes so far 
as to say that this event was one of the principal causes 
of so many wars: " ••. Ca mucho mal y mucha guerra nascio 
en Castilla por esta razon. 112 Ayala later shows the queen 
in the role of oeing merciful when she tries to warn a 
nobleman against certain death at her son's hands.3 
However, Pedro's mother allied herself to the Trastamarans 
16 
against her own son, when they had Pedro virtually imprisoned 
in order to force him to return to his wife, so as to gain 
more important positions in the government of Castile for 
themselves. Though Ayala moralizes about many things 
throughout the chronicles, he makes no comment about this 
strange alliance, nor of the fact that Pedro took no re-
venge on his mother, but rather granted her request to go 
back to Portugal. 
The greatest problem in Pedro's reign was created by 
Alfonso XI 1 s mistress, Dona Leonor de Guzman, and her il-
legitimate children, Enrique, Fadrique, Tello, Juana, Juan 
and Pedro, known as the Trastamaran family. Dona Leonor 
was responsible for stirring up trouble immediately after 
Alfonso's death, by entering her city of Medina Sidonia 
instead of continuing with Alfonso's body to Seville, where 
young King Pedro was waiting. This act put everyone on the 
defensive, including Pedro's adviser Juan Alfonso de Al-
burquerque, who then wanted to arrest her sons, until 
seeing what steps she would take. Ayala defends the theory 
that she entered Medina Sidonia only to replace Alfonso 
Ferrandez Coronel, a nobleman who held that fortress in her 
name and who wanted to be relieved of this duty.4 Whether 
she was preparing some sort of conspiracy or not is not 
known, but it seems more probably than Ayala would h~ve us 
believe. In any event, Dona Leonor was disposed of by 
Pedro's mother on the advice of Alburquerque, after Leonor 
had her son Enrique consummate a marriage with Dona Juana 
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Manuel, his betrothed, in order to prevent Alburquerque•s 
plan of marrying her to Pedro. 
Enrique de Trastarnara was Pedro's principal enemy 
from the time of Alfonso XI's death in 1350 to Pedro's 
death at Enrique's hands in 1369. Ayala presents Pedro's 
illegitimate brother as the one chosen by God to rid 
Castile of a brutal tyrant. To present Enrique in a good 
light without deliberately falsifying the facts, Ayala 
uses a clever method. He minimizes Enrique's crimes either 
by describing them briefly, or else he rationalizes 
Enrique's behavior. A good example of the technique of 
rationalization is the description of the slaughter of 
1,200 Jews in Toledo in 1355. Ayala states: Eel conde 
[i.e. Enrique] eel Maestre, desque entraron en la cibdad, 
asosegaron en sus posadas; pero las sus companas comenzaron 
a robar una juderia apartada que dicen el Alcana, e ro-
baronla, e mataron los Judios que fallaron fasta mile 
docientas personas, omes e mugeres, grandes e pequenos. 11 5 
Here Enrique is obviously not responsible for the actions 
of his men. On the other hand, Pedro's crimes, such as 
the assassination of his half-brother, Fadrique, are des-
cribed in most vivid and graphic terms. If we carefully 
follow Enrique's steps throughout Ayala's chronicle, we can 
see that the king had a most forgiving spirit. Enrique 
betrayed his brother at least five times: in 1350, when 
Enrique attempted to subdue the city of Algeciras immediately 
after his father's death; in 1352, when Enrique rebelled 
18 
against Pedro in Gij6n, after Alfonso IV of Portugal had 
convinced Pedro to permit his half-brotner to return to 
Asturias; in 1353, when ~nrique and Tello arrived at 
Pedro's wedding in Valladolid armed for war; in 1354, when 
Enrique made an agreement with the now out-of-favor 
Alburquerque to hand over the throne of Castile to the 
Infante Don Pedro of Portugal (a plan thwarted by Alfonso 
IV); and in 1354, when the Trastamarans, Pedro's mother, 
the Infantes de Aragon and their mother, Dofia Leonor de 
Castilla, literally imprisoned Pedro to force him to re-
turn to his queen, Dofia Blanca, and to remove his advisers, 
who were relatives of his mistress, Maria de Padilla. Even 
though this eliminated any possibility of reconciliation 
between Pedro and Enrique, Pedro later gave his brother a 
safe conduct pass to go to France. Ayala asserts that 
Pedro ordered him arrested, but there is no proof of this. 6 
It seems reasonable that Pedro was only too happy to be 
rid of his troublesome brother. 
Thus, Ayala's chronicles alone, while minimizing 
Enrique's behavior, give ample proof that he was a traitor 
to Castile and his king. Ayala's asser~ion that Enrique's 
earlier belligerent acts were due only to dislike and re-
sentment against Alburquerque seems unreasonable when one 
considers the alliance between the former enemies, after 
Alburquerque had fallen out of favor. Furtner evidence 
of Enrique's treasonable acts, can be found in the Archive 
de la Corona.de Aragon. Two examples might be mentioned; 
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one is "El Tratado de Pina," of January 20, 1357, in 
which Enrique offered to serve the King of Aragon instead 
of Pedro in exchange for towns which had belonged to the 
Infantes de Aragon and their mother; the other is "El 
Tratado de Monz6n" of March 31, 1363, in which Enrique 
promised to give the King of Aragon one-sixth of Castilian 
territory in exchange for the latter's aid in securing the 
throne of Castile for him. This agreement was nullified 
when a peace treaty was signed between Castile and Aragon 
in July, 1363.7 
The culmination of Enrique's treason was the bringing 
of the White Companies into Castile in 1366. Jean Froissart, 
a completely biased, anti-Pedro historian, described the 
men who were supposed to liberate Castile from Pedro as 
follows: "Encores avoit adonc en France grant fuison de 
pillaurs angles, gascons et alemans, qui voloient, ce 
disoiant, vivre, et y tenoient des fortereces et des 
garnisons .•. Quant li papes Innocens VIe at li colleges 
de Rornme se veirent ensi vexe et guerriiet par ces maleoites 
gens, si an furent durement esbahi et ordonnerent une 
croiserie sus ces mauvais crestiiens qui se mettoient en 
painne de destruira crestiannete, ensi comme les Wandeles 
fisent jadis, sans title de nulle raison, et gastoient 
taus le pays ou il conv~rsoient sans cause, et roboient 
sans deport quanqu'il pooiant trouver, et violoient fern.mes 
viallas et jones sans pite, et tuoient hommes et femmes 
et enfans sans merci qui rien ne leur avoient mefait ••• 
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Si fisent li papas et li cardinal sennonner de le crois 
partout publikement, et absoloient de painne et de coupe 
tous chiaus qui prendoient le crois et qui s 1abandonnoient 
de corps et de volunte pour destruire celle mauvaise gent 
et leur compagnie. 118 Ayala's description of the Com-
panies is limited to mentioning that the King of Aragon 
had sent for them and that they entered Castile with 
Enrique.9 ~yala could hardly justify Enrique's role in 
Castilian history if he were to describe such men as his 
country's saviors. 
Enrique's twin brother Fadrique was designated by 
Alfonso XI to be Maestre de Santiago. In 1351 he attacked 
Algeciras with Enrique and was pardoned, whereupon he re-
tired to his possessions in Santiago. There is no mention 
of his presence at the Cortes of Valladolid held in 1351, 
nor did he take part in the uprising of Enrique at Gij6n 
in 1352. He did not attend the wedding of Pedro and Dofia 
Blanca as did his brothers Enrique and Tello. He re-
appeared in 1354 to conspire with Enrique in order to 
put the Infante Don Pedro of Portugal on the Gastilian 
throne. He was also present when Pedro was arrested at 
Toro, where, however, he had a reconciliation with Pedro 
and thereafter no more dealings with Enrique. 10 On May 29, 
1358, Fadrique was brutally assassinated by order of Pedro, 
though there was no evidence of his being involved in any 
acts of conspiracy against his king. The question is why? 
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There are several possibilities, which are incon-
clusive but interesting to explore. One is the rat.her 
Tristanesque story of Fadrique and Pedro's bride-to-be, 
Dona Blanca de Borb6n. Ballads and histories have been 
written suggesting that Fadrique went to France to bring 
Blanca back to Valladolid and tnat he had relations with 
her during the journey. 
11 .Sntre la gente se dice, 
Mas no por cosa sabida, 
Que la reina Dona Blanca 
Del Maestre esta parida. 1111 
This would perhaps explain why Pedro abruptly abandoned 
his bride almost immediately after their marriage and re-
fused to have anything to do with her thereafter. Bases 
for this story are the following: Fadrique could pos-
sibly have been among those who went to bring the queen, 
since there is no news of him between December 3, 1362 and 
February 25, 1363, the period of her journey to Spain; 
Fadrique later recognized his son, Alonso Enriquez, with-
out naming his mother, though he had named other women in 
similar circurnstances; 12 Fadrique did not attend the 
wedding of Pedro and Blanca as did his brothers. Bases to 
refute this possibility are the following: Pedro received 
Fadrique affectionately on July 29, 1354, which would be 
improbable if he suspected nis brother of such a be-
traya1f3; According to P~rez de Guzman 1 s Generaciones y 
Semblanzas, Alonso ~nriquez died in 1429 at tne age of 75, 
which means that the illegitimate child was born more than 
a year after Blanca 1 s arrival in Castile. 14 To contra-
diet Sitges' theory against the story of Fadrique and 
Blanca, one might mention the possibility of error 
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(perhaps intentional) in the calculation of Alonso Enriquez' 
age. In addition, the fact that Pedro received Fadrique 
affectionately is no proof, since he also received him 
affectionately before having him killed: 11 e el Hey le 
rescivi6 con buena voluntad que le mostr6 ••• " 15 
Ayala does not mention the Fadrique-Blanca affair at 
all, and gives no reason for tne murder of Fadrique. 'rhe 
description of Fadrique's death is long and blood-curdling, 
and is obviously told in such detail to show Pedro's 
brutal nature. A plausible reason for Pedro's seemingly 
treacherous act is the fact that Fadrique represented a 
constant threat to the stability of Pedro, who did not 
trust his bastard brother in any contest between him and 
Enrique. To Pedro, such a powerful knight as Fadrique on 
Castilian soil must have been a constant threat. 
One need not go to too much trouble to defend Pedro's 
desire to be rid of another of his bastard half-brothers, 
Don Tello. Even Ayala shows Tello to be a cowardly and 
untrustworthy figure. He subserviently offered himself 
to serve Pedro immediately after his own mother's death, 
saying, "Senor, y no he otro padre, nin otra rnadre salvo 
a la vuestra merced. 1116 In 1352, he robbed some Castilian 
merchants and tnen defected to Pere III el Ceremonioso 
of Aragon. In 1353, after a reconciliation with Pedro, 
he attended Pedro's wedding along with Enrique, prepared 
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for war, and was with tne conspirators at Toro. Tello 1 s 
cowardice was reflected in the Battle of Najera in 1366, 
from whic.n he and his men fled, abandoning ~nrique to his 
fate. He died in 1370, according to Ayala, possibly 
poisoned by his own brother, Enrique. 1 7 
Pedro's youngest half-brothers, Juan (age 19) and 
Pedro (age 14), were both assassinated by order of Pedro 
in 1359 after he suffered a serious defeat by the Aragonese 
and Enrique at the Battle of Araviana. Since they were 
children, Juan and Pedro certainly had committed no crime 
against their king; they were, however, unfortunate victims 
of their own brothers' treachery. By 1359, Pedro had 
pardoned the guilty too often; he could not afford to be 
merciful to the innocent, who were, after all, Trasta-
marans. It is certainly true, as Ayala suggests, that these 
deaths came as revenge for a defeat, in which Ferrandez 
de Henestrosa, one of Pedro's most faithful vassals, was 
killed.lB 
Next to the Trastamarans, Dona Leonor de Castilla 
and her sons, the Infantes Don Fernando and Don Juan, 
came to represent the second major threat to Pedro•s throne. 
Dona Leonor was Pedro's aunt, sister of Alfonso XI. She 
was the second wife of the Aragonese king Alfonso IV, and 
was therefore forced to seek refuge in Castile upon the 
accession of her step-son, Pere III el Ceremonioso to the 
Aragonese throne. Pedro's desire to do away with all three 
stems from the following reasons. As Infante, Fernando 
was the heir to the Castilian throne; possibly ne would 
like to have assassinated Pedro before he had a male 
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heir. All three were involved in the Toro conspiracy. 
Pedro had knowledge that the Infantes had been dealing with 
the King of Aragon since 1355. 'l'here is evidence of a 
letter from the King of Aragon to Pedro insinuatin 6 that 
Leonor and her sons were plotting his death. 19 Juan, who 
had offered to murder Fadrique personally, was himself 
murdered on Pedro's order in Bilbao in 1358. 20 Dona 
Leonor was murdered in 1359 after a long imprisoruaent. 21 
Fernando, who returned to Aragon after the murder of his 
relatives, was finally killed on the order of the King of 
Aragon in 1363. The opportunism of all three shows 
clearly through Ayala's chronicle. 
One of the most intriguing problems of Pedro's 
reign was his treatment of his French wife, Dona Blanca 
de Borb6n. The wedding between the daughter of the Duke 
of Bourbon and Pedro of Castile in 1353 was the result of 
Alburquerque's attempt to cement a French-Castilian alliance. 
Pedro abandoned his new bride two days after the wedding, 
and refused steadfastly thereafter to live with her as 
husband and wife. It is true that he fell in love with 
Maria de Padilla between the time of the first negotia-
tions and the wedding; however, it is unlikely that his 
love for his mistress could have interfered with this 
marriage. If this had been the case, he probably would 
have refused to participate in the wedding in the first 
place. Physical repugnance can hardly have been a factor, 
since Ayala describes her as a very handsome woman.22 
Sitges proposed the hypothesis that after ti1e wedding 
Pedro learned something from his bride which infuriated 
him to such an extent that he refused to stay witn her. 
He refutes the popular legent of the involvement of 
Blanca with Don Fadrique and attributes Pedro's wrath 
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to the question of money and honor--perhaps that Jean II 
of France could not and would not pay the dowry which he 
had promised. 2 3 Whatever it wss that Pedro found out 
about Blanca, it must have been fairly serious, if he was 
willing to jeopardize his position with the already 
troublesome nobles and undergo excommunication because of 
her. 
Ayala offers no explanation for Pedro's attitude, 
and is obviously a supporter or' the conspirators' attempt 
to force Pedro to return to his bride. Dona Blanca became 
t11e banner around whicn the rebellious nobles rallied to 
oppose the influence of the Padilla family, who had replaced 
Alburquerque as Pedro's advisers. Pedro finally had Dona 
Blanca poisoned in 1361 after a long imprisonment. Ayala 
mentions the dismay of many Castilian vassals at Pedro's 
action. From a practical point of view, however, her 
death was necessary so that Pedro could either marry some-
one else and have children by her or so that he could declare 
Maria de Padilla his wife and thus make her children 
legitimate heirs to the throne. If there was some reason 
which kept him from living with his wife, then he had to 
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get rid of her altogether. 
Pedro I and the Nobles 
~n addition to the difficulties within his own 
family, Pedro I was plagued by rebellions from other 
sectors of the nobility, such as the powerful Lara and 
Manuel families. Tnese continued. to resist royal 
hegenomy under the new young king as they had done under 
his father, Alfonso XI. 
Even before the assassination of Leonor de GuzmAn, 
many nobles were supporting Juan Nunez de Lara, who was 
a pretender to the Castilian throne. This problem came 
to a head in 1350 during a serious illness to which 
Pedro nearly succwnbed. The nobility divided into those 
who supported Pedro's cousin, the Infante Don Ferrando 
of Aragon, and those who supported Juan Nunez de Larao 
Pedro I's privado, Alburquerque, supported Ferrando and 
viewed those who opposed his will as potential enemies. 
Two of the most important nobles who supported Juan Nunez 
were Garci Laso de la Vega and Alfonso Ferrandez Coronel. 
Garci Laso, who held tne position of Adelantado de Castilla, 
had also been responsible for rebellion against Pedro in 
Burgos, and was killed on Alburquerque's advice in 1351. 
Alfonso Ferrandez Coronel, Cepero under Alfonso XI and 
Pedro I, began rebelling against Pedro in Andalusia and 
was finally killed in 1353. 
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The situation of Pedro and Dona Blanca eventually 
gave rise to the downfall of ,Uburquerque, w.t10 wanted to 
force Pedro to return to his wife. Alburquerque, realizing 
his precarious position and seeing his influence threatened 
by the relatives of Pedro's mistress, fled to Portugal 
and there allied himself to his former enemies, the 
Trastamarans, in order to hand tne Castilian throne to 
the Infante Don Pedro of Portugal. When this plan failed, 
the conspirators took up the banner of Dona Blanca and 
were joined by many other nobles who were distressed by 
Pedro's treatment of his wife. Ayala emphasizes the in-
justice being done to Dona Blanca, but also admits that the 
nobles were also concerned with the fact that Pedro had 
put some of the Padilla family in positions of power. 
Ayala stresses this tr1roughout ti:J.e chronicle, but to all 
appearances only three members of this family had positions 
of any great importance--Juan Ferrandez de Henestrosa, 
Diego Garcia de Padilla and Juan Garcia de Villagera. 
The same nobles who had criticized and resented the in-
fluence of Alburquerque now joined with him to protest 
against the Padilla regime. Obviously all were seeking more 
for themselves and were using Pedro's wife as an excuse. 
Though this protest began as a meeting at Tejadilla 
in 1354, in which fifty knights representing Pedro and 
fifty representing the defenders of Blanca were to meet, 
Pedro was eventu.ally taken prisoner at a town called Toro, 
whereupon the rebellious vassals demanded that he banish 
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Maria de Padilla from Castile, return to Dona Blanca and 
accept their conditions for governing the kingdom. Pedro 
never forgot nor forgave this outrage to his dignity as 
a sovereign. As a good diplomat, however, he began bar-
gaining secretly with various nobles, promising them 
offices and lands. Many, lured by greed, promptly gave 
up their gallant defense of Dona Blanca and returned to 
Pedro's side. Pedro was not grateful to those nobles who 
returned to him, since these had been won over only by 
their desires for profit, not out of loyalty to their 
sovereign. In fact, the first two nobles to reap Pedro's 
harsh vengeance were precisely those who had gone oack to 
his service: Pero Ruiz de Villegas and Sancho Ruiz de 
Rojas. Pero Ruiz de Villegas had been Don Tello's Mayor-
domo Mayor and as such had committed treasonable acts 
against his king as early as 1351. Ayala even mentions 
his responsibility in influencing Enrique and Tello to 
appear at Pedro's wedding in Valladolid armed for war. He 
was involved in the plan to dethrone Pedro in 1354, and 
was present on the conspirators' side at the meeting in 
Tejadillo. His condition for returning to Pedro at Toro was 
his being named Adelantado Mayor of Castile, a post which 
already belonged to Garci Ferrandez Manrique. It is little 
wonder, then, that Pedro took the first opportunity to rid 
himself of such an untrustworthy subject, whicn he did by 
having him murdered during his siesta at Medina del Campo. 
Sancho Ruiz de Rojas was also killed at Medina del Campo. 
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Ayala only mentions him otherwise as having been with the 
conspirators at Tejadilla. 
After her son's escape, Pedro's mother remained at 
Toro with Fadrique and several nobles. The king returned 
and besieged Toro, which was finally forced to surrender, 
especially after Fadrique's defection to the king. Pedro 
spared his mother's life, although sne had allied herself 
with his half-brothers; he was not so generous with her 
followers, all of whom were executed. 
Another important noble whom Pedro was well rid of was 
Don Juan de la Cerda. He sought to defend Alfonso Ferrandez 
Coronel in 1353 by bringing in troops from Granada and 
Morocco, and conspired against Pedro witn the Trastamarans 
at Toro, but returned to Pedro's side in exchange for the 
fortress of Gibrali6n. He and Alvar Perez de Guzman 
left their posts as fronteros in Aragon, because Pedro 
supposedly wanted to seduce Aldonza Coronel, Alvar Perez' 
wife and Juan de la Gerda's sister-in-law. Juan de la 
Cerda then began stirring up trouble in Andalusia and was 
killed in 1357 after his defeat in a battle with Micer 
Gil Bocanegra and Juan Ponce de Leon, who were in the ser-
vice of the king. 
The Civil War between the Trastarnarans and Pedro began 
in earnest after Pedro's escape from Toro. In general, 
Pedro maintained the upper hand and was implacable in his 
justice against those who aided his enemies. The nobles 
who helped Enrique's abortive attempt to take Toledo and 
who then surrendered to Pedro were immediately put to 
death. Although Fadrique returned to Pedro's service 
after Toro, Pedro gave no respite to his followers. 
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It is evident that Pedro had not forgiven his half-brother's 
actions and was only biding time to take revenge on him 
also. 
One example might serve to corroborate Pedro's 
fierce impiacability and distrust of anyone wno had once 
betrayed him. Martin Abarca, one of the vassals of Pedro's 
mother, was with the nobles who were killed after her 
surrender at Toro. In order to save his own life, Martin 
Abarca came out holding Don Juan, Pedro's Trastamaran 
half-brother. When Pedro threatened to kill him anyway 
if he came out, Martin Abarca bravely approached Pedro and 
offered him his life. Pedro was impressed with his valor, 
and consequently spared nim. One year later, Martin 
Abarca was holding castles for the King of Aragon in the 
war between Aragon and Castile. Pedro captured tne Ara-
gonese fortress of Tarazana in 1358 and this time nad 
Martin Abarca put to death. 
The fact that wives and families had to suffer the 
consequences of their husbands' actions was not only a 
proof of Pedro's particular justice, but a practice common 
to the times. Pedro's victims were Juana Nunez de Lara, 
Don Tello's wife, who was killed in 1359, and Isabel de 
Lara, the wife of Don Juan de Arag6n, who was killed in 
1361. 
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The invasion of Castile by Enrique de Trastamara 
and his followers in 1J60 was the cause of a substantial 
increase in political assassinations ordered by Pedro. 
The only really innocent victim of the king's wrath was 
a Dominican monk who sought out tne king to warn him 
against Enrique, because he had had a vision in which 
Santo Domingo de la Calzada predicted Pedro's death at the 
hands of ~is half-brother. Pedro, who, according to Ayala, 
had a very superstitious nature, believed that Enrique 
had sent the monk to frighten him, and therefore had the 
unfortunate man burned to death. All others killed were 
followers of Enrique. 
Another group of political murders which took place 
in 1360 came about as the result of an exchange of nobles 
between Pedro of Castile and Pedro of Portugal. This was 
a rather infamous but convenient agreement by which each 
monarch got rid of several troublesome subjects. One of 
those handed over to the king of Castile was Pero Nunez 
de Guzm~n, Adelantado Mayor de Leon, who in 1359 had 
earned Pedro's enmity by abandoning his post at the 
Aragonese border after the Battle of Araviana, in which 
Pedro's forces were badly defeated. Pedro Nunez escaped 
to Portugal, where he remained until the exchange of 
refugees caught him off-guard. Ayala calls his execution 
in Sevilla too brutal to describe - "e la manera de su 
muerte seria asaz fee e crua de contar. 1124 
32 
Two rather isolated cases of murder in 1360 are that 
of Simuel Levi and that of Gutier Ferrandez de Toledo. 
Both seem to have been loyal followers of Pedro without 
any record of betrayal. Simuel Levi, a Jew, was made 
treasurer of Castile under Alburquerque 1s regime and served 
Pedro in this capacity until his death. He had helped 
increase the treasure of the realm and seemed to be one of 
the king's most loyal vassals. Suddenly Pedro had him 
and all the members of his family throughout Castile ar-
rested. Simuel Levi was tortured, so that Pedro could find 
out if he had any more money hidden away, and died from 
his tortures. His death is hard to justify, unless one can 
change it to Pedro's lack of trust in anyone at this point 
and his need for funds to finance the war against Aragon. 
Though Ayala gives no further explanation of Pedro's actions, 
it is logical to assume that Pedro suspec.ted his treasurer 
of embezzling funds and therefore had him tortured to find 
out where they were. 
The case of Gutier Ferrandez de Toledo is more moving 
in Ayala's account, because of a letter which Gutier Ferran-
dez wrote protesting his innocence and warning Pedro 
against murdering his loyal subjects. Gutier Ferrandez 
had been one of Pedro's most faithful servants since 1350, 
without any evidence of treason. He was Pedro's Guarda 
Mayor in 1350 and was in charge of the force sent to Alge-
ciras to put down the insurrection led by Enrique there. 
In 1354 he held the post of Alcalde Mayor of Toledo and as 
33 
such was witi1 Pedro at Tejadillo. He was later promoted 
to Repostero Mayor. In 1360 Pedro sent him to Tudela for 
peace talks between Aragon and Castile, which were being 
arranged by the Papal Legate, the Cardinal of Bolo 6na. 
Ayala asserts that Gutier F'errandez, seeing that peace 
talks were not going well, tried to bribe Don Ferrando, 
Infante de Aragon, to return to Pedro, which Don Perrando 
refused to do. Pedro learned of these secret meetings 
between Don Ferrando and Gutier Ferrandez and immediately 
suspected the latter of treason. He therefore had him 
killed. 
The years between 1360 and 1366 represent Pedro's 
struggle to retain the Castilian crown against the forces 
of Enrique, intermittent wars with Aragon, and the re-
solving of the Civil War in Granada to Pedro's satisfaction. 
He was successful in all endeavors until 1366, when Bnrique 
invaded Castile for the second time witn the White Companies, 
whereupon Pedro was forced to flee from his kingdom. 
The last series of political murders ordered by Pedro 
took place in 1367 after his smashing victory witn the 
Prince of Wales over Enrique at the Battle of Najera. 
Pedro had taken many prisoners and would probably have had 
them all put to death were it not for the influence of the 
Black Prince, who had a high sense of chivalric behavior. 
Those nobles who were spared and ransomed (such as L6pez de 
Ayala) later aided in Pedro's downfall and eventual death. 
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Foreign Policy 
Besides studying Pedro's relationship witn his family 
and vassals, one must examine his relationship to those 
countries involved in Castilian politics during his reign. 
Pedro's foreign policy differed from that of his father, 
Alfonso XI, in that there was less emphasis on continuing 
the fight against the Moors in Granada and a more belligerent 
policy toward the kingdom of Aragon. This change, however, 
came about as the result of the internal situation in 
Castile in which Aragon supported the nobles who fled from 
Pedro. The principal powers involved in Castilian affairs 
during Pedro's reign were Granada, Portugal, Aragon, 
Navarre, France, England and the Papacy. Using Ayala as 
the basic source, we shall attempt to analyze Pedro's 
major decisions and Ayala's view of them. 
Granada 
The kingdom of Granada was undoubtedly saved from 
reconquest by the death of Alfonso XI, who was waging a 
vigorous campaign for Gibraltar after having conquered 
Algeciras. Pedro, on the other hand, became too enmeshed 
in his own kingdom's internal struggles to be able to 
dedicate his efforts in the direction taken by his father. 
Pedro had signed a peace treaty with Mo.hammed, King of 
Granada, who was overthrown in 1359 by his younger brother 
Ismael. In 1360 Ismael's adviser, Abu Said, known as 
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the Rey Bermejo, took over the throne after having Ismael 
assassinated. He made an alliance with Aragon, an act 
which incurred Pedro's wrath, since Pedro's policy had 
always been specifically aimed at avoiding being caught 
with an enemy on two frontiers. Pedro then actively took 
part in aiding Mohammed to regain the throne of Granada. 
Ayala describes Pedro's alliance with Mohammed, their 
cooperative efforts in Granada, and finally the assassina-
tion of Abu Said in cold blood by Pedro's order. The 
circumstances of this assassination were tr1e following: 
Diego Garcia de Padilla, Maestre de Calatrava, had been 
taken prisoner by Abu Said in the wars with Granada, and 
was not only freed without ransom, but was given gifts 
to take back to Pedro. Later, Abu Said, in a daring move, 
went to Pedro personally, bearing jewels and rich gifts 
in order to render homage to him. Pedro, according to 
Ayala, was overcome by greed and had Abu Said killed for 
the jewels. This, of course, is absurd, since the jewels 
were destined ~or him anyway. Ayala also mentions Pedro's 
desire for revenge because of Abu Said's alliance with 
Aragon, an alliance which forced Pedro to seek peace with 
Aragon at a time when he was winning the war (1361). This 
reason is the more probable one. In any case, Ayala con-
siders the act barbaric and unchivalrous. Pedro had to 
make a choice between three alternatives: betraying 
Mohammed and making an alliance with Abu Said; remaining 
an ally of Mohammed, but permitting Abu Said to leave in 
peace, whereupon the Civil War in Granada would have 
continued; and murdering Abu Said, .whereupon Mohammed 
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could rule in peace. Pedro's choice reestablished Mohammed 
as monarch in Granada, thereby assuring Pedro a loyal 
ally on his southern frontier. He could now dedicate his 
efforts to the Aragonese wars and his own internal political 
and family problems. Ayala in this case lets his personal 
opinion and medieval admiration for chivalric behavior 
cloud his good political sense. 
Portugal 
Due to family ties, Portugal was basically an ally of 
Castile during Pedro's reign. Alfonso IV of Portugal, 
Pedro's maternal grandfather, remained neutral during the 
conflict between Pedro and Alburquerque although he did 
prevent his son, the Infante Don Pedro, from accepting the 
Castilian crown offered to him by the Trastamarans and 
Alburquerque in 1354. The same Infante Don Pedro became 
Pedro I of Portugal in 1357; as king he maintained friendly 
relations with Pedro of Castile, in spite of the former 
conspiracy against him. Their alliance led to an exchange 
of prisoners in 1360, whereby Pedro of Castile handed over 
the assassins of his former mistress, Ines de Castro, in 
exchange for several Castilian nobles who had rebelled 
against him. Relations were further cemented in 1363, 
when the king of Aragon had his half-brother, the Infante 
Don Ferrando of Aragon, killed. (Ferrando's wife was 
Dofia Maria, daughter of Pedro of Portu~al.) PortuGal 
thereafter aided Castile with ships and troops for the 
wars against Aragon and even against the supporters of 
Enrique. However, when Pedro of Castile was forced to 
flee in 1366, the King of Portugal refused him asylum 
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and renounced the proposed marriage between his son, 
Fernando, and Pedro of Castile's daughter, Beatriz. Ayala 
reports the Portuguese-Castilian alliance wit.n complete 
detachment and objectivity. He has no comment to make 
about the fact that the Castilians wanted to hand over the 
throne of Castile to a foreign monarch, nor about the in-
famous alliance between Alburquerque and the Trastamarans, 
and alliance whicn existed despite the fact that Alburquer-
que had Dofia Leonor de Guzman killed. Ayala does not 
moralize in cases in which Enrique is to be censured. 
Aragon 
King Pedro III el Ceremonioso ruled Aragon from 1336 
to 1387, from long before to long after the reign of Pedro I 
of Castile. His principal problems were the struggle 
with his ambitious step-mother, Leonor of Castile, and her 
sons, the Infantes Ferrando and Juan; the conquest of 
Mallorca; the fight with those in favor of an Aragonese 
union; the wars with Corsica and Sardinia; and the wars 
with Castile. 
Ayala mentions the principal cause of the war with 
Castile as being the 11 Perell6s" incident in 1356, when ten 
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ships from Catalonia under the command of Mosen J:t'rances 
de Perell6s took olive oil from ships bound for Alexandria, 
stating that it had belonged to the Genoese, enemies of 
Catalonia. Pedro sent word that the goods should not be 
touched or he would have all Catalonian merchants in 
Seville arrested and their possessions confiscated. Never-
theless Perell6s confiscated and later sold the goods, 
and sailed off to France. 25 Pedro's advisers, in order 
to regain his esteem, urged Pedro to take a belligerent 
stand, and to demand that Perell6s be handed over to him; 
if not, he should declare war. Ayala's report and judgment 
of the matter are reflected in tne following words: "E el 
Rey lo fizo asi segund le consejaron; ca el Rey era 
mancebo en edad de veinte e tres anos, e era ome de grand 
corazon e de grand bollicio, e amaba siempre guerras, e 
crey6 a los que le consejaron esto. 11 26 Pedro sent an 
alcalde from his court to Aragon to demand the delivery 
of Perell6s and also to demand that the encomienda of 
Alcaniz of the Order of Calatrava be given to Castile, 
since Pedro was not content with the fact that Pero Moniz 
de Godoy, a rebellious Castilian nobleman should be in 
charge as Comendador of this territory. 27 The king of 
Aragon answered that justice would be done to Perell6s 
when he returned to Aragon, and that the Encomienda would 
be handed over to Castile as soon as something else could 
be given to Godoy.28 The attitude of El Ceremonioso as 
presented in Ayala is most conciliatory, and from this 
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chronicle one would have to place tne entire bli:ime for the 
conflict on Pedro's intransigence and desire for war. 
Ger6nimo Zurita, the important Aragonese chronicler of 
the early 17th century and one of Spain's most objective 
historians, offers some information which Ayala nee;lected 
to mention and which is doubly valid, due to the fact of 
Zurita 1 s naturally pro-Aragonese stand. Zurita mentions 
the following additional causes of' the war. There was 
a deep hatred between the two kings, because each protected 
dissident members of the other's family: Pedro of Castile 
protected his aunt and cousins, Leonor of Castile and the 
Infantes Juan and Ferrando of Aragon; ~n Pere of Aragon 
protected the Trastamarans and other rebellious Castilian 
nobles. After Pedro's escape from Toro in 1354, he made an 
agreement with Ferrando by which Ferrando's castles of 
Orihuela and Alicante and other possessions in the Kingdom 
of Valencia would be given to him as security ( 11 rehenes 11 ). 
Pedro of Aragon was incensed by this bargain, since he was 
an heir to these possessions. 
The Perell6s affair, a seemingly isolated incident, 
not worthy of starting a war, indirectly caused a great 
deal of hardship in Andalusia. The area was wracked by 
internal disturbances, starvation and inflation (wheat 
was 120 maravedis a fanega). An important wheat shipment 
which was to come into the port of Seville was diverted 
because of the fear that it might be hijacked as the oil 
had been. Consequently Andalusia was deprived of an im-
portant means of alleviatini:::; the famine. 29 When Diee;o 
Garcia de Padilla was named Maestre de Calatrava, the 
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King of Aragon did not allow him to take over the encomiendas 
which the Order of Calatrava had in the kingdom of Arae;on 
under the standing arrangement which gave Castile political 
control over the three military orders both within and 
without Castilian territory. Alcaniz had been given to 
Pero Moniz de Godoy, Comendador de Caracuel, who served 
Aragon and who refused to obey Diego Garcia de Padilla 
as Maestre of the Order. All Castilian rebels, sucn as 
Gonzalo Mexia and Gomez Carrillo, who rebelled ae;ainst 
Pedro, were actively supported by el Ceremonioso. As 
early as the Toro incident, the King of Aragon was anxious 
for war with Castile over the question of Dona Blanca: 
"Antes del rompimiento de la guerra con Castilla, tuvo el 
Rey sus inteligencias con el rey de Francia, y con el 
Duque de Borbon so hermano, para que se hiziesse guerra 
al rey de Castilla, haste que recibiesse a la reyna dona 
Blanca su muger, y hiziesse vida con ella. 113° Certainly, 
then it is evident that Ayala's description of the causes 
of the war is such as to make Pedro of Castile seem to 
be a war-monger, while El Ceremonioso was pictured as 
going out of his way to keep the peace. 
The war between Castile and Aragon, whic11 began toward 
the end of 1356, was intennittently mediated by the Papal 
Legate. Twice during the year 1357, the Pope's representa-
tive managed to establish truces, one for fifteen days and 
one for one year. According to both Ayala and Zurita, 
Pedro of Castile was responsible for violating both of 
them; the second time Pedro filled the city of Tarazana, 
which he had captured from Ara~on, with Castilians instead 
of turning it over to the Papal Legate, as he had a 6reed 
to do. Zurita mentions that Pedro was excommunicated for 
this action. War actively broke out again, however, in 
1358, when Pedro learned that his half-brother ~nrique had 
entered Castile, though the peace treaty was still on, and 
that the Infante Don Ferrando was doing a great deal of 
damage in Murcia. The fighting was still going on in 
1359, when a new Papal Legate, the Cardinal of Bologna, 
was sent to mediate. According to Ayala, Pedro's condi-
tions for terminating the war were unreasonable. They 
included the handing over of Perell6s; the removal of 
the Trastamarans and the Infante Don Ferrando from Ara-
gon; the return of Orihuela, Alicante, Gardamar, Elche 
and Val de Alda, taken in the time of Jaime II of Aragon 
from Pedro's grandfather, Don Fernando IV; and payment 
by El Ceremonioso of the expenses of the war. Once again, 
in Ayala's view, the King of Aragon is tne peace-loving 
monarch, ready to make any possible concessions: If 
Perell6s were found guilty, he would be sent to Pedro to 
be executed; all Castilians would be paid and asked to 
leave Aragon; the lands which Aragon had inherited ac-
cording to an agreement signed in 1342 between the kings 
of Castile and Aragon would be put in the Pope's hands 
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for mediation; Pere of Aragon would not pay the war expenses, 
since the war was not his fault; but he would aid Pedro of 
Castile in the war against Granada. The Aragonese monarch 
goes on to say that if the Castilian king really wanted 
peace, he would not make such impossible conditions, and 
he appeals for friendship like that which existed between 
himself and Alfonso xr.31 Pedro of Castile then offered to 
terminate the war on the second and third conditions, 
i.e., the expulsion of the Trastamarans and tne return of 
the lands, since the agreement had been made with advisers 
when Fernando IV was a child.32 The Consejo de Aragon 
advised El Ceremonioso to insist on putting the question 
of the disputed lands before the Pope, and proposed a 
six month interim to straighten tne matter out. But 
Pedro of Castile insisted on continuing the war. 
Ayala is correct in presenting Pedro :c;1 Ceremonioso 
as conciliatory at this point. But this can be explained 
easily. El Ceremonioso was losing the war on land and 
sea, and had already lost a great deal of territory to 
his Castilian adversary. Pedro of Castile had his fleet 
prepared, his forces in position and all salaries paid;33 
he had everything to lose and nothing to gain by a six-
month truce. The prospect of Papal intervention was of 
little value, since the Papacy had a pro-Aragonese and 
pro-French policy. 
A new attempt at peace took place in 1360 in Tudela, 
in Navarre. Here Pedro of Castile was more conciliatory, 
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because he had just suffered a resounding defeat in the 
Battle of Araviana at Almazan on the Aragonese frontier • 
.Nevertheless, no agreement was reached. A peace treaty 
was finally agreed upon in 1361, however, brought about 
by the Papal Legate. This came about as a direct result 
of an impending alliance between tne King of Aragon and 
Abu Said, the usurper to the throne of Granada, wno had 
brought about the overtr1row of Pedro I s trustworthy ally 
Mohammed. Pedro's whole imperialistic desiisn for Castile 
was thwarted by the Hey Bermejo. In tne agreement between 
the two Pedros, the Trastamarans and other Castilian nobles 
were to be expelled from Ara 15 on in return for tne castles 
which Pedro I had captured from Aragon. This was not a 
conciliatory gesture on the Castilian's part, but rather 
a desperate measure taken from a position of weakness. 
After disposing of the hey Bermejo, Pedro of Castile 
once again directed his belligerent attentions toward 
Aragon. He planned to attack some Aragonese towns 
secretly, while En Pere was resting in Perpignan. Pedro's 
excuse for war, according to Ayala, was that the White 
Companies were preparing to invade Castile through Aragon 
and Navarre. Ayala's words express what he considered to 
be the sentiments of Pedro's vassals: ".t,; ninguno podia 
entender que el rey queria facer guerra a Aragon. 1134 
Pedro's action might be considered as foresight, since the 
Aragonese were continually conspiring witn Enrique and the 
French. In addition, Pedro took advanta6 e of the fact 
that the King of Navarre, Carlos II, was at odds wi tt1 the 
King of France, Charles V, to form a Castilian-Navarrese 
mutual defense pact. Carlos II, being confident that 
Pedro of Castile was now at peace witn everyone, agreed in 
order to receive aid against France. Pedro then reopened 
the war with Aragon, to the surprise and dismay of his 
new ally, who was forced to participate by the terms of 
the pact he had just signed. 
Between 1363 and 1366 Pedro of Castile had the upper 
hand in the war. He captured a great deal of territory, 
including Calatayud, Teruel, Alicante, Elche and some 
possessions in Valencia, and was threatening the city of 
Valencia itself. In Aragon the nobles were divided between 
those who favored the Infante Don Ferrando's idea of re-
turning with Enrique and his Castilian followers and the 
Companies to France to help the French king against the 
English and those who insisted on invading Castile with 
Enrique and the Companies. This dilemma was solved when 
the King of Aragon had his half-brother arrested. When 
he tried to escape, Ferrando was murdered by Enrique's 
squire. 
The turning point in the Castilian-Aragonese wars 
came about with the entrance of Enrique and the Companies 
into Castile in 1366. Pedro was forced to flee, and as 
Aragon 1 s ally, Enrique was recognized as King of Castile. 
Enrique's triumph was short-lived, however; Pedro returned 
to Castile in 1367 with the Prince of Wales, who helped him 
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win the decisive battle of Najera. After Pedro's victory 
there was a four-power conference at Tarbes in November 
of 1367, between Castile, Aragon, Navarre and Bngland. 
It was agreed that the Castilian-Aragonese conflict be 
resolved by the marriage of Pedro's daughter Constanza to 
En Joan, Duke of Gerona and heir to the Aragonese throne. 
The Aragonese territorial claim could then be settled by 
a dowry.35 There is also evidence in the Archives of 
Aragon that El Ceremonioso made several alternative secret 
proposals to the English in order to prevent any possible 
conquest of Aragon. One was an alliance between Pedro of 
Castile and El Ceremonioso b)· means of marriage; a second 
was a similar sort of alliance with ~nrique instead of 
Pedro; and a third was the partition of Castile among 
Aragon, Navarre and England. But there is no evidence 
that the Prince of Wales agreed to betray Pedro of Castile.36 
In his presentation of the facts, Ayala interprets 
his own monarch as the belligerent one and the King of 
Aragon as a reasonable and conciliatory person. Actually 
both were imperialists and realistic politicians--ruthless 
when they could be and conciliatory when they had to be. 
Zurita 1 s description of the two monarchs, though favoring 
the Aragonese king, is more to the point: "los .Reyes 
queen estos hechos concurrieron eran de animo feroz, 
y mas inclinados a rigurosa vengan9a que a clemencia; y 
aunque el nuestro se justifica mucho en las causas de la 
guerra y encarece la crueldad de sus adversario, el no 
fue el mas maso y benigno Rey de sus tiempos •••• El uno 
y el otro cruelissimamente persiguieron a sus propios 
hermanos hasta la muerte. 11 37 
Navarre 
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This kingdom, ruled by Carlos II, El Malo, was 
coveted by France, Castile and Aragon. Its importance 
was strategic, in that it controlled the pass of Honces-
valles, through which any troops had to 6 0 in order to 
reach Castile from the north. Ayala analyzes Carlos ll's 
role in these wars as pure expediency; he changed sides 
often and managed to avoid being annexed by any power--
a delicate feat of diplomacy. But Navarre was a completely 
untrustworthy ally to anyone. 
England 
Edward Ill's interest in the Iberian peninsula was 
based mainly on the fact that Castile as well as Aragon 
had superior naval fleets.JS It was also of interest to 
England to have a friendly power near France in order to 
have an even greater advantage in its wars on the continent. 
There had been one attempt at an alliance between England 
and Castile during the reign of Alfonso XI by means of a 
proposed marriage between Pedro and Jane Plantagenet, 
Edward's daughter; this alliance collapsed with Jane's 
untimely death. Pedro, under Alburquerque's pro-French 
influence, did not encourage further relations. Then on 
June 22, 1362, at a public ceremony in London, a political 
and military alliance between the Kings of England and 
Castile was concluded. This represented a reversal in 
Castile's traditional pro-French policy whicn nad gone 
on from the times of the Cluniac and Cistercian monks 
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nearly three centuries before. Ayala claims that the treaty 
was brought about because of Pedro's fear of French re-
action to the death of his wife. 39 A more likely explana-
tion for this treaty is Pedro's awareness that he was in 
danger from the impending alliance between .C.:nrique, En 
Pere of Aragon and the dreaded White Companies which were 
ravaging the French countryside. i-1.fter all, .t::nrique had 
been fighting along witn these mercenaries for tne king 
of France, and it is natural that he would want to use 
them in his struggle against his half-brother. In addition, 
it was known that the Pope and the French king wanted to 
remove the Companies from France, since they were ruining 
the country. 
The expected invasion of Castile by Enrique and the 
Companies took place in September, 1366, under tne pretense 
that they would fight Moors and Jews. This was Pope 
Urban V 1 s idea to get the Companies out of Languedoc.4° 
Ayala neglects to mention the Pope's hypocritical excuse 
for the invasion of Castile, and is sparing in his descrip-
tion of these men, who were considered devils throughout 
the Christian world. 
During Pedro's exile in France, a treaty was agreed 
upon at Libourne between him, Navarre and ~ngland by which 
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Navarre would receive Alava and Guipuzcoa, while Vizcaya 
would go to the Prince of Wales. Thus the most highly 
developed mercantile and shipbuilding centers upon which 
Castilian sea-power depended were to be ceded in exchange 
for the aid that England and ~avarre would give Pedro to 
recover Castile.41 
The success of this alliance was culminated by the 
victory of the English-Castilian coalition at Najera. 
Ayala's account of this battle seems to coincide in 
important details witn that of Jean Chandos, constable 
of Aquitaine under ti1e Black Prince. The letters between 
Enrique and the Prince before tne battle are recorded in 
both and are basically the same; ~nrique protests against 
the Prince's intervention in Castile and defends his role 
as the one chosen by God to overthrow the tyrannical 
Pedro.42 Both Ayala and Chandos record an enormous list 
of prisoners and refer to the Prince I s refusal to turn the 
prisoners over to Pedro, who wanted to kill them. The 
Prince's motives were his chivalric code and the desire for 
ransom, while Pedro only wanted revenge.43 
Ayala emphasizes the chivalr~c qualities of the Black 
Prince. This is evident in his horrified reaction to 
Pedro's desire to kill the prisoners.44 Ayala mentions 
the disagreements between Pedro and the Prince over Pedro's 
hesitation in paying his debts; he portrays Pedro as a 
scoundrel, and the Prince as a disillusioned ally, tired 
out by Pedro's treacherous behavior. Actually Pedro was a 
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more realistic politician; he was tryint to preserve his 
throne, and used whatever means he had at his disposal to 
do so. The Black Prince, by refusing to keep supporting 
his Castilian ally because of the debt, thereby lost the 
strategic position whic.i1 he had gained in C as ti le. France 
would once again get the upper hand. Ayala in his analysis 
of the Castilian-English alliance is 6 uided by the chival-
ric ideal of the Middle Ages. 
France 
During Pedro's reign, there were two kings on the 
French throne, Jean II le Bon and Charles V le Sage. 
Castile's pro-French policy followed a long tradition, 
which was renewed in 1352, when Pedro's advisers arranged 
a marriage between Pedro and Dona Blanca de Borbon, Jean's 
niece, and daughter of the Duke of Bourbon. Jean II was 
principally concerned with Carlos II of Navarre and the 
wars with England. From 1356 he spent most of his time 
as a prisoner in London, where he died in 1364. 
Charles V acted as regent of France from 1356 due to 
his fatner's imprisonment. He became more involved with 
the Iberian peninsula than Jean II because of the fact that 
~nrique of Trastamara and his followers were fignting as 
mercenaries with him against the English. he wanted to get 
rid of the White Companies, and saw ~nrique's invasion of 
Castile as the perfect opportunity; he also was interested 
in keeping English influence out of Spain. 
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Ayala exaggerates the importance of Do5a Blanca's 
role in France's relations with Castile. Prance was not 
at all interested in supporting a war against Castile in 
1354 in order to force Pedro to return to his wife. This 
proposal had been made to France by ~l Ceremonioso, and 
had been ignored. Pedro's troubles with France nad only 
to do wi tn t.t10 matter of the Companies and )i;nrique de 
Trastamara. 
The Papacy 
Popes Innocent VI (1352-62) and Urban V (1362-70) 
supported French interests, since both were French. Their 
principal activities in Castile were to try to force Pedro 
to return to his legitimate wife and to mediate the 
Castilian-Aragonese conflict. Innocent VI had Pedro 
excommunicated twice, in 1354 for escaping from 'roro, and 
in 1357 for breaking the fifteen-day truce at Tarazana. 
Ayala does not mention either case of excomrn.unication, 
possibly because in neither case had Pedro committed any 
act against the dogma of the Church. Ayala is also silent 
about the Church's refusal to concede the standard of the 
Church to Pedro in 1354 for tne war against tne .Moors. 
Urban V was responsible for actively backing the White 
Companies against Pedro by contributing 100,000 florins 
to them in addition to absolving them of all their past 
sins.45 Ayala does not mention this fact, nor the fact 
that Pedro had just offered to help the Pope rid France 
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of these cursed people, as Froissart calls them.46 From 
reading Ayala, one has the impression that the Papacy 
was a neutral observer, distressed by Pedro's treatment 
of his queen and active in tne cause of peace. 
Conclusion 
Pedro I of Castile was more of a modern politician 
than Ayala was a modern historian. Pedro was a forerunner 
of the monarchs of a nationalistic, unified Spain, such as 
eventually appeared with the Catholic kings just over a 
century later. His internal policies were basically con-
cerned with subduing rebellious nobles; nis foreign policy 
was imperialistic, in that he wanted to unify the Iberian 
peninsula under Castilian rule. Ayala, in spite of his 
detached manner of recording the events whicn he knew at 
first hand, was still imbued with such medieval ideals as 
chivalric behavior, and represented the power of the nobles 
rather than the concept of the state unified by the autnority 
of the monarch. This is the measure of the difference between 
the historian and his subject in their day, and helps serve 
to explain how that subject would appear to future genera-
tions. 
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LA CRONICA DEL REY DON ENRIQUE II 
La Cr6nica del Rey Don ~nrique II deals with Enrique's 
attempt to consolidate his position as legitimate monarch 
on the Castilian throne. This involved not only the re-
establishment of domestic peace, but also the perhaps 
even more arduous task of restoring Castile to a position 
of power on the international scene. 
Enrique's Domestic Policy 
Pedro's death in 1369 nominally ended the Castilian 
Civil War. Enrique, however, was confronted witn the 
problem of facing many rebellions in various parts of 
his kingdom. The number of rebellious areas mentioned 
by Ayala himself would seem to contradict his former 
assertion in the Cr6nica del Rey Don Pedro! that ~nrique 
was almost unanimously supported throughout Castile. 
Martin L6pez de C6rdoba held Carmona and made war in 
Andalusia until 1371. Zamora and Ciudad Rodrigo tried 
to join Portugal. Galicia continued fighting against the 
new monarch, while several cities on the eastern frontier 
surrendered to the King of Aragon. Soria and several 
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1 Basque ports remained loyal to Pedro. If Ayala mentions 
these rebellions so explicitly, it is not to show that 
Enrique was unpopular, but rather to demonstrate his force 
and ability in subduing his enemies. After two years of 
fighting against constant resistance, Enrique was finally 
able to defeat Martin L6pez and Fernando de Castro, his 
two most powerful pro-Pedro adversaries. Ayala defends 
Enrique's decision to execute Martin Lopez by mentioning 
that Martin Lopez had previously killed many of ~nrique's 
men who had tried to scale the towers of Carmona. 2 Never-
theless, Martin L6pez had bargained with Enrique for his 
liberty, so that his murder was no more justifiable than 
those committed by Pedro. Ayala eliminates the more grue-
some details of the method by which Pedro's former servant 
was disposed of, but it is known that his death was an 
extremely brutal one: 11 E el lunes doce dias de junio 
arrastraron a Martin L6pez por toda Sevilla, e le cortaron 
los pies e las manos en la plaza de San Francisco e le 
quemaron. 113 
Enrique's other major victory was the taking of Zamora 
and Ciudad Rodrigo for Castile and the flight of Fernando 
de Castro to Portugal, whereby Galicia lost its greatest 
Petrist leader and ultimately surrendered to the Trasta-
maran dynasty. 
Another major event of Enrique's early years in power 
was the death of Don Tello, his brother. He died mysteriously, 
and Ayala mentions the possibility of his having been 
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poisoned for dealing with Enrique's enemies.4 Though 
this seems to be a logical assumption, Ayala hastens 
to add that this rumor was not at all true. This is 
amusing when one compares it to Ayala's description of the 
death of Pedro's first privado, the Duke of Alburquerque. 
There Ayala had clearly insinuated that Alburquerque was 
murdered by his Roman doctor at Pedro's command.5 In 
neither case is there a definite falsification of the 
facts, but rather a subtle bias to sway the opinion of the 
reader. 
The lands of Lara and Vizcaya which had belonged to 
Don Tello through his marriage to the Lara family now were 
given to Enrique's son, Don Juan. This brought a protest 
from Dona Maria de Lara, sister of Tello's wife. Ayala 
shows Enrique's clever political ability in this situation. 
The king recognized the family's claim to these lands and 
agreed to hand them over to Dona Maria's sons, the Counts 
of Alanz6n and Percha, if they, in turn, agreed to leave 
France and take care of their Castilian holdings. Enrique 
knew that the two young lords would never give up their 
holdings in France, so that there was no danger in such an 
offer. Ayala openly admired such clever maneuvering--an 
inconsistency with his somewhat overly moralistic attitude 
on other occasions.6 
Enrique's military ability and energy certainly cannot 
be denied. His successes in this area, however, were counter-
balanced by his failure to administer well the land which 
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he had fought so long and hard to rule. Some of his ad-
ministrative problems, of course, can be blamed on the 
ravages of tne Civil War, but tne fact tnet Castile 
economically had deteriorated even more by the time of 
Enrique's death in 1379 must be attributed in part to 
his inept rule. 
Since Ayala does not deal extensively with Enrique's 
domestic policies, one must study the documents of the 
Cortes de Le6n -y__ Castilla, published by the Real Academia 
de la Historia.7 Here there is abundant evidence of the 
anarchy which was raging through Castile throughout 
Enrique's reign. The Cortes of Toro in 1369 were convoked 
to quell internal disorder. The country was being ran-
sacked by thieves, murderers and rapists; court officials 
were guilty of graft; and justice had become a term without 
meaning. Enrique's decision to mint new coins (cruzados and 
reales) in order to pay off the foreign mercenaries had 
had a drastic effect on Castilian economy, and had caused 
an inflation which was still going on at the time of 
Enrique's death ten years later. Enrique at Toro attempted 
to control the inflationary monstBr which he had released 
by establishing set prices for almost all goods which were 
on the market. The failure of these measures became clear 
the following year, when the Cortes were reconvoked at 
Medina del Campo, and Enrique was obligated to retract many 
of these price controls. The economic crisis was such that 
Enrique was forced to restrict the sale of products outside 
of Castile. Meanwhile the wave of crimes continued in 
spite of the hermandades set up to establish some sort 
of order.8 
At the Cortes of Toro, in 1371, there were demands 
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that the mo~ey which Enrique had created after the earlier 
Cortes be devaluated in order to solve the financial crisis. 
Another cause of discontent was the fact that so many lands--
especially villages and towns--, had been given away to 
foreigners such as Du Guesclin. Also there was a dearth 
of previously abundant goods, especially livestock and 
other edibles.9 
The Cortes of 1373 and 1377 brought no improvement in 
the economic situation of Castile. Prices and crime re-
mained high; the level of justice low. Tributes were being 
imposed for the first time on towns by certain nobles who 
were unlawfully taking them over and building fortresses 
nearby to keep them under control. The citizens complained 
that Enrique was handing over royal lands to these rapacious 
lords and knights to the detriment of the inhabitants, 
who under royal tutelage had had a certain autonomy which 
was now disappearing. Excessive taxation was causing some 
areas to become depopulated. 10 
Finally one notices in the documents of the Cortes 
the amount of discussion and legislation with reference 
to the Jewish problem. As early as 1367, (1366 according 
to Ayala) at Enrique's first session of the Cortes in 
Burgos, the Jews were blamed for a great part of Castile's 
troubles: "O trossy a lo que nos dixieron que todos los 
delas cibdades e villas e lugares de nuestros rregnos, 
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que tovieron quelos muchos males e dapnos e muertes e des-
terramientos queles venieron en los tiempos pasados que 
fueran por consejo de judios que fueron privados e officia-
les delos rreyes passados que ffueron ffasta aqui, por qua 
querien male dapno delos cristianos •.• 1111 The Jews 
continued to be 8nrique's economic scapegoat throughout 
his reign. They were the unscrupulous tax-collectors, 
usurers, enemies of God and Man, and friends of the devil. 
Thus, Enrique's anti-Semitic propaganda was one of the main 
factors which would eventually cause such a drastic step 
as that taken by the Catholic kings in 1492. 
Of all this Ayala has extremely little to say. He 
explains very briefly the creation of new coinage, with 
the resulting inflation and the distribution of lands to 
the mercenary soldiers. A Jewish problem is insinuated, 
but not explained; Ayala only mentions that Jews and Moors 
were made to wear some sign on their clothes, wnereby 
they would be known to Christians and to each otner. 12 
All in all, it would seem that Ayala's reticence about 
the administrative difficulties of Enrique II was a deli-
berate attempt to pass over the most unsuccessful aspect 
of the monarch's regime. 
Enrique's Foreign Policy 
A great portion of the Cr6nica del Hey Don Enrique II 
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deals with Castilian foreign policy. As was the case 
with Pedro, Enrique became immediately enmeshed in a web 
of international intrigue, in wnicn the principal forces 
were once again Bngland, France, Aragon, Portugal, Navarre, 
Granada and the Papacy. The difficulties and emnities which 
surrounded Enrique on all sides and t.t1e skill wi tn which 
he overcame them form the underlying tneme of Ayala's work. 
Aragon 
Relations had not been too amicable between the former 
allies, Enrique II and En Pere of Aragon, ever since En 
Pere had refused to cooperate with Enrique after the lat-
ter's defeat at Najera in 1366. The situation was ag-
gravated further in 1369 when many towns on the eastern 
frontier of Castile handed themselves over to Aragon upon 
learning of Pedro's death. Ayala only mentions that there 
was evidence of war between Enrique and En Pere and that 
Enrique had sent men to Requena, one of the frontier towns 
which had surrendered to En Pere. 1 3 Zurita gives many 
more details about the outbreak of war. The King of Aragon 
wished to hold Du Guesclin to his promise of going to 
Sardinia to fight in his place, and tnerefore sent to 
Castile for him. Du Guesclin, as En Pere's vassal, was 
obligated to comply with this request. Enrique, however, 
had given Du Guesclin the rebellious towns of Molina and 
Requena; therefore Du Guesclin not only refused to serve 
En Pere, but ·also threatened to help Znrique attack Aragon 
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and Catalonia in order to remove the towns which had sur-
rendered to Aragon. The excuse for this belligerency was 
that an Aragonese nobleman, the Viscount of Castelbo, had 
inflicted damage on the Castilians and mercenaries who had 
returned to Castile to fight against Pedro after rJajera. 
En Pere claimed his right to Molina and Requena, not only 
because these towns had surrendered to him, but also 
because they lay in the territory which ~nrique had origi-
nally promised him during Pedro's reign. Du Guesclin, 
according to Zurita, showed himself to be a disloyal vassal 
in his refusal to serve En Pere and in his refusal to accept 
En Pere 1 s offer to arbitrate the matter of land distri-
bution. To add to the dispute, 8n Pere also claimed 
Murcia according to former treaties, and refused to give 
his daughter Leonor to Bnrique's son in marriage unless 
Murcia were given to Aragon. Upon seeing 8nrique 1s war-
like attitude and ingratitude, En Pere decided to come to 
an agreement with Navarre and Portuga1. 14 
In all fairness to Ayala and his view of the Aragonese-
Castilian conflict, one must remember that :Z.urita was 
Aragonese and therefore as liable to bias as Ayala himself. 
It is clear that discussions had been going on over the 
division of Castile by England, Portu6al, Aragon and 
Navarre even before Pedro's death. There is evidence 
of negotiations between Aragon and England at Bordeaux in 
1369, after Pedro's death, for the conquest and partition 
of Castile. If the Prince of Wales were to inherit the 
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Castilian crown, Aragon wanted Murcia, Albacete, Cuenca, 
Guadalajara, Soria, parts of Burgos and LoGrono. If 
Fernando of Portugal were to inherit the throne, the claims 
would have to be more modest. Aragonese hopes for a 
thorough conquest of Castile were shattered by England's 
involvement with France, an invasion of l\.ra0 on by Jaime III, 
Infante of Mallorca, mistrust of Portugal, and internal 
opposition to ~n Pere within Aragon itself. 1 5 
The Aragonese situation seems to disappear from the 
Cr6nica until 1374, when Enrique learned that En Pere's 
nephew, Jaime III (whose kingdom had been taken by En 
Pere) was warring with En Pere in Aragon. ~ince Enrique 
was still angry at in Pere's refusal to hand over Leonor 
in marriage to the Infante Don Juan, he decided to actively 
aid Jaime. Ayala says"••• e aun non estorvaba nin extra-
naba a algunos suyos que ayudasen al Infante de Mallorcas. 1116 
The bias of Ayala in such a statement is obvious, when one 
thinks back to the Cr6nica del Hey Don Pedro!, in which 
Ayala maintained that all were horrified over the idea of 
any Aragonese-Castilian conflict. 
Enrique continued to send messengers to Aragon to 
demand that Leonor and Juan marry according to the agree-
ments made while he was in Aragon. ~n Pere obstinately 
refused, because Enrique had not handed over the promised 
territories. En Pere's final compliance to Enrique's 
demands without the corresponding territorial compensation 
was according to Ayala a clear indication that Aragon now 
realized that Enrique was firmly entrenched as monarch of 
Castile.17 The wedding between the Infante Don Juan of 
Castile and the Infante Dona Leonor of Aragon was held in 
Soria in 1375. 
Castilian-Aragonese relations between 1371 and 1375 
must be gathered from the Archive de la Corona de Arag6n. 
Summed up briefly, it is evident that Aragon continued 
seeking allies, especially England and/or Portugal, for 
the invasion and partition of Castile. When the Duke of 
Lancaster took control of Aquitaine from tne Prince of 
Wales in 1370 and established himself as a pretender to 
the Castilian throne in 1371, Aragonese hopes were re-
kindled. However, En Pere was more cautious, for any overt 
belligerent intentions on his part without any real guaran-
tee of ~nglish support would be disastrous for Aragon. 
The Treaty of Alcoutim, signed on March 22, 1371, between 
Portugal and Castile, had ruined Aragonese invasion plans. 
Aragon was, therefore, worried about becoming involved in 
18 any more treaties with Portugal. With this background 
in mind, it becomes evident tnat the marriage between 
Leonor and Juan meant an end to Aragonese imperialistic 
designs on Castilian territory--an obvious triumph for 
Enrique II. Ayala's failure to capitalize on Aragonese 
plots and frustrations to the glory of Castile is due 




While En Pere of Aragon was greedily eyeing eastern 
Castile after Pedro's death, Fernando I of Portugal was 
ready to grab what he could of the western territories. 
Some cities, such as Ciudad Hodrigo and Zamora, Alcantara 
and Tuy, had surrendered to Portugal, while Ferrando de 
Castro was fighting for Galicia with Portuguese cooperation. 
Fernando I prepared to make war on Enrique, declaring that, 
as great-grandson of Sancho IV of Castile, he was heir to 
the Castilian throne. Enrique responded energetically 
by capturing Braga and Breganza. 19 Peace between Castile 
and Portugal was brought about in 1371 througn the media-
tion of Alfonso Perez de Guzman, a Castilian nobleman whose 
mother was Portuguese. The peace treaty was sealed by a 
marriage agreement between Ferrando and Enrique's daughter, 
Leonor, but this tie was immediately undone when Ferrando 
married Leonor Tellez de Meneses. Enrique received la 
Coruna, Ciudad Rodrigo and Valencia de Alcantara as com-
pensation, so that the peace treaty was preserved for the 
moment. 20 
F'errando broke the treaty in 1372 by making war in 
Galicia and confiscating Basque and Asturian ships in 
Lisbon. Bnrique immediately declared war, and was occupied 
with fignting in Portugal for most of 1373. Ayala describes 
this war in some detail, from Enrique's entrance into Portu-
gal via Coimbra to the besieging of Lisbon. A Papal 
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Legate finally arranged a peace treaty at Santarem in 1373 
with the following provisions; the Portuguese were to lend 
five galleys to Castile each year to help the French 
against England; Portugal was to send Ferrando de Castro 
and all other rebellious Castilian nobles out of the country; 
and a series of marriaJes were to be arranged to tie the 
two dynasties together. These involved Sancho, ~nrique•s 
brother and Beatriz, Fernando's sister; Fadrique, ~nrique 1 s 
illegitimate son and Beatriz, Fernando's daugnter; and 
Alfonso, Enrique's son and Isabel, Fernando's daughter. 21 
As was the case with En Pere of Aragon, Fernando had 
hoped to gain at least a portion of western Castile through 
the intervention of the Duke of Lancaster in Castile. 
English failure to give aid to Portugal after ~nrique's 
invasion of that country in 1373, forced Fernando to sign 
the humiliating peace treaty of Santarem with Enrique. 
Because of the provision by which Portugal had to aid the 
French with ships, it even came about that Portugal was to 
fight against her own ally, ~ngland, until 1379. 22 
Once again Enrique was triumphant. Certainly Ayala's 
presentation of the Portuguese situation was exact, and 
any details omitted were probably done so out of ignorance 
rather than out of deliberate suppression of tne facts. 
Granada 
The King of Granada, who had been faithfully supported 
by Pedro against el Rey Bermejo, continued fighting 
against Enrique after Pedro's death. While ~nrique wus 
occupied in Portugal, the Moors recaptured Algeciras, 
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an occurrence mourned greatly in Castile, since this city 
had been won at such a great cost by Alfonso XI in 1349. 
Ayala states that it had been a great port and was com-
pletely destroyed by the Musullmans. 23 In 1370 a peace 
treaty was signed with Granada, after which relations 
between the two kingdoms must have been peaceful, since 
Ayala makes no further mention of them. 24 
Navarre 
After Enrique's successful negotiations with Portu-
gal, he sent word to King Carlos II of Navarre to return 
Vitoria and Logrono to Castile. Once again an agreement 
was reached through the mediation of the Papal Legate. 
Navarre would cede Vitoria and Logrono to Castile, and the 
Infante Don Carlos, first-born son of Carlos II, would 
marry Enrique's daughter, Dona Leonor for a dowry of gold. 
This alliance having been agreed upon, Carlos II then 
attempted to loosen Franco-Castilian ties by proposing th~t 
Enrique pay Pedro's debt to the Prince of Wales, in exchange 
for the latter's renouncing any claims to Castile. Enrique 
refused to enter into any agreement with England except in 
the case of an Anglo-French treaty. 2 5 
A conflict between the two monarchs arose at the time 
of the wedding in May, 1375, over the means of payment. 
Carlos of Navarre was to receive 120,000 doblas--100,00 
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as a dowry and 20,000 for Vitoria, Logrono and ~alvatiorra. 
Pero Ferrandez, treasurer of Castile, wanted to pay in 
silver (150,000 reales), whereas the agreement nad been 
for payment in gold. The wedding took place, but tne con-
flict was not settled, and caused future strife. 26 
The marriage ties between Navarre and Castile put 
~nrique in an embarrassing position due to ~avarre's 
pro-English stand. This was aggravated in 1377 when 
Enrique's new son-in-law, the Infante Don Carlos of Navarre, 
decided to pay a visit to his uncle, the King of France. 
In France itself, it was rumored that Don Carlos wanted to 
take over the fortresses which he possessed in Normandy in 
order to join the English. This rumor was confirmed when 
the King of France had Jacques de Rua, squire of Don Carlos 
and privado of the King of Navarre, arrested. A note was 
found on him from the King of l'iiavarre instructing his son 
to make war on the French for control of Guyenne and to aid 
with the fortresses in Normandy. Jacques de Rua was 
killed, and Don Carlos and his brother, Don Pedro, arrested. 
The Duke of Burgundy and Du Guesclin were sent to Normandy 
to destroy Navarrese castles there (except Cherbourg, 
leased by Navarre to England). 27 
In 1378 the King of France sent word to Enrique of 
the Navarrese plot and suggested tnat Enrique make war on 
Navarre. Meanwhile, Pero Manrique, Adelantado Mayor of 
Castile, had written to 8nrique tnat Carlos of Navarre 
was trying to buy back Logrono for 20,000 doblas. Bnrique, 
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angry about the Navarrese plot in France, decided to 
trap the Navarrese king by having Pero Manrique agree to 
sell Logro~o, arrange to meet him there for the exchange 
and then capture him. 28 The plan failed, because Carlos 
of Navarre suspected foul plaJ and refused to enter the 
city. Enrique then declared open war and sent his son, 
the Infante Don Juan, to invade Navarre in order to carry 
out agreements with France, wnich was at war with Navarre 
at the time. The king of Navarre received immediate aid 
from England, and attacked Castile. Juan entered Navarre 
with lancers from the Basque countries, des~royed tne area 
near Pamplona and captured Viana, wnich he handed over to 
Pero Manrique, before returning to Castile. 2 9 A peace 
treaty was finally agreed upon, on Castilian initiative, 
whereby Enrique declared that Castile would be an ally of 
France and Navarre; Navarre would in turn send the English 
out of the country. Enrique would pay 20,000 doblas to 
English and Gascon mercenaries and would hand back to 
Navarre all territories taken over by Juan. 30 
In contrast to the situation with Portugal and Aragon, 
the treaties between Castile and Navarre in 1379 can hardly 
be called a diplomatic victory for Enrique. The whole war 
in 1378 gained nothing for Castile, and only demonstrated 
to what extent Enrique was subservient to the king of 
France. Russell maintains that Navarre was the kingdom 
of the peninsula which showed the greatest diplomatic 
skill and internal harmony in this turbulent period. Her 
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subjects were loyal, feudal magnates were few and racial 
laws liberal. Jews immigrated from Castile and established 
large and prosperous aljamas in the three principal cities 
of Navarre--Pamplona, Bstella and Tudela. The survival 
of an independent Navarre, surrounded by larger imperialis-
tic powers--Aragon, France and Castile--depended on skillful 
diplomacy, intrigue and defensive military strategy.31 
France and England 
Pedro's death in 1369 cemented a firm Franco-Castilian 
alliance, in which Enrique was constantly faithful to 
Charles V of France, the man who had helped him obtain 
the Castilian crown. Enrique's loyalty to his former 
benefactor affected his relations with England in that he 
refused to make any treaty with either the Prince of Wales 
or the Duke of Lancaster while France and England were at 
war. 
Ayala emphasizes the success of the Castilian fleet, 
which aided France against the British on many occasions. 
In 1371, Enrique's Admiral, Micer Ambrosio Bocanegra, was 
sent with twelve galleys to help France and captured the 
famous English captain, Pembroke, after which the March of 
Guyenne was returned to France. Enrique received a great 
ransom for Pembroke with which he bought back Soria, Al-
mazan and Atienza from Du Guesclin.32 In 1372 Enrique sent 
forty armed ships to La Rochelle to help the French against 
the coming of an English fleet, which, in fact, never 
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appeered. 33 In 1374 he sent an Armada under Ferrand 
S~nchez de Tovar, to aid the French.34 Hussell also 
emphasizes the role of Castile as a sea-power in the 
Franco-English struggle and tne fact that Enrique ac-
quiesced to demands of France that booty was to be equally 
shared between the French and the Castilians, even though 
the French squadron was smaller. Enrique told his subjects 
that the French only received one-third of the booty.35 
Russell concludes that the Franco-Castilian naval alliance 
was favorable to the Duke of Lancaster's designs in Spain, 
since many were ready to accept his argument that defeating 
Trastamaran Spain was even more urgent than a victory 
over France itself.36 
In 1374, Castilian fears of an English invasion were 
confirmed when the Duke of Lancaster appeared in Guyenne 
with his wife, Do5a Constanza, Pedro's daughter; he bore 
arms with castles and lions, and claimed the Castilian 
throne in his wife's name.37 Lancaster had married the 
exiled daughter of Pedro in 1372, whereupon he was given 
permission by the Bnglish council to bear the title and 
arms of the King of Castile and Leon. On Feb. 10, 1372, 
the new Duchess of Lancaster made her ceremonial entry 
into Lisbon as Queen of Castile.38 Even Froissart, a 
pro-Enrique historian, admitted the rignt of Constanza 
to rule Castile: "Si se tenoient la les deus filletes 
toutes esgarees, dont on pooit avoir grant pite, car elles 
estoient hiritieres de Castille, qui bien leur fesist droit, 
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par la succession dou roy, leur pere. 11 39 Lancaster was 
also supported in his plans by many "emperogilados" 
(i.e., former supporters of Pedro) such as Fernando de 
Castro, Fernan Rodriguez de Aza and Fernan Alfonso de 
Zamora, who had been forced to flee to England after the 
Castilian-Portuguese peace treaty.4° 
As Enrique was in Burgos preparing to meet the awaited 
invasion in 1374, he received word from the Duke of Anjou 
in Languedoc that Lancaster had lost many men in France 
and was returning to England. Anjou then enlisted ~nrique 
to aid in a campaign against the ~nglish in Bayonne--a plan 
which failed because the Duke of Anjou never snowed up. 
Many Castilians died as a result of floods and starvation, 
while vainly awaiting the arrival of 1-1.njou's troops.41 
Ayala mentions very briefly peace talks between France 
and ~ngland in Bruges in 1375. The Dukes of Anjou and 
Burgundy, brothers of Charles V, represented France; the 
Dukes of Lancaster and York, brothers of ~dward III, re-
presented England. Castile sent Pero Ferrandez de Velas-
co, Enrique's Camarero Mayor, as a representative to the 
meetings.42 What Ayala neglects to explain in all this 
is that in the peace talks at Bruges, Lancaster had offered 
to give up claims to Castile in exchange for Enrique's 
promise not to penalize "emperogilados," who would have 
their lands and titles restored. E. Perroy demonstrates, 
in an article entitled "The Anglo-French Negotiations at 
Bruges 1374-1377," that the Tras tamarans were hos ti le to 
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this proposal and furthermore were opposed to any An6 lo-
French agreement whatsoever.43 Froissart backs this 
s ta temen t with one phrase: "Et quan t on es toi t sus voies 
d 1acord, Bretagne et Espagne desrompoient tout. 11 44 
The fact that Pero Ferrandez de Velasco was trying to 
sabotage negotiations is evident in his act of capturing 
an Englishman, the Lord of Lesparre, during a period of 
truce. The Castilians, under Fernan Sanchez de Tovar, 
again violated the truce on August 10, 1375, by attacking 
~nglish merchant ships and burning or capturing thirty-
nine of them.45 
Enrique, instead of attempting to resolve the situa-
tion with Bngland, tenaciously clung to France for support. 
This policy prolonged the inevitable Anglo-Castilian con-
flict, which fell eventually on the shoulders of Enrique's 
son, Juan. Ayala seems to admire Enrique's support and 
loyalty to Charles V. For Ayala it was surely an example 
of chivalric behavior on Enrique's part to maintain such 
ties. Politically, however, it postponed a resolution 
of the differences.between Castile and the English to 
the later detriment of Castile. 
The Papacy 
In 1378 Enrique was confronted with the Papal discord 
which occurred at the death of Pope Gregory XI. The 
Cardinals elected a new Pope, under the threat of Roman 
mobs, who demanded that the Pope be Italian. Urban VI, 
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was chosen. The Cardinals then went to France, declared 
the Roman election to be fraudulent, and chose Clement 
VII as Pope. 
~nrique remained neutral in this conflict--the only 
instance in which he defied Charles V of France, who was 
definitely in favor of the French Clement VII. On his 
deathbed, Enrique warned his son, Juan, to be cautious 
about the schism in Rome. 
Conclusion 
Ayala admired Enrique II as a man and as a political 
ruler. His description of Enrique reflects tnis without 
any doubt. 11 .i:I: fue pequeno de cuerpo, pero b ien f echo, 
e blanco e rubio en de buen seso e de grande esfuerzo 
e franco e virtuoso e muy buen rescebidor e honrador 
de las gentes. 11 46 
Because of this admiration, Ayala emphasized Enrique's 
triumphs within and without Castile, while minimizing such 
faults as Enrique's lack of administrative ability in 
internal affairs and his short-sightedness in external 
affairs, reflected particularly in his excessive anti-
English and pro-French policies. Luis Suarez Fernandez, 
a medieval historian who defends .i:'.:nrique II, states: ".2;n 
la guerra civil castellana se acostumbr6 aver, en el 
pretendiente, un defensor de la nobleza. Vencedor, no 
desminti6 tales esperanzas. En este aspecto la alianza 
francesa tiene tambien honda significaci6n. Desde los 
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dias de San Luis, Francia representaba en Buropa el espiritu 
caballeresco lo que, en terminos politicos, queria decir 
tambien la defensa de un sistema social de predominio 
aristocratico. Para la burguesia los Trastamara repre-
sentaban un regimen especialmente antipatico. 11 47 
France, aristocracy and chivalry: these are the 
political ideals of Ayala. For ti1is reason Enrique II 
represented a great monarch in the eyes of the chronicler, 
where Pedro I had been a brutal tyrant. Ayala and those 
of his class were simply not prepared to give up the pri-
vileges of aristocracy for the dubious virtue of a unified 
monarchy at this time. 
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LA CROl'J ICA DEL HEY DON Jl.JAN I 
Juan I was proclaimed sovereign of Castile in Santo 
Domingo de Silos on May 1, 1379, at tne age of 21. He 
was crowned at the Monastery of Las nuelgas on June 21 
witn his queen, Dofia Leonor, daughter of Pere III of 
Aragon. Ayala mentions that great celebrations were 
held in Burgos, and a session of the Cortes was convoked, 
wherein all former privileges were confirmed. 1 With 
Juan's ascension to the throne, the Civil War in Spain 
itself became a dead issue. This is due to the fact that 
the new king was able to claim the throne through his 
mother, Dofia Juana Manuel, from tne line of Fernando de la 
Cerda, eldest son of Alfonso X. Thus, the Pedro-~nrique 
struggle, the contest between tne legitimate and illegiti-
mate lines descending from Alfonso XI became practically 
irrelevant except for the presence of Pedro l's daughters 
in ~ngland. In Castile tnere was no popular movement to 
place Constanza, Pedro's eldest daughter, on the throne, 
although the Duke of Lancaster would later claim the 
crown through her. 
Whereas Enrique II had successfully managed to con-
solidate Castile's role as an important European power, 
Juan I would be more successful at laying the foundation 
of the Castilian monarchy itself. 
"Las Mercedes Enriquenas" 
At the first session of the Cortes in Burgos, in 
1379, Juan and the procuradores or representatives of 
the cities seemed to be in complete agreement about the 
necessity of limiting the concession of privileges and 
territories, a policy which had been so prevalent under 
.i::nrique II that it has come to be known as "Las Mercedes 
Enriquenas." A revision of privileges was carried out to 
a slight extent, and means were taken to begin a general 
statistical census of taxes. Two other measures, the 
Ordenamiento de Luto in which the nobles were to dress 
as if in mourning, and the prohibition of the export of 
precious metals and livestock, were taken to restrict 
excessive expenditures.2 
Ayala goes into some detail about the problem of 
lands and privileges in his recording of the session of 
the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390, the last year of Juan I's 
reign. According to Ayala's statement, the situation had 
not improved very much during Juan l's reign in spite of 
his good intentions. The procuradores complained that 
Pedro, Enrique and other kings had given towns to certain 
knights and lords under the privilege of mixto imperio--
i.e., joint control by both the king and the nobleman in-
volved. Many noblemen refused to recognize the sovereign's 
part in the control of tnese lands, as a result of which 
royal control was being dissipated. The king ordered court 
quarrels to be resolved before the alcaldes ordinaries of 
the towns which be longed to the noble in question. If 
necessary the decision could be appealed before the 
monarch. 3 
Juan's decision not to violate any previous privileges 
was carried out continually during his reign. This is 
brought out by Ayala in another passage on the Cortes of 
Guadalajara in which lords and knights who had received 
lands from Enrique were afraid of a supposedly secret 
clause of ~nrique 1 s will,in which Bnrique had ordered 
these donations to be made into Mayorazgos--lands which 
in the case of no direct heir would revert to ti1e crown. 
Juan reassured them of his guarantee of tne integrity 
of all such donations.4 
In spite of Juan l's attempt to alleviate the situa-
tion, the problem created by the "Mercedes Enriquenas" was 
never really solved and would again become acute during 
the reign of his son and successor, ~nrique III. 
Nobility vs. Clergy 
A struggle between the nobility and the clergy 
manifested itself during Juan l's reign. A vigorous, 
reform-minded clergy led by Don Pedro Tenorio, Arch-
bishop of Toledo, was able to ally itself closely with the 
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pious monarch. This alliance was based on tne fact that 
the Archbishop saw a strong monarchy as tne necessary 
means of preventing rapacious nobles from encroaching on 
the lands of the church.5 Major religious reforms included 
the founding of three monasteries, Guadalupe, El Paular and 
San Benito de Valladolid, and tne installation of Carthusian 
monasteries throughout Castile. 6 
Ayala was intimately involved with several of the 
conflicts between the first two estates, and gives a de-
tailed account of them in the chronicle. The first great 
struggle took place in 1380 when abbots and abbesses from 
Castile and Leon came to the new king at Medina del Campo 
and complained that the great lords were taking lands and 
vassals from the monasteries. These monasteries, argued 
the clergy, had been founded by tne kings and could be 
traced back to the Cid. Juan I ordered two knignts and 
two doctors to arbitrate the quarrel. One of the knights 
was Ayala himself. The final decision was made in favor 
of the monasteries and the law was made public at the Cortes 
of Soria in 1380. Ayala adds that this law was obeyed 
during Juan's reign. 7 
Ayala's decision in favor of the clergy seems strange 
and extremely generous when one considers his family posi-
tion. This fact, however, is most logical if one takes into 
account the situation of the nobility under Juan I as 
studied by Luis Suarez Fernandez in Nobleza monarguia. 
Suarez sees reconciled in Juan I the formerly opposing 
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concepts of a stron~ monarchy and a strong nobility, 
which had been defended by Pedro I and Enrique II res-
pectively. He states: "Hacia 1380 el problerna politico 
castellano se plantea come una pugna entre dos posibles 
oligarquias - la de los parientes del rey y la de los prin-
cipales linajes de la se~unda nobleza. Por eso la ascen-
si6n de la oligarquia nobiliaria es, en su primers fase, 
un crecimiento de la monarqufa. 118 Juan I leaned for support 
on the lesser nobility and withdrew from the Trastamarans. 
Ayala, who belonged to the so-called lesser nobility, was 
unaffected by the decision to return lands and vassals to 
the monasteries, whereas otners, including the king's own 
relatives and .1.'amilies such as the Sarmientos, t.ne Velas-
cos, and the Manriques, lost much of their land and vassals 
to the monasteries.9 
Ayala's anti-clerical feelings become more manifest 
in another struggle which took place in the cortes of 
Guadalajara. There is a long passage in whicn he presents 
the complaints against the Pope, WHO was favorin6 Castile 
less than he was other kingdoms throughout Christendom. 
The following are recorded in the chronicle. Foreign 
clergy had no desire to live in Castile, and those few 
who did were of little worth, since they took the church 
income of gold and silver from the kingdom; the churc.nes 
were poorly served, since the best offices were given to 
people outside of Castile; since Castilians received no 
benefits, they were reluctant to have their sons become 
clergymen, with the result that learning was not en-
couraged. Ayala also stresses the unfairness in salaries. 
For example in one church in wr1ic.i:1 there were two canons, 
the Castilian received 2000 maravedis, w.tiereas the foreigner 
received 13,000. Juan agreed to send ambassadors to the 
Pope about these injustices. 
A more direct attack on the prelates of Castile can be 
found in Aya~a•s presentation of their requests at the 
cortes of Guadalajara to force knights and lords of the 
diocese of Calahorra, to which all the Basque areas were 
subject, to stop taking tithes. The prelates maintained 
that the nobles violated the Old and ~ew Testaments by 
interfering in clerical matters. Speaking for the nobility, 
Ayala presents a long, impassioned answer, throu~1 wnich 
his own views and tnose of his class are completely evident. 
The nobles argue that for 400 years it had been the practice 
for the nobles to take titnes and to provide eacn church 
with a clergyman, who would be supported by tne nobles. 
This privilege came to them as a reward for tneir crusade 
against the infidel at a time wnen no Christian church 
even existed in that area. 'r!-10 preservation of tne faith 
was due to the efforts of Cabdillos to whom the people gave 
a tenth of all their earnings to finance the fighting 
against the Moors. The nobles go on to say that as far as 
the Old Testament is concerned, it was also stated that 
those prelates who received tithes should have no other 
temporal goods. This was in direct contrast to the practice 
of the day, where the clergy now lrnd castles, cities, towns 
and vassals. Juan I decided that since tne Basque situa-
tion could not be cnanged without a scandal, it was better 
to leave things as they were. To the prelates' complaint 
that there were clergymen in some Dioceses wno were forced 
to pay taxes on lands bought from peasants, Juan answered 
that no clergyman would pay taxes for inherited lands, but 
that lands bou8ht for tne c.tiurch were taxable. 11 
That Juan I was by no means completely dominated by 
the clergy is evident in the fact that he openly appointed 
new Maestres de Santiago and Galatrava in 1384, after a 
plague which had taken the life of t.rrn former .r1aestre 
de Santiago. Ayala admits tnat tne king could order this: 
11 ••• e ficieron los Freyres de las dichas Ordenes segund 
12 el rey les mando." He also mentions the discontent it 
created because tne Maestre de Calatrava of tne Cistercian 
Order became Maestre de Santiago, while tne Prior of the 
Order of San Juan became Maestre de Calatrava. 1 3 The 
interesting thing here is Ayala's apparent approval of a 
monarch's interference in the affairs of the Military 
Order, a practice which he had censured in Pedro I's 
regime. 
The Jewish Problem 
• -.--, • I The Jewish problem, which had begun during ~nrique s 
regime, increased during the reign of Juan I. In 1379 
Don Jusuf Pichon, a rich Jew who, ironically, had served 
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the anti-Semitic Enrique II as contador mayor was tried 
and execute~ by his own people. Juan was furious at such 
an outrage and had this privilege of private criminal 
jurisdiction retracted.14 Though Ayala gives no further 
details, it is evident from a study of the documents of 
the Cortes of Soria that this event served as good pro-
paganda to enforce new anti-Jewish measures, among which 
was the prohibition against tneir taking charge of criminal 
cases. 0 ther measures were the c ornplete segregation of the 
aljamas and rigorous prohibition of proselytizin~. 15 This 
anti-Semitism of 1380 was directly related to the support 
whic11 Juan I sought from the clergy at that time.16 
The Titled Nobility 
What Suarez Fernandez calls la alta nobleza consisted 
mainly of Juan I's immediate family and certain foreign 
collaborators, all of whom were titled nobility. During 
most of Juan's reign they had little direct influence on 
the government of the realm until the Cortes of Guadalajara 
in 1390. The warriors and diplomats came from the baja 
nobleza, those who possessed lands but no title. •rhese 
were families such as the Ayalas, the Tovars, the Manriques, 
the Velascos, the Mendozas and the Quinones. 17 
The members of Juan's family were as untrustworthy 
in their loyalty to the crown as the Trastamarans had 
been under Pedro I. However, due to various circumstances 
and perhaps to a certain amount of good fortune on Juan's 
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part, they were unsuccessful in early attempts to rid them-
selves of their sovereign. It is probable thut the memories 
of the Civil War were too bitter. Ayala mentions the 
various attempts of Don Alfonso Enriquez, Conde de Norena, 
Enrique II 1 s illegitimate son, to incite a rebellion against 
Juan I. He and Pero Manrique, Juan's Adelantado Mayor de 
Castilla, were involved in an insurrection in 1380. Juan 
solved the situation by arresting Pero Manrique and appointing 
his brotner, Diego Gomez Manrique, to the post. 1 8 In 1381, 
Juan learned that his brother was in the town of Paredes 
de Nava, dealing with the king of Portugal. A reconcilia-
tion took place in Oviedo, after Alfonso had fled to 
Asturias.19 In 1382 Alfonso was in Braganza dealing again 
with Fernando of Portugal. Juan had to grant him lands and 
privileges and make him Condestable in order to force his 
brother into loyalty. 20 After another evidence of treason--
this time letters to the King of Portugal--Alfonso was ar-
rested and his goods in Asturias were confiscated. 21 
In 1385, Juan called together his advisers to see what 
should be done with his troublesome brotlier. Ayala's de-
tailed account indicates that Ayala was on the.king's 
advisory council. He presents Juan's whole case against 
Alfonso and shows the number of times when Juan pardoned 
him. The king had in fact given Alfonso more land and 
privileges than Alfonso had received from his own father. 
Nevertheless, Alfonso had since repeated dealings witn the 
King of Portugal; he had tried to arrange a marriage be-
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tween himself and .Uona Beatriz, daughter of tne King of 
Portugal, when he knew that Beatriz was already promised 
to Juan's son; Juan had had to bribe Alfonso to join him 
against Portugal in Zamora; Alfonso refused to attend the 
wedding of Juan I and Beatriz when Juan decided to marry 
her himself; instead, Alfonso went to Asturias and began 
pillaging the land; Alfonso had also dealt with the English 
at Bayonne. Juan wanted to execute Alfonso, since he 
himself had almost died in Seville of an illness and had 
fears of Alfonso's rebelling a 6ainst his infant son, Bnrique, 
in the event of his own death. Juan therefore, presented 
the problem of his rebellious brother to his advisory 
council. 22 
The answer to t.ne king, apparently formulated by Ayala, 
is a long discourse on the evils which arise when monarchs 
carry out their own justice. He lists crimes of such monarchs 
as Alfonso X, Sancho IV, Alfonso XI and Pedro I. Bnrique II 
is not included in the list. The outbreak of war between 
Castile and Aragon is attributed to Pedro l's murder of 
Don Fadrique and the Infante Don Juan de 1-~ra~on. Ayala 
states that putting the matter into the hands of the 
Alcaldes would make it look outside of Castile as though 
the Alea ldes were lac keys of tne king. He suggests that 
Juan should follow the procedure whicn King Jean II 
of France, father of Charles V, used wi tll his prisoner, 
King Charles of Navarre, who had been accused of dealing 
wi tn the English. 'l'he defendant was given tne best de-
89 
fense lawyers in Europe. However, the trial never took 
place because of Jean's capture at Poitou by the ~nglish 
and Charles of Navarre's escape from Paris. Ayala states 
that Juan an "ome de buena conciencia," wanted to follow 
this procedure. However tne suggested trial never took 
place, because of Juan's return to Portuga1. 2 3 Juan I's 
good conscience with Alfonso was to prove prejudicial to 
Castile, as the latter continued to sow rebellion during 
the subsequent reign of Enrique III. 
Pedro, Count of Trastamara, Tello's illegitimate son, 
had formed a plan to assassinate Juan I, marry Dona Leonor, 
widow of Fernando of Portugal, and proclaim himself and 
Leonor regents of Portu~al in the name of Fernando's daughter, 
Beatriz. This plan failed. 24 Ayala mentions nothing of 
tnis plot, but does indicate some former conflict between 
Juan and his cousin, when he speaks of tne return of Pedro 
to Castile from France, where ne had been banished. Don 
Pedro returned after the disaster of Aljubarrota in 1385 
and received the town of Paredes de Nava, which nad be-
longed to Alfonso. 2 5 
Juan's youngest illegitimate brother, Fadrique, Duke 
of Benavente, was a child during most of Juan I's reign, so 
he presented no immediate threat to the monarchy. However, 
by the time of Juan's death, he was one of the leaders of 
the alta nobleza which had been dispersed during the years 
of the Portuguese conflict, but w.hich at t.t10 Cortes of 
Guadalajara in 1390 demonstrated renewed vigor. From that 
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time the alta nobleza began increasing in number and power, 
led by the Duke of Benavente and tne Count of Trastamara. 
Juan l's death in that year unleasned new ambitions of the 
nobility, a fact which during the reign of ~nrique Ill 
would sabotage the monarchical gains achieved by his 
father. 26 
The Cortes and the Third Estate 
One of the great goals of Juan l's reign was the attempt 
at es ta bli shing a centralized monarchy through t.r1e c rea ti on 
or reform of such national organisms as the Gonsejo Real 
( of which Ayala became a member), tne 1rndienc ia, tne her-
mandades, and a rudimentary army. Modern historians con-
sider the last years of Juan's reign (1386-90) to be the 
high point of the Cortes in Spanish medieval nistory, mainly 
because t.tiese organi za ti ons received their true form at 
this time. The group mainly responsible for this success 
were the procuradores, or representatives of the cities--
in other words, t110 Third Estate. It is evident from 
Ayala's chronicle that he was unaware of the importance 
which the bourgeoisie nad in the formulation of tne country 
and of the institutions which it had developed. His main 
impression of the Cortes seems to be that many laws were 
passed which were often violated. 
Though Ayala discusses in detail many decisions of 
the Consejo, he says nothing of the importance of its forma-
tion. The original plan formulated for this advisory body 
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to the king was quite revolutionary, and came into 
effect during the Cortes of Valladolid of 1385. The Con-
sejo would consist of twelve members, four from each 
of the three estates--nobility, clergy and citizens. This 
council was to carry out all affairs of the kingdom except 
those which would be dealt with by trie Audiencia, a judi-
ciary body. The king explains tne creation of tne Con-
sejo as follows: 11 E nos por las sabre die.bas rrazones 
queriendo tomar exemplo dela Escriptura de Dias, fizimos 
esta ordenacion por ser mas aliviado delos trabajos que 
fasta aqui aviamos, e pudiessemos aver algund rremedio 
de nuestra enfermedat, e principalmente, para aver tiempo 
e manera para fazer justicia, la qual esta muy mengoada 
eneste rregno ••. 11 27 
This revolutionary representation given to tne citizens 
on the Consejo was short-lived; four doctors of law were 
substituted for the citizens by the King's request at the 
Cortes of Briviesca in 1387. Was Juan I under pressure 
from discontented nobles? An answer would only be con-
jecture, since nothing is mentioned in the documents of the 
Cortes. In addition to the removal of tne citizens, tne 
Consejo was limited to receivin6 and distributin6 petitions 
and to direct control only over the dispositions of income 
and appointment to government positions. Further, the 
Consejo Real would be appointed directly by the king. 28 
The Audiencia had been created under Enrique II at 
the request of the procuradores, but was completely re-
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formed at the Cortes of Briviesca. All problems of crimi-
nal and civil justice would go to the Audiencia r~ther 
than to the monarch himself. The place of rasidence of 
this judicial body was to be fixed in four areas: Medina 
del Campo from April to June, Olmedo from July to Septem-
ber, Madrid from October to December, and Alcal§ de Henares 
from January to March. The Audiencia would .have two 
classes of member, oidores and alcaldes, who would be paid 
and supported by the king. Tnere would be eight laymen 
and two prelates, two each from Castile, Leon, ~xtremadura 
and Andalusia. Each would serve for a six-month period. 29 
Its existence was not considered incompatible with the 
right of appeal to the king himself nor with the right of 
adelantados and merinos to carry out justice in their own 
areas of jurisdiction. The Audiencia insured the existence 
of a high Court of Appeal and Tribunal sustained bJ the 
Crown. 30 
A third measure to stabilize the kingdom was proposed 
at the Cortes of Segovia in 1386. This was the creation 
of the Hermandades or type of civil rural police force 
which was to be supported by the cities.31 The Hermandades 
were founded in 1382 during a session of tne Cortes which 
Sancho IV, then in rebellion against his father, Alfonso X, 
convoked in Valladolid. These, however, were basically 
groups of cities formed to defend their interests and 
privileges. They were destroyed by the succeeding monarchs, 
especially Alfonso XI. The actual model for this police 
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force was the Hermandad Vieja formed by the bee-keepers 
and archers of Toledo, Talavera and Ciudad Heal to defend 
the mountain roads. This was protected by the monarchs, 
and later evolved into a civil police force. Juan I in 
1386 incorporated this idea into the entire kin6 dom. 
Without mentionin6 any monarch, several statutes resemble 
el "Ordenamiento de Pedro I", proclaimed at tne Cortes of 
Valladolid in 1351.32 
The last great reform carried out by Juan I wc1s tne 
military reform--an attempt to establish some sort of 
standing army. This reform was also put into tne hands 
of the procuradores at the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390. 
Juan wanted the representatives to decide the number of 
lancers needed and how much each would receive. It was 
decided that royal lands should be distributed to a per-
manent force of 4,500 lancers and 1,500 Andalusian horse-
men, all of whom should receive 1,500 maravedis per year 
and necessary provisions such as arms, horses and mules. 
The king's brothers, the Duke of Benavente and tne Count 
of Trastamara, were given the difficult task of carrying 
out this provision.33 Ayala's view of this decision for 
a national army is a pessimistic one. He mentions the 
great difficulties involved in establishing an army, the 
confusion which it caused, and the problem of keeping royal 
soldiers from serving other lords as well as the king.34 
A sharp conflict arose between tne third estate and 
the first two estates over the issue of taxation. The 
extensive wars and tne 11 Hercedes Enriquenas 11 had greatly 
overburdened the citizens financially. In the Cortes of 
Burgos of 1379, the procuradores convinced Juan of the 
need for limiting these privileges, as we have already 
mentioned. In subsequent Cortes of 1380, 1383 and 1385, 
they protested so strongly against t.l:le abuses of the 
nobility that Juan decided to incorporate them into one 
branch of the Consejo Real. The rise in power of the 
third estate, it seems, is directly related to the tem-
porary downfall of the nobility because of w~rs and plagues 
and the disaster of Aljubarrota. In the Cortes of Hriviesca 
of 1387, the monarch decided to tax the nobility and clergy 
to meet the economic needs of the realm.35 Ayala mentions 
that the overwhelming protests of tne nobles and clergy 
prevented this law from going into effect.36 When Juan 
sought 45,000 maravedis from the procuradores to pay off 
the Duke of Lancaster at trie Cortes of Palencia in 131.-38, 
the citizens showed violent indignation--especially after 
the exemptions of the hidalgos were reinstated; they even 
demanded to examine the royal accounts.37 
Ayala mentions the tax situation in great detail at 
the Cortes of Guadalajara in 1390. He states that the 
procuradores had expected a reduction and were unpleasantly 
surprised by the king's request for a huge increase. A 
final agreement was made that t11e rnonarcr1 must put the 
expenditures of Castile in order with tne aid of the pro-
curadores. The king's weariness and disillusion are seen 
in his decision to turn the whole financial matter over 
to the city representatives and let them straignten it 
out.38 
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It is interesting that the Cortes of Guadalajara are 
considered to be evidence of a decline in the influence 
of the third estate and a renewal of power in the titled 
nobility. The Historia de Espana has this to say about 
the last Cortes of Juan's reign: 11 Se las ha considerado 
como las mas importantes, pero en ello tal vez influya la 
atenci6n minuciosa que les dedic6 en su Cr6nica Pedro Lopez 
de Ayala. 11 39 Ayala's view of the Cortes in general is 
reflected in a statement which he made about the Cortes 
de Segovia: 11 De muchas leyes y ordenamientos alli pub-
licados pocos se guardaron. 11 4° 
Ayala, Juan I and the Medieval Christian Ideal 
Pero L6pez de Ayala's description of Juan indicutes 
that he felt a sincere affection for the pious son of 
the audacious Enrique II. Ayala saw his king as a com-
pletely good person--so good that he was unsuccessful in 
many undertakings: " ••• fuera el rley Don Juan de buenas 
maneras e buenas costumbres e sin sana ninguna, como quier 
que ovo siempre en todos sus fechos muy pequena ventura."41 
A study of the Cortes completely corroborates Ayala's 
opinion. Juan I lived as the Father of his kin~dom and 
suffered for his people. The number of religious reforms 
and provisions of the Cortes also indicates to what extent 
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the king was tryin~ to improve tne conditions of Castile. 
Among the reli6ious provisions of t.tie Cortes during Jui:in Ir s 
reign are the following: Any person wno insulted a con-
verted Jew was to be fined or imprisoned; all women who 
had immoral relationsnips with members of the clergy 
were to wear a red cloth so that they could be distinguished 
from honorable married ladies; fasting and prayers were 
required to help Castile, while mourning was to be worn 
for the country's sins; there were measures against evil 
customs such as the clergy's having mistresses; vagabonds 
(who could be forced to work one month without pay), gam-
bling in public or in private; and against bigamy. Weeping 
and disfiguring of faces was prohibited during burial 
ceremonies, since such demonstrations led people to believe 
tnat one did not conform to God's will. J·uan's sincerity 
and humility are most evident in his desire to terminate 
the custom of having the people of a certain town or vil-
lage come to meet their sovereign witn a cross or religious 
image in hand. A king in Juan I's view was a temporal 
ruler and should therefore go to the Cross, not vice versa. 
Juan I at the Cortes of Valladolid in 1385 had a speech 
read in which he developed nis interpretation of the role 
of the monarchy. ~he sovereign was to be a representative 
of God on earth and custodian of order, peace and justice.42 
Ayala could not help but admire a monarch who re-
presented to the fullest extent possible the ideal of a 
Christian monarch. Both Juan I and his chronicler were 
dominated by the chivalric spirit of Franc0 and wore dis-
tressed by the apparent lock of ideals in the nobility 
and clergy of Castile. 
The interest which Ayala had in chivalry is cloarly 
evident throughout the Cr6nica de Don Juan~. One example 
is the rather romantic story o'f: the King o'f: Armenia whoso 
kingdom had been invaded by the Sultan of Babylonia and 
who sought aid for his ransom from the Christian monorchs 
of Europe. Ayala emphasizes that Juan I sent many jewels, 
whereas the King of Aragon only sent letters.43 Two years 
later, in 1383, a huge reception was prepared in Badajoz to 
receive the recently liberated monarch. The King of Ar-
menia dismounted, knelt before Juan and threw off his hat 
in gratitude. Juan presented him with gold and silk 
cloth, jewels, money, silver dishes and the towns of 
Madrid and Andujar, plus a pension of 150,000 maravedis 
a year.44 This chiva.lric gesture on the part of Juan I, 
so admired by Ayala, caused great resentment on the part 
of the Castilian subjects, who were suffering the pains 
of war and over-taxation.45 
Juan I should be credited for making a serious attempt 
to straighten out the anarchy which was rampant in Castile 
as a direct result of the years of Civil War. However, most 
of the progressive measures Gaken were done so at the in-
sistance of the procuradores, who became very influential 
betweenlJ85 and 1388, during a period when much of the 
nobility was incapacitated by the ravages of war and the 
plague. The failure of his attempts and ti:rn renewed 
vigor of the nobility in 1390 would represent a regression 
in the internal policies of Castile. 
Neither Juan I nor Ayala seemed to be fully aware 
of the revolutionary importance of the third estate, but 
clung tenaciously to the chivalric ideals of the past. 
Juan I's Foreign Policy 
In contrast to Enrique II, Juan I was a failure in 
foreign affairs. Ayala himself admits this and attributes 
it to the king's other-worldly nature.46 The costly wars 
with Portugal and England were more than a little respon-
sible for the king's difficulty in putting into practice 
with efficiency many of the new measures enacted by the 
Cortes. Castile's excessively pro-French stand and im-
perial designs in Portugal were partially the reason why 
the international situation was so complicated to resolve. 
Ayala recognized the folly of Juan I's designs in Portu-
gal; he did not have such insight in regard to the An6lo-
French struggle. 
The Iberian Peninsula and tne Papal Schism 
The Anglo-French conflict was directly involved with 
the Papal Schism. Charles V of France had immediately 
supported Clement VII, while the English favored the 
legitimist Pope, Urban VI. The Iberian peninsula at the 
time of Enrique II's death in 1379 was neutral, and the 
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four major kingdoms--Castile, Navarre, PortuGal and 
J\ragon--rema ined undecided for one year. Boti:1 Popes 
considered the peninsula important enougr1 to dispatch 
messengers immediately to convince the monarcns of their 
right to the Papal throne. 
Pere III Bl Ceremonioso of Aragon made great efforts 
to create a bloc of neutralism throughout the peninsula 
in an attempt to keep it free from the conflict between 
France and England.47 Evidence from: the Archive de la 
Corona de Aragon shows a letter dated Dec. 27, 1379, from 
Pere III to Juan I, announcing the reception of Juan's 
ambassador to France, Pero L6pez de Ayala. In this letter, 
El Ceremonioso expresses his desire to consult with Juan 
about the Schism, so that they can be in accord about what 
action to take. 
Barcelona - 27 - Die - 1379 
"Quante al feyto de los Pappes ete que los ditos 
messageros vros. nos han faulado de part vra., tos 
hemes feyta haver tote aquella infonaaci6n quehemos 
podida haver e la feTuos encara por personas sole-
nnas de nro. Regno recibir, e al mas antes que podre-
mos, sobre esti (sic) feyto e otros, nos embiare-
mos nros. messageros informados de nra. intenci6n. 
E certificamosvos, hey muy car fillo, que a nos 
plazerA muyto que vos e nos seamos una cosa e una 
voluntat a determinarnos sobrel dito feyto. Y 
assia que al dia present sean venidos a nos messa-
geros del rey de Francia, sobre esta raz6n, certi-
ficamosvos que a ellos ni a otros no faremos cierta 
respuesta sogre esto entro le hayamos con vos con-
cordada ••. 114 
Zurita also mentions a great meeting which was to be 
effected between the two monarchs and the outstanding 
persons of each kingdom. 
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11 Luego que sucedi6 en Castilla el rey Don Juan, pro-
cur6 el Hey de Aragon su suegro, que ambos se con-
certasen en lo que tocava a declararse cerca de la 
union de la Iglesia, y que diessen la obedicncia al 
que entendiessen que era verdadero pastor, y vicario 
della y canonicarnente elegido • 11 ••• 11 Allende de 
los perlados se avia de juntar las personas mas 
senaladas en letras de sus rleynos. 11 49 
It is curious that Ayala, w.t10 was directly involved 
with Bn Pere I s proposals, never mentions them in the c.t1ronic le. 
His report of the Schism in the Cr6nica del Hey Don Juan I 
deals with the King of France's ambassadors to Castile, 
who were consul ting with Juan on the matter and the ar-
rival of messengers of Urban VI at the Castilian court. 
Juan I called a meeting of learned men and prelates who 
gathered in Hedina del Campo to argue the issue. 11 .8 
avian sus disputaciones, ca el fecho era peligroso e muy 
dubdoso, e non se podia tan aina declarar. 11 5° 
At the beginning of 1381, Juan I voted for Clement VII. 
Once again Castile followed in the footsteps of Charles V. 
Since Fernando I of Portugal had also voted for Clement, 
any hopes of Gastilian neutrality were snattered, while 
French diplomacy was triumphant. In Aragon and Navarre, 
the reigning monarchs remained neutral until their deaths 
in 1387. The heirs to the crowns, Charles III of Navarre 
and Juan of Aragon, abandoned their fathers' neutrality 
and also voted for Clement VII.51 
Juan's pious fervor and pain are reflected in his 
letters addressed to Christendom in general, which Ayala 
inserts in the chronicle. The tone is one of despair 
over the Papal split. 
"O de voe ion corrornpida del pueblo eris tiano .•. 11 
".A d6 es, a d6 es la Fe de Jesu Christo?" 
"Como se escurecio el sole el guiador lumbroso 
de la verdad, e como los carros resplandecientes 
de luz son trastornados en tinieblas? 11 52 
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The length and eloquence of tnis portion of tne chronicle 
are sufficient to indicate Ayala's preoccupation with 
religious matters. His avoidance of the matter of a 
possible neutrality indicates his stron~ pvo-French 
sympathies. 
Castile and the War with Portugal 
Juan I's greatest mistake was his desire to be monarch 
of Portugal. It was his policy with this kingdom that 
led to the near destruction of Castile both morally and 
economically. 
In 1380, Juan I and Fernando I of Portugal agreed on 
the marriage of Juan's first-born son, the Infante Don 
Enrique, to Fernando's only daughter, Beatriz. Both monarchs 
agreed that since they were first cousins and great-grandsons 
of Sancho VI of Castile, they should be allies. It was 
agreed also that one would inherit the crown of the otner 
in case either died without leaving an heir.53 
Evidence from the Portuguese chronicler Fernio Lopes, 
however, indicates that the treacherous Portuguese monarch 
was dealing secretly with England, because many of his 
opponents were Francophiles, especially the powerful Bishop 
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of London.54 Juan Francisco Andeiro, a Port;ul_:!;uese noble-
man who had fled to England after Santarem, was responsible 
for the Anglo-Portuguese alliance of 1380. It was de-
cided that one thousand men would go to Portugal under t.ne 
orders of Edmund, Duke of Cambridge, who would marry 
Fernando's daughter, Beatriz, and become heir of Portugal. 
Andeiro, meanwhile, in his secret mission to Portugal, 
became the paramour of Fernando's wife, Queen Leonor, a 
development which would prove to be important in future 
events.55 
When Juan I learned of t.trn Anglo-Portuguese plans, 
he immediately went to Zamora and declared war on Portu-
gal. Because of Castilian readiness on land and sea (twenty 
Portuguese galleys were captured immediately), Fernando 
hastened to send Alvar Perez de Castro (Ferrando de Castro's 
brother) to Juan I to undertake negotiations. An agree-
ment was reached in which the Infanta Dona Beatriz would 
marry the Infante Don Fernando, Juan's second son, rather 
.than Don Enrique. The Portuguese monarch was thus assured 
of the continued separation of Portugal and Castile.50 
Another factor which influenced Fernando's decision 
to abandon the English alliance for a Castilian one was the 
diplomatic and material difficulties with the ~nglish. 
The English disembarked without horses, so that they were 
nearly useless in battle. The Duke of Cambridge brought 
Papal Bulls of Bxcommunication against those w110 supported 
Clement VII--a dangerous policy in a country whose clergy 
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and nobility were strongly F'rancophi le. When the power-
ful Portuguese nobleman, the Count of Ourern, died in 1381, 
the title was given to Andeiro, through the influence of 
Queen Leonor. He then abandoned the English cause which 
he had previously so strongly defended.57 
In 1382, the situstion was favorable to Castile due 
to the breakup of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and in-
ternal dissension throughout Portugal itself. There was 
strong opposition to the lascivious Queen Leonor, to tr10 
corrupt administration of the King, and to the useless 
war.58 
The real troubles began for Castile when Juan I de-
cided to marry Fernando's daughter himself ratner tnan 
hand her over to his son. Thus, Juan would inherit Portu-
gal if Fernando of Portugal had no sons. Fernando's wife, 
Leonor, would be regent until a son of Juan and Beatriz 
should reach fourteen years of age. Their son would then 
become king of Portugal.59 Of the wedding itself Ayala 
has little to say: "E alli fueron fee.bas grandes fiestas 
estando y los Senores e Hicos omes e cavalleros de Portu-
6al e muchos de Castilla. 1160 According to Fernao Lopes, 
Juan 1 1 s wedding with Beatriz was due to the initiative of 
Queen Leonor, who was looking for support against Portu-
gal's rebellious nobles, since Fernando I was dying. She 
was disillusioned upon meeting Juan I personally and re-
marked to Fernando's illegitimate brotner, the Maestre 
D 1Avis, on the day of Juan I's wedding, that she wished 
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he were more of a man.61 
One motive for Juan's desire to become monarch of 
Portugal not mentioned by Ayala was to unite PortuGal to 
the system of Franco-Castilian defenses and to deny the 
English access to Guropean ports from Antwerp to Gibral-
tar. This policy, which gave Castile exclusive control 
over the route to Flanders, would excite the already 
hostile burghers of Oporto and Lisbon to open rebellion. 62 
The crisis arose with tne death of Fernando I. Juan 
immediately had Fernando's brother, the Infante Don Juan, 
arrested in Castile, out of fear tnat the people of Portu-
gal would claim him as king. 63 He then sent men and arms 
into Portugal to enforce tne agreement previously made with 
Fernando that he should be king and Leonor regent, until 
Beatriz's son was fourteen years old. Some of his advisers 
suggested that he go to Salamanca and negotiate his posi-
tion. Ayala seems to have been one of them, to judge from 
his lengthy description of the advisability of a more 
conciliatory position. 64 In Portu6al, the regency of Leonor 
was partially controlled by "emperogilado" (i.e., Anti-
Pedro) emigrants such as Juan Alfonso Baeza and Fern~n 
Alfonso de Zamora. She was opposed by the Consejo neal 
of the realm. On December 3, 1383, her lover, Juan 
Ferrandez de Andeiro, was assassinated in the Queen's 
chamber by the Maestre D 1Avis, ~10 was extremely popular 
in Lisbon. 65 A Bishop of Lisbon, originally from Zamora, 
who had been a privado of Fernando I, was killed by a mob 
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in the bell tower of tHe main churcn wnere 110 n&d tc1ken 
refuge after hearini:; of Andeiro's death. Queen Leonor, 
upon seeing the gravity of 'her position, made a deal with 
d'Avis and escaped to Santarem. The people of Lisbon 
clamored for d'Avis as regent for either Don Juan, Fernando's 
brother, or Dona Beatriz, Fernando's daughter and wife of 
Juan I of Castile.66 
While Juan I was in Portugal attempting to aid tne 
desperate Dona Leonor, he learned that she, her brother, 
Don Gonzalo Mendez de Vasconcelos, and Juan l's cousin, 
the Count of Trastamara, were conspiring to assassinate 
him and proclaim tne Count as King of Portu6 a1. 67 Ayala 
states that the question of whether or not to arrest her 
was bitterly debated by Juan's advisers. Those against 
such a measure maintained that sJ:10 had previously handed 
over Santarem to Juan willingly. Those in favor of arresting 
her wanted her safe in Castile, where she could cause no 
trouble.68 Ayala seems to have been against her arrest. 
However, she was taken to Castile and shut up in the con-
vent of Santa Clara de Tordesillas, a measure which caused 
her supporters in Portugal to join the forces of d'Avis. 69 
1304 and 1385 are the years of major catastrophe in 
Juan's designs in Portugal. Ayala describes tne period in 
minute detail--the plague in the Castilian forces besieging 
Lisbon, which took over two thousand lives; the failure 
of a Castilian blockade, when a heroic Portugue~e noble-
man sacrificed himself and several small ships to permit 
106 
the entry of a convoy bringing goods from Oporto to Lis-
bon; and finally the humiliating Castilian defeat at Alju-
barrota. Ayala's accounts of t.l:10 entire war are extremely 
objective--but this is not surprising, since he himself 
obviously was against the war in t11e first place. Ayala 
attempted to show why the war was absurd without openly 
criticizing Juan I, whom he admired in all other aspects. 
One method which Ayala uses to present his dissention 
is by reporting discussions between Juan I and his advisers, 
specifying clearly the pros and cons of a certain question 
and then adding a phrase which indicates tnat he nirn.self 
was not in agreement witu tne final decision. One example 
of this was in 1384, when Juan I returned to Lisbon and 
found that the Castilian camp was being rava6ed by plague. 
He then called the advisers togetner to determine whet.tier 
to besiege the city or to make war throughout otner areas 
of Portugal. Those against staying in Lisbon were mainly 
concerned with the plague, but also mentioned tnat without 
an effective blockade, the siege was ineffective. Those in 
favor of fighting in Lisbon wanted to capture d'Avis and 
Lisbon since he was the leader of the opposition, while 
Lisbon was the center of the supply lines of Portugal. 
Juan I decided to continue the siege. Ayala ends the 
passage witn these words: "E fue muy grand dano, segund 
adelante oiredes. 1170 
Another method which Ayala uses to indicate his 
personal opinion witnout expressing it directly, is by pre-
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senting the arguments for his views in more detail. For 
instance, in 1385, Juan I held a council meetin~ to decide 
whether to enter Portugal wi tn a full force to 111eet d 'Avis 
who was advancing toward Coimbra, or to leave fronteros 
and withdraw tr1e main Castilian force. Tt1e argument in 
favor of a full-scale invasion is only tnat d'Avis would 
rtot dare to fight a full force. Those opposed to the in-
vasion had several arguments: if the king died, no one 
could lead his troups, since the other leaders had diod 
, 
of the plague; Juan's captains were young and inexperienced; 
d'Avis was brave and would most certainly fight. In addition, 
Juan did not have enough money to pay those soldiers holding 
towns; if they actually saw him without money, they would 
rebel. He should distribute goods from the ships to 
various posts and return to Castile. Juan decided to 
enter Portuga1.71 
Ayala's account of the disaster of Aljubarrota is a 
long description of prudent battle technique. In this 
case Juan was advised to have the Castilian force let the 
Portuguese attack first. This defensive policy was more 
practical because of a valley in front of the two wings of 
the Gas ti lian f orrna tion, which would .tlinder any offensive 
action. Also the Portuguese only had one day's supply 
of food and would have to attack. An old and experienced 
French knight was in complete agreement. However, some 
young knights who had never been in battle convinced the 
king that this was cowardly; thus, the Castilians took the 
offensive. The passage dealing with Aljubarrota ends 
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thus: "L, d ' 1 f. uro a por 1a de la batalla, antes que pare-
ciese quales perdi,m o ganaban, media hora asaz pequena. 11 72 
Ayala also makes it clear that Juan's claim to Portu-
gal was extremely unpopular with the Portuguese. In 1383, 
Juan I sent a knight of Santia~o, Alfonso L6pez de Tejada, 
to take letters to the Queen of Portu6 al and the important 
nobles, asking that they obey the agreement made between 
him and Fernando I. All professed a1sreement. Ayala then 
says: "empero avia algunos que maguer asi lo decian, non 
lo tenian en voluntad. 117 3 After Fernando's death, Don 
Enrique Manuel, Count of Sintra, went through the streets 
in Lisbon with a banner crying "Real, Real, Portogal, 
Portogal por la Reina Dona Beatriz. 11 74 Ayala states that 
many knights were upset and feared the union of Castile 
and Portuga1,75 Over d 1 Avis 1 usurpation of the Portuguese 
monarchy in 1385, Ayala states: "e plogo dello a todos 
los mas del Regno de Portogal, asi cibdades e villas, como 
Fijos-dalgo e otros, salvo aquellos que tenian la parte del 
Hey de Castilla, e de la Reyna Dona Beatriz ••• 11 76 
In 1386, Castile was recovering from the effects of 
the plague and Aljubarrota, when Juan learned tnat the Duke 
of Lancaster was in Galicia.77 Lancaster and D'Avis met 
at Oporto ano agreed to make war on Castile in full force. 
D1Avis, a Cistercian monk, should obtain a Papal dispensa-
tion and marry Philippa, Lancaster's daughter. D'Avis 
would be rewarded with towns and villages in Castile. Lan-
caster agreed to make no treaty with Juan I without con-
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sulting D'Avis first--a promise which he promptly broke. 78 
The Anglo-Portuguese advance began in the su.rmner of 
1387. The Castilians were saved by a plague which forced 
the invaders to return to Portuga1.79 D'Avis' aspirations 
were abruptly frustrated with the Anglo-Gastilian agree-
ment signed at Bayonne in 13SB. In 1389, D'Avis and Juan I 
signed a six-year non-agression treaty which followed a 
three-year Anglo-French peace treaty. Portugal would return 
all lands taken in Galicia, and Juan would return lands 
taken in Portugal.Bo 
That Juan I was extremely unhappy over this peace 
treaty is evident in Ayala's recording of the year 1390. 
Ayala explains in detail Juan's plans, whicr1 he had been 
formulating for six years, to leave his kingdom to his son, 
Enrique. Juan planned to retain Seville and Cordoba, the 
Diocese of Jaen, the kingdom of Murcia and the Se5orio 
of Vizcaya. His reasons were the following: All Portugal 
refused him as king, because people feared tne union of 
Castile and Portugal. Therefore, he would keep many ter-
ritories but not the title of king of Custile. Finally, 
he wanted to organize everything for ~nrique, who was 
young. Ayala's presentation of the Consejo's answer re-
presents a definite, unanimous NO to Juan's request. He 
mentions the evils of partitioning kingdoms, using the 
example of the wars caused by the partitions of Fernando 
el Magno. The Portuguese do not want Juan I; if he cannot 
subdue them as the powerful king of Castile and Leon, how 
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can he hope to succeed without this title? In addition, 
it was bad policy to have two separated areas such as 
Andalusia and VizcaJa under one monarch with Castile under 
another. Ayal·a uses the simile of bees to illustrate that 
the hive functions better under one queen. If ~nrique 
were monarch, Castile would be severed by a division of 
command. When Enrique came of age, his desire to possess 
all of Castile would most likely lead to a new civil war. 
Also any son of Juan I and his Portuguese wife, Beatriz, 
would also want to inherit Juan's land in Castile. If Juan 
did not manage to become ruler of Portugal and trie ivloors 
attacked, he would not be able to defend his reduced pos-
sessions. The Consejo 1 s final argument was that a king 
does not rule wisely until the age of 25, and the Infante 
Don Enrique was still a child. 81 
Although the Gonsejo was able to convince Juan I 
to abandon this fantastic scheme, the Castilian monarch 
still planned to settle accounts with Portugal. At the 
Cortes of Guadalajara, Juan I made it clear that tne war 
with Portugal was definitely not finished. To those wno 
complained about the loss of cities and honor, the monarch 
responded that the realm was weary of war and taxes, and 
good captains were lacking. All should rest for six years, 
after which period he would certainly renew the war. 82 
The Portuguese crisis of 1383 revealed an internal 
debility which had lain dormant beneath tne victories of 
the previous fifteen years--a victory of tne nobility and 
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reconstruction of the country based on a new signorial 
regime. Under Juan I of Castile the nobility continued 
triumphunt; in Portugal tho middle-class was victorious.83 
Ayala saw clearly the folly of Juan l's Portubuese 
policy. However, he, as a member of the signorial class, 
did not appreciate the importance of D':Avis' victory in 
Portugal as a triumph for the third estate in that country. 
Castile and the Anglo-French Struggle 
After the peace with Navarre in 1379, Castile turned 
its eyes once again to England, since the war wi tr1 the 
English involved the most vital economic interests of 
the kingdom. The British military situation improved, 
when Charles VI or France alienated the population of 
Brittany by incorporating that land to the French crown. 84 
Castile sent eight galleys to help the French king against 
the English, who were aiding the Duke of Brittany. The 
Franco-Castilian force took the castle of La H.oche Guyon 
at the mouth of the Loire, a fortress whicn had belonged 
t h . 85 o t e Duke of Brittany. 
From the beginning of 1380, the governrnen t of Hi chard II 
was willing to accept Aragonese mediation for peace in 
Castile. The Castilians, however, were unwilling to give 
up their traditional Francophile policies for neutrality. 
Ayala reports Enrique II's desire that Juan 1 continue his 
pro-French policy, whereupon messengers were sent to 
Charles v. 86 Ayala himself was one of the ambassadors 
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to the French court, a fact which explains his own Franco-
phile position. He held this post intermittently from 
1378 until 1384, and it is now believed that he spent one 
end a half years--from April 1381, until the end of 1382, 
in France in close contact with the 1'1 rench court. 87 
In 1380 the new king sent 20 galleys under the Castilian 
admiral Ferrand Sanchez de Tovar to aid Charles V. 'I'he 
Franco-Castilian fleet attacked the coasts of southern 
England, pillaged Winchelsea and even entered the mouth 
of the Thames. 88 This, however, was the high point of the 
maritime threat to the English presented by tne Franco-
Castilian alliance. Witn the deatn of tne energetic 
French monarch, Charles V, and the Castilian involvement 
in Portugal, the control over English Channel--so important 
for the maritime cities of Castile--was left to private 
initiative. 89 
In 1381 Castile became involved in the war with Portu-
gal, and thus with the English, who were sending men to 
Portugal under Edmund of Cambridge.90 Since Juan I knew 
that the Portuguese and English were gathering horses and 
mules for an invasion of Castile, he kept his own companies 
. t b , 91 together for six months near the Por uguese oraer. 
Later, Bnglish designs in the peninsula were foiled by the 
secret alliance between Fernando I and Juan I in 1382. 
While Castile was involved with Portu~al, Flanders 
became the major scene of the Anglo-French discord. Ayala 
describes the situation in some detail, which indicates 
llJ 
that he was probably present. The Plemings rebelled ae:;ainst 
the Count of Flanders and defeated him near Bruges. 'l'he 
Count sought aid from Charles VI, thirteen year old monarch 
of France, who went with his uncles, the Dukes of Berry, 
Burgundy and Bourbon to crush the rebellion. Ayala des-
cribes the care taken of the youthful king and the honors 
given to twenty-six French knights who died in battle. 
Ayala was at the battle as camarero of Charles VI--a fact 
which indicates his influence in the French court. 92 
The fall of Bruges in 1382 provoked a collapse in 
international relations. France's interest in the rebel-
lion was based on the fact that the Duke of Burgundy was 
heir to Flanders. Castile's interest was to protect 
Bruges, which was the principal market for Castilian ex-
ports. The battle of Roosebeke on Nov. 27, 1382, permitted 
Castile to establish a monopoly in wool comrnerce. 93 
An English counter-offensive took place in 1383, 
when a huge force entered Planders and encircled Ypres, 
a French possession; Ghent supported the invaders. 
Charles VI sent 22,000 men--the best knights of France, 
including the Dukes of Berry, Burgundy and Bourbon. Ayala 
says that the Duke of Brittany arranged a treaty, when 
it was clear that the English cause was lost--a fact which 
proved that he favored the English, accordin6 to Ayala. 94 
That Ayala was on his way to France in 1384 is known 
by the existence of a safe-conduct pass issued to him on 
February 17 of that year.95 Ayala was at the side of the 
llL~ 
Dukes of Berry and Burgundy when tne Treaty of Lloulogne 
was signed between France and England in September of 
1384.96 In May of the same year, the Count of Flanders 
had confirmed Spanish economic privileges in Flanders. 
The route to Flanders had come to be tne spinal column 
of Castilian economy. 97 Ayala does not mention eitner 
agreement in the chronicle. His portrayal of the Flemish 
situation is an account of glorious, chivalric warfare, 
while the economic aspects of Castile's interest in Flanders 
are completely ignored. 
In 1385 the Iberian peninsulu once again became a 
main center of the Anglo-French struggle. The failure 
of the siege of Lisbon by the Castilians awakened the 
merchants of London, who saw in the victory of tne 
Maestre D'Avis a chance to break the Castilian economic 
monopoly of the Atlantic. 98 The Duke of Lancaster decided 
to take advantage of the opportunity to assert his claim 
to Castile, and was prepared to help D'Avis. Juan I re-
acted by asking Charles VI to aid. 99 
A treaty between England and Portugal had been signed 
on May 9, 1385, at Windsor. Lancaster agreed not to make 
peace with Juan I except for an indemnity of 200,000 pounds, 
enough to cover the deficit for the mobilization of a great 
fleet. 100 England, meanwhile, looked to En Pere of Aragon 
for an alliance, but the king of Aragon maintained strict 
neutrality, and even offered to mediate between Lancaster 
and Juan I. An agreement between Richard II and the Duke 
115 
of Lancaster at Westminster on April 38, 1386, contained 
clauses to assure liberty of con®erce in the future between 
the respective monarchies. This brougnt about the active 
support of London merchants, who had traditionally been 
opposed to Lancaster's designs in the Iberian peninsula. 101 
The British fleet left Plymouth on July 8, 1386, and 
immediately took La Coruna--the first British victory since 
the battle of La Rochelle. Santiago de Compostela was 
captured, Urban VI proclaimed Pope, and the city of Orense 
was converted into a temporary court for the English. 
During 1386 the British were negotiating with both the 
Castilians and the Portuguese. An agreement was made with 
Portugal at the Ponte do Moura, in which Lancaster, upon 
taking the Castilian throne, would alter tne frontier of 
Castile to give Portugal more territory. The line would 
be drqen through Ledesma, Plasencia, Caceres, Merida and 
Zafre. 102 
A pestilence in his troops caused the Duke of Lancaster 
to seek a secret treaty with Castile. In an exchange of 
heralds, Juan I and the Duke eactl gave his reason for 
claiming the Castilian crown. Juan based his claim on his 
descent from Fernando de la Cerda, and offered to settle 
the question in hand-to-hand combat in order to avoid 
shedding more Christian blood. Lancaster claimed the throne 
through his marriage to Pedro I I s daughter, Constanza, and 
through Dona Leonor, Fernando el Santo's daughter, who 
had married the King of England. Secretly they proposed 
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a solution of the problem by an agreewent to have Juan's 
first-born son, Enrique, marry Catalina, daughter of 
Lancaster and Constanza. 103 ·rhis time ~ngland betrayed 
Portugal by signin6 tne Treaty of Bayonne in 1388 with 
Castile. The provisions of the treaty were the following: 
Both monarchs would work for peace between ~ngland and 
France, and for tne union of the Papacy. ~nrique of Castile 
would marry Catalina of .England within two months. The 
couple would receive Soria, Almazan, Atienza, Deza and 
Molina; Juan should declare Enrique and Catalina his heirs 
at the Cortes. Lancaster and Constanza would ~et 600,000 
gold francs and 40,000 francs per year for the rest of 
tneir lives; Castile would not increase galley contri-
butions to France. Pedro's sons, whom Enrique II had 
arrested, would be released within two years; and goods 
previously confiscated would be returned to Pedro de Castro, 
Ferrando de Castro's son; all Castilians who had helped 
Lancaster would be pardoned. Inheritance of Castile would 
go in the following order; Enrique; ~nrique's sons; 
Fernando, Juan l's second son; other relatives of Juan I; 
the Duke and Duchess of Lancaster and their daughter, 
Catalina. Lancaster would renounce his right to the Castilian 
crown for as long as he received payments from Castile; Juan 
gave his brother, Fadrique, and other knights as hostages 
until certain debts were paid. Constanza would receive 
Guadalajara, Medina del Campo and Olmedo. 104 
After the Treaty of Bayonne, Lancaster attempted to 
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weaken Anglo-F'rench ties even further. He proposed, 
for example, that English pilgrims and merchants be 
permitted to go to Santia~o de Compostela, but the 
Castilians feared doing anything which would violate the 
Franco-Castilian alliance. 105 
By 1389 exhaustion was general in most of Burope. 
A three-year peace treaty was signed between ~ngland and 
France, followed by a six-year treaty between Castile and 
Portugal. 'l'ne treaty with Granada was even extended in 
1390 immediately before Juan I's death. Juan's feelings 
of any further war against the infidel at that moment 
are expressed by Ayala's explanation of the treaty: "E 
el Rey, entendiendo queen aquel tiempo asi complia a su 
servicio, otorg6lo e firm6 con el sus treguas par cierto 
tiempo. 11106 
Conclusion 
Pero L6pez de Ayala presented the Portuguese situation 
in a clearly objective manner, because he himself was 
against Castilian policy, while sympathizing with Juan I 
as a man. His detailed reports of the discussions in the 
King's council indicate that he was present at council 
debates and in respect to Portugal was mostly against 
Juan l's final decisions. 
In respect to England and France, Ayala was much more 
partial. He neglects to admit that the treaty of Bayonne, 
signed in 1388 after a long war, could have been signed 
1H3 
much sooner, if Juan I had bellowed ~n Pere's policy of 
neutrality in regard to the Papacy and the strugGle between 
England and France. In fact, the idea of neutrality is 
never even mentioned in the chronicle. 
In Castile itself, ,.yala slights tne importance of 
t.t1e laws enacted in the Cortes which provided for the basis 
of national rather than signorial rule of the kingdom. And 
his family position kept him from appreciating the contri-
butions of the third estate. However, it must be added that 
Ayala was in Portugal during tte period between 1385-1388, 
when the Cortes reached their hi§lest point of development. 
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LA CRONICA DBL .KEY DO:N EiHUQ-u~ III 
When Enrique III became monarch of Castile in 1390 
at the age of eleven, he found a kingdom whose treasury 
was exhausted and whose nobles were anxiously waiting to 
take advantage of the youthful king for their own profit. 
Ayala describes the first seven turbulent years of Enrique's 
reign in minute detail, and in ttiis chronicle, more than 
any of the preceding ones, we can see that tne chronicler 
was completely loyal to the crown and openly critical of 
those rapacious nobles who opposed the authority of the 
king. 
The Archbishop of Toledo versus the Arcnbis.t1op of Santiago 
After Juan l's burial, nobles, prelates and represen-
tatives of the towns gathered in Madrid to set up a 
regency, since Enrique III could not rule until he was 
fourteen years old. The problem immediately arose as 
to what sort of government should rule the kingdom in the 
king's name. Ayala mentions that Juan I had made a will 
while he was in Portugal, which Ayala and others had signed 
as witnesses. Because all knew that Juan I had later 
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changed his mind about many provisions of this will, 
it was decided tnat even if it were found, it should be 
ignored. Two forms of government were proposed--rule 01' 
regents or rule by consejo. •rne Arcnbish<?P of Toledo pro-
posed followin6 the Segunda Partida of Alfonso X, in which 
it was stated that one, three or five re gen ts be appointed 
if a monarch died without leavin6 a will and while the 
heir to the throne was too young to rule. The Archbishop 
of Santiago and many others, including Ayala, favored rule 
by consejo with all classes represented. Ayala's view-
point here is evident, since he mentions the model of 
Charles VI of France, who had a Consejo until he was 
twenty years of age. Ayala also emphasizes the bad results 
of "tu tores II and II regidores II in the history of Gas tile 
and Leon. '' ••. e ficieron muy grandes sinrazones e muertes 
e robes en el Regno, por lo qual grand tiempo lacer6 el 
Regno, fasta que el Hey ovo edad de catorce anos que tom6 
su regimiento e cesaron las tutorias. 1 
No decision had been reached in the conflict between 
a consejo and tutorial regency, when several nobles, in-
cluding Ayala, found Juan l's will in an old coffer. Most 
of the nobles were displeased with the discovery, since 
Juan I had later changed many decisions in it, including 
the regents he had named. Most of those present were in 
favor of burning the will, but the Archbishop intervened 
with the excuse that some donations to the church were 
found in it. He then kept it himself. 2 
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The will presented no immediate problem, however, 
and the conflict continued to flare between those who pre-
ferred the Segunda Partida and those who preferred a con-
se j o. Bes ides the Arch bis.nop of Toledo, tnose who pre-
ferred this form of rule were mainly those of the upper 
nobility such as the king's relatives, who, according to 
Ayala, wanted more influence than other knights and pre-
lates. The Archbishop of Santiaco led the lower nobility 
and the third estate, who preferred a consejo in order 
to keep the upper nobility from having too much power.3 
The final acceptance of a consejo was a triumph 
for the Archbishop of Santiabo. Ayala himself was one of 
the advisers named along with the Duke of Benavente, the 
Count of Trastamara, the Archbishops of Toledo and San-
tiago and others. To the eight nobles, there were to be 
fourteen representatives of b1e cities, a seemingly great 
victory for the third estate. This victory was only ap-
parent, however, for the consejo was mistrusted and tnere-
fore rendered almost impotent by numerous restrictions. 
Advisers were not to give or take away privileges other 
than those designated by Juan I at the Cortes of Guada-
lajara; no government positions could be given or taken 
away, except upon the request of tne citizens of the towns 
involved; Juan l's foreign policy was to be followed; no 
taxes could be levied, unless absolutely necessary and ti:ien 
only after the approval of the Cortes. All letters had to 
be signed by four regents, one from eacn estate. With the 
rivalries between tne members of the consejo, this was 
not an easy task. Ayala says ":2; luego se cornenz6 todo 
esto a guardar bien, empero adelante non se guard6 tan 
bien. 11 4 
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The procuradores did manage to take momentary advan-
tage of the strife between the various factions of the 
nobility in order to pass a law devaluatin3 the coins 
called blancos, which had been created by Juan I when he 
needed money. Ayala agreed with this measure, whereas 
many nobles were opposed to it. "B todas las gentes del 
Regno se quexaban con aquella moneda, ca las cosas valian 
grandes sumas, e las tierras e mercedes que los Senoras 
e Caballeros e otros omes avian de los Reyes no les apro-
vechaban, por quanta ge lo daban segund la cuenta de la 
dicha moneda, e les daba en pai:.:;a aquellos blancos. 11 5 
The effectiveness of tne regency was almost immediately 
impaired by the Archriishop of Toledo, who had been in favor 
of the Segunda Partida and therefore refused to swear 
loyalty to the Consejo. After great pressure was put on 
him by the other members, he finally agreed to cooperate 
in order not to cause a scandal throughout the kingdom. 
According to Ayala, he acquiesced because one of the .E.,!'.£-
curadores warned him that his life would be in danger if 
he did not do so. The Archbishop tnen left the court in 
Madrid and began sending letters to the Pope, to the Car-
dinals, to tne kin~s of France and Aragon and to tnose whom 
Juan had named as tutors in the will, saying that the Con-
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sejo was not valid, because Juan I had left a will de-
signating regents for his son. rle enclosed copies of tho 
will in the letters c1nd kept the original document.7 The 
conflict was aggravated furt11er when tue rulin6 body bei:;an 
handing out jobs and lands against the provisions accepted 
at the Cortes of Madrid. The kingdom inevitably divided 
into those in favor of the will and those in favor of the 
Consejo. Ayala stresses the gravity of this situation by 
saying that every city and town had two par ti es - 11 :2: c ada 
partida decia sus razones asaz fuertes para afirmar su 
opini6n, e sabre esto avia muches contiendas e escandalos. 
E ovo en muchos logares par esta razon muertes e PE?leas, 
e las que podian mas echaban & las otros de la cibdad o 
villa do estaban, e ton1aban las dineros del Hey e avia 
poca avenancia e obediencia en todo el Hegne, e muchos 
escandalos, e mucha discordia. 118 
Those who were on the Consejo were forced to promise 
more lands and pri vi leg es than those granted by Jw.m I, in 
order to have followers. 11 .c; de aqui se comenz6 mucno a 
desgastar e desordenar el Hegne ••• E las Cavalleros del 
Hegna, desque vieron tal desordenarniento, no curaban de 
nada, e todo se robaba e coechaba. 119 The city of Burgos 
proposed a meeting of the Cortes in that city to settle 
this scandalous affair. An agreement was finally reacned, 
which represented a resounding victory for the Archbishop 
of Toledo and his followers. It was decided that rule by 
Consejo be abandoned and that Juan l's will be followed 
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with certain modifications. nyala praises the role of 
the third estate of the city of Burgos in arranging a 
solution. 11_t: todo esto se fizo muy bien, e con grand costa 
de la cibdad de Burgos, por guarder servicio del rtey e del 
Regno. 1110 
Ayala presents the will of Juan I in its entirety in 
the chronicle. Six regents were named: the Marques de 
Villena, the Archbishop of Toledo, the Archbishop of San-
tiago, the Maestre de Calatrava, the Count of Niebla and 
Juan Furtado de Mendoza, plus six citizens from Burgos, 
Toledo, Leon, Seville, Cordoba and Murcia. Ayala, as 
Alferez de la Banda, was one of the witnesses who signed -- . 
tne will. 11 At the Cortes of Burgos, it was agreed to in-
crease the number of regents from six to nine, so that the 
Duke of Benavente, the Count of Trastamara and Maestre de 
Santiago could be includect. 12 
The great problem which rule ace ording to Jmm I I s 
will created was how to resolve situations in which Juan's 
orders given after the will was written conflicted with 
the provisions of the will itself. For example, Juan Al-
fonso de Guzman, Count of Niebla, was one of the six ori-
ginal regents named. Later, however, he was made Adelantado 
Mayor de la Frontera: no adelantado could be a tutor, so 
therefore he was ineligible for that post. Similar situa-
tions arose in the granting of lands and privileges. In 
the will, Medina del Campo and Olmedo were to be given to 
Juan's second son, tne Infante Don Ferrando. Meanwhile 
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those lands were given to Pedro I I s daug.h ter, Constanza, 
following the treaty between Castile and ~ngland, signed 
several years after the will was written. 1 3 
As one can well imagine, numerous conflicts of this 
sort caused incessant strife throughout t:rie kingdom. Ayala 
says that many provisions were made in conflict with what 
Juan I had designated in the will in order to keep people 
happy and to avoid scandals. Ayala's view of the effective-
ness of the regents is expressed in a few words: 11 E con 
todo esto los die.hos tutores nunca eran entre si bien 
avenidos, e cada uno queria ayudar al que bien queria, e por 
ende muchas vegadas se olvidaba el provecho e bien co-
munal. 11 l4 
The young king was so disgusted with the regents that 
he went to Burgos in 1379, several months before his four-
teenth birthday, and publicly announced at tne monastery 
of Las Hue lg as that .rm was going to rule by .himself . 15 
After his fourteenth birthday, he convoked the Cortes at 
Madrid and immediately revoked all laws made by tne re-
gents. 
The end of the regency marked a definite victory for 
the Archbishop of Toledo, wno became privado to Enrique, 
while the Archbishop of Santiago began to lose influence 
in the governing of the kingdom. The latter joined forces 
with his former enemies, t110 king's family, who were also 
distressed about the influence of the Arcnbishop of Toledo. 
Ayala says that the Archbishop of Santiago finally left 
Castile, lost his possessions and allied himself with 
16 the Roman Pope. 
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Ayala was actually irnpartial in this strug6le between 
the two prelates, althougn ne naa been allied to tne 
Archbishop of Santi~go as long as the kingdom was bein6 
ruled by the C onse jo. Ayala's opinion of the dispute 
between these two personalities is expressed in the fol-
lowing words: "E nin la una partida, nin la otra no facian 
mencion de la manera de governamiento que avian primero 
tornado, que era el Consejo, nin curaba de ello. 1117 Of 
the two Archbishops Ayala says: 11 Fecnado ne a el ac:_;raz 
Ferrezuelo a Manchagaz; pero si Manchagaz se suelta, Fe-
rrezuelo es en revuelta. 1118 
The upper Nobility 
Enrique's uncles, the Duke· of Benavente and the Count 
of Norena; his aunt, Leonor, Queen of Navarra; and his 
second cousin, the Count of Trastamara were intimately 
involved in the affairs of the regency and reign of Castile. 
They tried to take advantage of the monarch's youth in order 
to gain more lands and privileges for themselves, and were 
therefore constantly opposed to the crown, which depended 
largely on the lesser nobility and tne bourgeosie for 
support. 
In 1390, when Enrique became king, Fadrique, duke of 
Benavente, and Pedro, Count of Trastamara, refused to pay 
f . d 19 homage to him until all of their privileges were con 1rme • 
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Fadrique then tried to increase his power by demanding 
to be married to the Countess of Alburquerque, the woman 
with most lands and money in Castile. Because such a 
marriage would have jeopardized the position of the monarch, 
it was decided that the Countess marry ,t;nrique's brother, 
the Infante Don Ferrando. 20 
During the discussions at the Cortes of Madrid in 
1391, Fadrique and Pedro favored the system specified in 
the Segunda Partida, one, three or five regents--themselves 
included. When the Consejo was accepted as the form of 
rule, both joined the opposition and allied themselves to 
the Archbishop of Toledo. 
After the agreement at Burgos, which increased the 
number of regents from six to nine, a problem arose when 
the members of the Consejo decided to liberate the brother 
of the Duke of Benavente, Alfonso, Count of Norena, who 
had been imprisoned under Juan I. This was done so that 
Alfonso would join the faction of the Archbishop of San-
tiago against the Archbishop of Toledo. A stalemate was 
reached when the Archbishop of Santiago's faction insisted 
on increasing the number of regents to ten in order to 
place Alfonso on the governing body. 21 
In 1392 the Queen of Navarra resolved the situation 
by convincing Pedro and Fadrique that Alfonso's alliance 
to the Archbishop of Santiago was only temporary and that 
the four relatives should be united. Two groups of regents 
were finally agreed upon, each group ruling for six monthso 
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One group was to be made up of Fadrique, the Archbishop of 
Toledo, the Maestre de Santiago, and Juan Furtado de Men-
doza. The other consisted of Alfonso, Pedro, the Arch-
bishop of Santiago and the Maestre de Calatrava. Two 
other regents, the Marques de Villena and the Count of 
Niebla, were disregarded, since they had refused to appear 
at court. 22 
Fadrique caused further trouble by threatening to 
marry the illegitimate daughter of the Maestre D'Avis, 
who had seized the throne of Portugal. The other regents, 
including his ally, the Archbishop of Toledo, begged him 
not to take a step which would ruin the honor of Castile. 2 3 
Fadrique•s insistence on such a tie caused great concern 
in the kingdom, due to the hos ti le re la ti ons be tween C as ti le 
and Portugal. Fadrique kept responding that he mistrusted 
the king's advisers and sought aid from Portugal. Ayala's 
reaction to Fadrique 1 s flimsy excuse is precisely expressed 
in the words 11 ••• aquellas irnaginaciones que tenia. 1124 
It was finally agreed that Fadrique receive more money 
each year, plus an additional sum to help him find a 
suitable wife in place of the Maestre's daughter. 25 
When Enrique III took personal control of the kingdom 
after three disastrous years of regency, he decided to 
cancel all privileges distributed during the regency and 
revert to Juan l's instructions in all financial matters. 
This procedure was necessary for stabilizing the regime; 
however, it alienated the members of the upper nobility 
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whose allotments were considerably reduced. 26 
Fodrique began sending letters to small villages and 
towns, demandin6 that they pay taxes to him rather than 
to the king. If the citizens refused, they would be ar-
rested. Ayala states that tr1ose villa6es which disobeyed 
were greatly harmed. 27 The king also learned of conspiracies 
between Fadrique, Pedro, Alfonso and the Queen of Navarre, 
and therefore sent a messenger to investigate the situation. 
An agreement was finally reached between Enrique lII and the 
Duke of Benavente under the following conditions: the Duke 
was to keep the taxes which covered any amount of money 
due to him and repay the rest; his yearly salary was to be 
substantially raised; however, he had to hand two of his 
castles over to the king, and his most important vassals 
had to swear to abandon his service in case of any 
hostilities between himself and the monarc.b. 28 
No sooner had the agreements between the king and 
Benavente been settled when Pedro and Leonor of Navarre 
began to conspire. This time Enrique lost .t1is patience 
and immediately had all the villages of Trastamara and 
Benavente confiscated. He then proceeded with one thousand 
men to pursue the Count, who escaped to Galicia. The Queen 
of Navarre war ordered to stop robbing territory of Castile, 
and her jurisdiction was restricted to a reduced area. 29 
To make matters worse, Alfonso, Count of Norena, 
began fortifying Gij6n and Oviedo. Alfonso also used the 
excuse that the king was controlled by privados, and refused 
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to go to court until Enrique reached the age of twenty-
five. En route to Asturias to punish Alfonso, ~nrique 
stopped in Leon. There, after a solemn Mass in the 
Iglesia Mayor, he decided to confiscate all of Alfonso's 
possessions, giving the following reasons: The rebellious 
brother of ~uen I had always caused trouble and had only 
been released as a political pawn during the regency. He 
had then received more money and land after his release 
than he had had under Enrique II or Juan I. Still he had 
left the court and was taking taxes for himself witnout 
the king's permission. He also refused to take an oath 
to obey the peace treaty with Portugal, and finally was 
fortifying his holdings throughout Asturias. Ayala empha-
sizes the pious attitude of the king at the time of this 
decision, thereby expressing overt approval of the king's 
actions: 11 .E porque es to fuese c i erto, que luego, pre sen tes 
los que y estaban, lo juraba asi en las manos del Obispo 
de Leon, que alli estaba, sobre la Cruze los Sanctos 
Evangelios. 11 30 The king's troops took Oviedo and began 
the siege of Gi j 6n wi tn the aid of the Count of Tras ta-
mara, who had begged the king's pardon. Since winter was 
approaching, the king wisned to end tnis siege as soon as 
possible. Finally he and ~lfonso agreed to send ambas-
sadors to the king of France within six months and let the 
French monarch arbitrate the dispute between them. During 
those months, the king would keep all of tne Count's lands 
6 . 31 except Gij n, where Alfonso was to remain. 
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The meeting between the F'rench king and the ambassadors 
of Snrique III and ~lfonso took place in Paris in the 
summer of 1395. Ayala's long, detailed description of the 
proceedings is ample proof that he was one of the repre-
sentatives of the Castilian monarch. There is no doubt 
about his own feelings in the matter, as is evident from 
the words of Enrique's ambassadors: 11 -2: a lo que decia 
(Alfonso) quel Rey de Castilla le tomara la tierra de 
Asturias sin raz6n e sin derecho, a esto responderian 
ellos delante del Rey de Francia, non asi como delante juez, 
mas come delante amigo del Rey de Castilla, su Senor, por-
que viese e oyese que lo quel Rey de Castilla ficiera, lo 
ficiera con raz6n e con derecho. 11 32 To the Count's assertion 
that the young king was controlled by privados, Ayala says: 
"Eel conde no ponia excusas ningunas que paresciesen 
razonables." 33 Ayala adds that 1-1.lfonso secretly warned 
those of the French court that the privados of Castile 
were pro-Bnglish. 0 f this, the chronicler says: "E 
todo esto decia el Conde por poner alguna sospecha entre 
el Hey de Francia eel Rey de Castilla. 11 34 Charles VI 
of France vacillated in his decision and attempted to 
prolong the period of compromise. Enrique's ambassadors, 
however, refused to extend the time limit without their 
king's permission, especially since many of the king's 
advisers had been opposed to placing an internal matter 
into another sovereign's hands for arbitration. Finally 
Charles VI ordered Alfonso to obey his king and refused 
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him aid of any sort--food, ships, arms or men. Enrique 
ended the threat of his rebellious uncle by having the 
town and castle of Gij6n destroyed.35 
Tha Jewish Problem 
The situation of the Jews, which had become progressively 
worse since the reign of Enrique II. and which had been 
practically ignored by Ayala in previous chronicles, is 
presented quite openly in the Cr6nica del Hey Don ~nrique III. 
During 1391, the Consejo received a complaint from 
the Jewish community of Sevilla that a certain clergyman, 
el Arcediano de Ecija, was preaching public sermons against 
the Jews and exciting the population to an anti-Semitic 
frenzy. When two officials of the city had a man whipped 
who had done a great deal of harm to many Jews, the whole 
city tried to assassinate the officials. Ayala states 
that the fervor aroused by this zealous priest spread 
not only through the Castilian cities of Cordoba, Burgos, 
Toledo and Logrono, but also to the Aragonese cities of 
Barcelona, Valencia and Lerida. The aljamas were completely 
destroyed, and those few Jews who escaped remained 
miserably poor, because they had to 6 ive all their money 
to the great lords for protection.36 As to the motives 
for such behavior, Ayala uses a masterpiece of under-
statement: 11 E todo esto fue cobdicia de robar, segund 
paresci6, masque devocion. 11 37 The chronicler adds that 
the Moors would have suffered the same fate, were it not 
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for tne fact that the Castilians were afraid of reprisals 
against th~ Christian captives ir1 Granuda. Ayala mentions 
that the Archdeacon had pre ache<; such anti-Semi tic sermons 
before Juan I's death, but tha: the discord among the 
rulers of the regime under the youthful ~nrique had un-
leashed the barbaric passions of people who were unafraid 
of punishment.38 
Ayala's presentation of the internal situation of 
Castile under Enrique is complete and told in great detail. 
He was disgusted at the discord between both the Prelates 
and the upper nobility and therefore took no one's side. 
He obviously resented the end of the Consejo, since he had 
been named as one of the original consejeros, and he openly 
proclaimed the superiority of this sort of rule over that 
of the regents. 
Foreign Policy 
Enrique Ill's youth and the internal problems caused 
by it led Castile to a period of pacifism in external 
affairs. One must also take into account the economic 
triumph which Castile had won in the Low Countries, under 
Juan I, and the increased trade which would be jeopardized 
by a foreign war. Finally the risin6 danger of the Ottoman 
Empire forced the Christian nations to attempt to form a 
common front against tne new threat from the east. 39 
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Navarre 
Immediately before Juan l's death at the Cortes of 
Guadalajara in 1390, two ambirnsadors from Navarre arrived 
at the Castilian court with letters from Carlos III, 
Juan l's brother-in-law. He requ~sted that Juan I send 
Leonor, his wife and Juan l's sister, back to her husband 
to live with him according to her matrimonial vows. She 
had been in Castile for ~wo years, ostensibly due to illness, 
and refused to return to Navarre. Leonor insisted that 
her husband had treated her badly, tnat she had not been 
paid her monthly allowance, and tnat in order to live, she 
had been forced to pawn her jewels. She even feared that 
her life was in danger and t1,a t a Jewish doc tor at the 
court of Navarre had tried to poison ner.4° 
Juan I I s counselors advised trwt sne return to l'rnvarre, 
if Carlos III agreed to take an oat.l:l to guarci her safety 
and to hand over certain areas to Castile as security. The 
Navarrese ambassadors naturally refused to accept these 
conditions, since Navarre could lose these lands through 
one word from the Queen. Ayala emphasizes Juan I's be-
wilderment in this matter, because he was extremely fond 
of his sister, but also was desirous of seeing ner live 
as a Christian wife. Ayala also mentions tne fact that 
some of those who were with Leonor in Navarre considered 
this fear of poisoning to be a figment of her own imagina-
tion. A compromise was finally agreed upon to send Juana, 
Leonor's first-born daughte½ to her father in ~avarre. 
This was important to Carlos III because he still hud no 
legitimate sons and was not likely to have any under the 
existing situation. He therefore wanted to be certain that 
his first-born daughter marry someone of whom he approved. 
If she remained in Castile, he would have no choice in 
this matter.41 
During the first year of the regency, Bnrique III re-
ceived ambassadors from several kingdoms, among wnom were 
ambassadors from Navarre. They continued to plead with 
Enrique to force his aunt to return to her husband. Be-
cause of Leonor's meddling in internal Castilian affairs, 
Enrique finally forced her to return to Navarre at the 
beginning of 1395, thereby resolving a situation which uad 
been causing ill will between Castile and Navarre for 
nearly seven years. Two bishops, legates of Benedict XIII, 
witnessed the oath of Carlos III not to harm his wife. It 
was understood that Castile would attack Navarre if anything 
happened to the Queen. Ayala adds tnat the king of ~avarre 
received the Queen and her company very well, a note which 
seems to indicate that her fears were probably imaginary 
and that .Gnrique III had done well to send her out _of 
Castile .42 
Portugal 
Enrique III sent ambassadors to Portugal in 1392 in 
order to extend the peace treaty with Joao I (the 
Maestre D•Avis). They returned reportin~ no a~reement, 
and blamed this on Fadrique, because of his scheme to 
marry D'Avis' illegitimate daughter. D 1Avis, seeing the 
dissension in the Castilian nobility, wanted to demand 
more favorable terms for Portugal before granting an exten-
sion of the treaties. Enrique then sent a new group of 
ambassadors, including Ayala, to Portugal. 43 The meetings 
were held in a neutral town near Ciudad Hodrigo. 1rhe Portu-
guese tried to use Fadrique as a bargaining power, which 
seems to have ctroused the wrath of the Castilian ambassadors. 
Their reply is a statement typical of Ayala: " ••. que pues to 
en la guerra pasada oviera algunas perdidas, que esto era 
aventura de guerras e tiempos que aciolescian los Regnos, 
ellos Principes e los Senores; e quand Dies place aderesza 
sus fechos, e despues, come el doliente guaresce, asi 
guarescen e tornan sus fechos e sus honras contra sus 
adversarios •... e que les era mejor aver sosiego, que poner 
bollicios en estos fechos. 11 44 The influence of Divine 
Will is often used by Ayala to explain historical events; 
here he uses it as a warning to the enemies of Castile. 
'fuough the Portuguese tried to delay settlement until 
seeing what further action the Duke of Benavente would 
take, the Castilians managed to arrange a two-month 
interim, which was later prolonged.45 Ayala here seems 
to have been partly responsible for Castile's diplomatic 
success, since the first ambassadors had failed to bring 
about an extension of the treaties. 
The Portuguese, however, continued to demand terms 
humiliating to the Castilians--the return of two neutral 
towns to Portugal; twelve noblemen and twelve citizens 
as hostages for twelve years; a promise from Bnrique III 
not to aid or grant favors to his mother, Beatriz of 
Portugal, or to the Infantes Don Juan and Don Donis, sons 
of Pedro of Portugal, who were in Castile. Ayala states 
that Castile acceded to Portuguese demands because of 
Enrique's youth, fear of an alliance between D'Avis and 
Fadrique and lack of funds in the Castilian treasury. Ayala 
also makes it clear that the treaty and its conditions were 
discussed thoroughly in the Consejo before the ambassadors 
were permitted to sign it. The fact that Castile at this 
point was willing to suffer a grave affront to its honor 
indicates that the kingdom was far too exhausted for war. 
The peace treaty was finally signed in May of 1393, and 
was to last for fifteen years.46 
Granada 
Luis Suarez Fernandez cites Enrique Ill's most bel-
ligerent attitude in foreign politics as his desire for a 
war against Granada. The reason which he gives for this 
is the rise of the Turkish Empire and the fear of a new 
wave of Islam in the peninsula. In 1391 Mohammed V, an 
old friend and ally of Pedro I, died. In 1392, Mohammed 
VII took over the throne and started a campaign to avenge 
some of the damages which Granada had received from the 
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frontier territories of Castile. When the Hoors enterod 
Murcia, they were soundly defeated by the Gt1ristians and 
were forced to respect the treaties, whicn were then kept 
until 1405.47 
Ayala relates in great detail a rather novelesque 
event which almost caused strife between Granada and 
Castile in 1394. The Maestre de AlcAntara had challenged 
the Sultan of Granada to a battle by sending him a letter 
stating that Christianity was holy and Islam a false 
religion. If the Sultan denied this, he would have to 
fight the Castilians, but he would be given a two-to-
one advantage regardless of the number of rnen involved in 
the battle. By tne time ~nrique III 1 s messengers arrived 
at Ale an tare to prevent a rupture of t11e tree ties by the 
crusading Maestre, the latter was en route to Cordoba. 
Ayala indicates that the Maestre's cause was popular maong 
the people of C6rdoba, because ti1e knights of that city 
were unable to prevent his passing over the bridge en route 
to Granada for fear of the hostile reactions of the popu-
lace should they attempt to do so. The Maestre explained 
that he owed more obedience to the faith than to the king, 
and refused to retreat.48 In Alcala la Real, near the 
Grenadine border, two knights tried to dissuade the 
Maestre by assuring him that neither he nor Andalusia 
was prepared for hostilities, and that only harm could 
come from breaking the treaty. They proposed that he 
offer to fight two Moorish knights on neutral ground; 
if the Moors refused, Granada would be dishonored, not 
Gas tile, and the treaties would be pre served. 'rhe Maestre, s 
men were pleased with the knights' advice and hoped that 
the situation could be resolved in such a simple manner. 
The Maestre, who expected a miracle, obstinately insisted 
on entering Moorish territory. Ayala did not admire the 
Maestre's actions as an example of chivalric behavior, 
but rather thought him a superstitious fool, as is indicated 
by these words: "Empero lo uno el Maestre era ome que 
avia sus imaginaciones quales el queria; otrosi cataba en 
estrelleria e en adevinos, e tenia consigo un hermitano 
que iba con el, que decian Juan del Sayo, que le decia que 
avia de veneer e conquistar la Horeria. 11 49 The Maestre 
insisted on fighting and in spite of a valiant battle 
fought by the Maestre and his followers, most of the 
Christians were killed or captured, except for a few who 
managed to arrive safely at Alcala la Rea1.5° 
Enrique III's advisers told the monarch to prepare 
for war, since it was rumored that the Moors were incensed 
at the Maestre's actions, and no one was certain of what 
actions they would take. The king was warned to show the 
Sultan that no Moor should dare to invade Castilian ter-
ritory, no matter what the provocations had been. But 
as the king and his forces were headin~ toward Toledo, the 
king received messages from Granada that tne Moors were 
interested in preserving the treaties.51 
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The Papacy 
When Pope Clement VII died in 1394, the College of 
Cardinals met and agreed on the necessity of working for 
the reunion of the Church. In an effort to bring about 
an end to the Papal schism, Pedro de Luna, a Cardinal from 
Aragon, was elected Pope, taking the name of Benedict XIII. 
Soon after, the Cardinals began to dissociate themselves 
from the new Pontiff, because he wanted to move the 
Apostolic See to Rome. 
Ayala describes in detail the intrigues through which 
the French tried to force Benedict XIII to renounce his 
claim to the Papacy. The Dukes of Berry, Burgundy and 
Orleans were sent to Avignon to confer witn him. 
They insisted that his renunciation of the ?apacy was the 
only way to bring about reunion of the Church. Benedict, 
on the other hand, insisted that tne only way to end the 
scnism was to •meet with tile Roman Pope and Cardinals and 
come to an agreement wit.ti them. Ayala's sympathies with 
Benedict are reflected in his statement that some Cardi-
nals agreed with the Pope's plan but did not want to go 
against the wishes of the French monarchy. He mentions 
that the only cardinal who openly opposed Benedict XIII's 
renunciation was a Spaniard from Pamplona.52 And Ayala's 
commentary on the Pope's proposal that eacn side elect 
a certain number of representatives to vote for the true 
Pontiff was 11 ••• respondioles asaz bien e legitimamente."53 
That Ayala was probably in Avignon during the dispute 
is evidenced by the fact that ne was ambassador to ~ranee 
during this period. Meregalli sug6ests ttrnt the ambas-
sadors had passed through Avignon, where Ayala had stayed 
at least during the month of May while the Dukes of Berry, 
Burgundy and Orleans were in Avignon conferring with the 
Pope. 54 
England and France 
Enrique III followed Juan l's example in his dealing 
with England and France. Treaties with both countries 
were confirmed during the regency in 1391, and no serious 
problems arose thereafter. In 1393, when Lancaster sent 
word to his son-in-law that he had not received his yearly 
allotment during the past two years, Enrique had tne money 
sent immediately to Bayonne.55 Castile's increasingly 
neutral attitude is somewhat reflected in the Papal con-
flict and in the objections of some of Bnrique Ill's 
advisers to Charles VI's mediation between Enrique and the 
Count of Nore5a. However, a greater factor in tnis neutrality 
was the temporary truce between France and England them-
selves, symbolized by the meetings of Richard II of England 
and Charles VI of France at Calais in 1396. Ayala describes 
the meetings and celebrations in great detail, and mentions 
the monarchs' decision to found a church, Saint Marie de 
la Faix, to commemorate the historic event. Valuable 5ifts 
were exchanged and treaties were confirmed. Richard II 
then received Isabelle, Charles VI's daughter, as his 
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wife, whereupon the French monarch began to weep. Ji.ya la, s 
report terminates with several requests which Isabelle 
made to her father; these included the preservation of peace 
between England and France and the cooperation of the two 
countries in the reunion of the Christian Church.56 
Conclusion 
Ayala's sympathies lay with the monarch, with the lesser 
nobility, and with the third estate, all of whom were working 
for the union of the realm. In contrast to his position 
during the reign of Pedro I, he criticized the members of 
the higher nobility, who actually were behaving in a 
similar fashion to the Trastambrans under Pedro I. Ji.yala's 
change of position can be attributed to the fact that under 
Pedro, he was an outsider as far as the workings of the 
regime were concerned, while under ~nrique III ne became 
one of the principal advisers to the king. Ayala's resent-
ment against the Archbis11op of 'foledo and t.i:1e members of 
Enrique's family is natural, when one considers tnat he lost 
influence when the Consejo was replaced by rule through 
regents, all of whom came from the upper nobility or the 
higher clergy. 
In foreign affairs Ayala was a pacifist; he was 
instrumental in arranging peace treaties with Portugal, 
end favored the reunification of the Papacy. He sympatnized 
with the new Aragonese Pope Benedict XIII--a change from 
his usual Francophile position--a view, however, which 
was snared tnroughout the Iberian peninsula. Finally, 
Ayala's description of tne Anglo-French situation toward 
the end of the fourteenth century reflects optimism for 
tne future political and spiritual unity of Europe. 
Ayala I s disillusion with t.t1e upper nobility and critic ism 
of the Maestre de Alcantara's crusading folly ~ive the 
impression that he had become less interested in chivalric 
gestures and gradually more interested in the practical 
aspects of everyday domestic politics--a centralized 
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CHAPTEH VII 
LITEHAHY DEVICES IN 'r.t-1E CHHONICLES 
Ayala's principal interest tj1roughout the cnronicles 
is political and this dedication oi purpose often detracts 
from his literary style. However, tne various methods 
whic.h he uses to give life to the day-by-day events re-
corded are of interest not only to the historian but to 
the literary scholar as well. Ayala gives some variety 
to the chronicles by the abundant utilization of speeches, 
letters, messages, dialogue and brief character analyses. 
Description 
The Castilian chronicler, because of his ratner cold, 
analytical nature, is often overly reserved in descriptive 
writing. He cannot compare with his French contemporary, 
Froissart, in this respect. however, tnere are a few 
descriptive passages in Ayala which can be studied for 
their literary merit--particularly those dealing with 
chivalry and with certain dramatic events. On the other 
hand, scenes of local color and human interest are dry 
and generally uninspired. 
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Chivalric Behavior 
Ayala has a special interest in chivalric description, 
which is especially preva}-ent in the chronicles dealing 
with Pedro I and Juan I. In the Cr6nica del Rey Don Pedro!_, 
we can observe the knightly behavior of Bnrique de Trasta-
mara, his allieg, Du Guesclin, Audreheim and the Prince 
of Wales which form a contrast to t.t10 barbaric actions of 
Pedro I. 
After the victory of Pedro and tb.e Black Prince at 
N~jera, Audreheim and Du Guesclin are taken prisoners. 
Audreheim is brought before the Prince and accused of 
violating an oath not to fight against the Black Prince, 
except under his own king. The accused knight gives 
the following defense of his actions, which pleases the 
Prince: 
"Senor: verdad es que yo fui preso en la batalla de 
Piteus do mi senor el Hey de Francia fue preso: 
e es verdad, senor que yo vos fice pleyto omenage, 
e vos di mi fe, que non me armase contra el Rey de 
Inglaterra, nin contra vos, fasta que toda mi rendicion 
fuese pagada, la qual aun non he pagado, salvo si 
me armase con el Rey de Prancia mi senor viniendo el 
por su cuerpo, o con al6 uno o algunos de su linage de 
la Flor de Lis. E Senor, yo veo bien que mi senor 
el Rey de Francia non es aqui, nin ninguno de su 
linage de la Flor de Lis; pero con todo esto yo non 
s6 caido en mal caso, nin fementido; ca yo non me 
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arme hoy contra vos, que vos non sodes hoy aqu{ el 
cabo desta batalla, ca el Capitan e cabo desta 
batalla es el Rey Don Pedro, ea sus gages ea su 
sueldo como asoldadado e ga~ero venides vos aqui el 
dia de hoy, e non venides c orno may or des ta hues te. 1 
•.. los doce Caballeros jueces que el Principe or-
denara para oir e librar este pleyto, segund dicno 
avemos, entendieron que el Mariscal decia razon, e se 
defendia come Caballero: e dixeron al Principe, que 
el Mariscal respondia bien, econ derecho: e dieronle 
por quite de la acusacion que el Principe le facia. 
El al Principe ea todos los Caballeros plogo mucho 
que el Mariscal toviera buena razon para se escusar, 
porque era buen Caballero. 111 
Du Guesclin, also a prisoner after Najera, presents 
another aspect of chivalric behavior, whicn has to do with 
tne ransorn of prisoners. He asks to be ransomed, but tne 
Black Prince considers him such a great knight that he 
prefers to keep him prisoner rather than pe~uit him to 
help the Frencl1. Du Guesclin is pleased by the Prince's 
esteem, but at:"sain expresses the desire for freedom, wnere-
upon the Prince asks him to name his own ransom price. 
Though Du Guesclin is poor, he sets the sum at 100,000 
gold francs as a point of honor for his own worth. Ayala 
praises the actions of all concerned: 
"E acordamos de poner este fecho en este libro corno 
pas6, por que acaesci6 asi a este Caballero que fue 
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preso en la batalla de Najera: otrosi por contar los 
grandes e nobles fecnos que los buenos facen: ca el 
Principe de Gales en todo lo que fizo en este fecno 
fizo como Grande, primeramente en poner a rendicion 
a Mosen Beltran, porque non dixesen que avian rescelo 
los lngleses a un solo Caballero: e otrosi fizo bien 
en dexar la finanza en alvedrio de Mosen Beltran, e 
non mostrar cobdicia ••• e Otrosi fuele contado a bien 
a Mosen Beltran en se poner en grand quantia de rendi-
cion, pues vio que la intencion del Principe era que 
por pequena valia le dexaria, e que non le preciaria 
mas. Otrosi fue e es grand razon de ser contada la 
nobleza e grandeza de corazon del rley de Francia en 
la dadiva que fizo en dar a :Mosen Beltran cien mil 
francos para su rendicion, e otros treinta mil para 
se apostar. E por todas estas razones se puso aqui 
este cuento; ca las franquezas e noblezas e dadivas 
__ de los .Reyes grand razon es que siempre finquen en 
memoria, e non sean olvidadas: otrosi las buenas 
razones de caballeria." 2 
Ayala's chivalric ideal is also evident in tne scene 
in which ~nrique arrives in Castile and swears never a6ain 
to leave his kingdom: 
"~ el estonce descavalg6 de un caballo en que venia, 
e finc6 los finojos en tierra e fizo una cruz en un 
arenal que estaba cerca del rio de Ebro, e bes6 en 
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ella, e dixo asi 'Yo lo juro a esta significanza de 
cruz, que nunca en mi vida, por menester que haya, 
salga del Hegno de Castilla, e antes espere y la 
muerte o la ventura que me viniere. 1 11 3 
The best example of chivalric description in the 
Cronic a del Rey Don Juan .l is found in the pass a 6e w.t1ich 
deals with the meeting of Juan I and the King of Armenia, 
whom he had ransomed from the Sultan of Babylonia: 
".c; el dia que lleg6 el hey de Armenia a .t3adajoz, 
sali6 el Hey Don Juan a le rescebir una legua de la 
cibdad; e quando el Hey de Armenia vido que el Rey 
venia, dixo a los que venian con ~l que le mostrasen 
do venia el Rey de Castilla; e ellos se le mostraron, 
diciendole asi: 1En esta gente que agora viene delante 
vos, do traen el espada alzada, viene el Rey de 
Gast i lla. 1 Es tonce e 1 Rey de Armenia, desque le vio 
cerca, descavalg6 de la mule en que venia, e finc6 
los finojos en tierra, e tir6se el sombrero eel 
capirote de la cabeza. el Hey Don Juan, quando 
aquello vio, descavalg6 de la mule, e todos los Senoras 
e Caballeros que alli eran se pusieron a pie. Z el 
Rey de .Armenia dixo al Rey de Castilla: 'Senor, yo so 
el que debo facer tal reverencia a la vuestra heal 
Magestad, como aquel que por vos e por la vuestra 
bondad so librado de tan cruel e dura prision como 
yo estaba.' el Rey de Castilla le abraz6, e dieronse 
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paz, e cavalgaron luego, B otro dia el rley Don Juan 
le envi6 muches panes de oro e de seda, e muches 
joyas, e doblas, e vajillas de plata, e diole para 
en toda su vida la villa de Madrid, e la de Villa-
real, e la de Andujar con todos sus pechos e derechos 
e rentas queen ellas avia, e diole mas en dada ano 
para en toda su vida ciento e cinquenta mil mara-
vedis. n4 
That Ayala's descriptions of chivalric behavior are 
reserved for the chronicles dealing with Pedro I and Juan I 
is a logical phenomenon, when one considers the fact tr.1at 
for .Ayala Pedro was the antithesis of tne chivalric ideal, 
while Juan was the most perfect symbol of it. 
Dramatic Action 
It is not surprising that the most dramatic passages 
of the chronicles are those which deal with the fates of 
Pedro I's enemies. The most famous passage of suspense 
and drama is that of the death of Pedro I s brot.l:ier, Fadrique. 
"li: el Maestre lleg6 en Sevilla el dicho dia martes por 
la manana a hora de tercia: e luego come lleg6 el 
Maestre fue a facer reverencia al 1{ey, e fall6le 
que jugaba a las tablas en el su Alcazar. i luego 
que lleg6 bes6le la mane el e muches Caballeros que 
venian con el: eel Rey le rescivi6 con buena voluntad 
que le mostr6, e pregunt6le donde partiera aquel dia, 
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e si tenia buenas posadas .•.• .0.: el Hey dixole que 
fuese a sosegar las posadas, e que despues se viniese 
para el: e esto decia el Hey porque entraran con el 
Maestre muchas c ornpanas en el lilC azar. B el r'iaes tre 
parti6 estonces del Hey, e fue ver a Dona Maria de 
Padilla, ea las fijas del Hey, que estaban en otro 
apartamiento del Alcazar, que dicen del caracol. B 
Dona Maria sabia todo lo que estaba acordado contra 
el Maestre, e quando le vi6 fizo tan triste cara, 
que todos lo podrian entender, ca ella era duena muy 
buena, e de buen seso, e non se pagaba de las cosas 
que el Rey facia, e pesabale mucho de la muerte que 
era ordenada de dar al Maestre .•.• E el Maestre torn6se 
para ir al Rey espantado, ca ya se rescelaba del mas •••. 
el Hey estaba en un palacio que dicen del fierro, 
la puerta cerrada: e llegaron los dos Maestre de 
Santiago e de Calatrava a la puerta del palacio d6 el 
Rey estaba, e non les abrieron, e estovieron a la 
puerta. E Pero Lopez de Padilla, que era Ballestero 
mayor del Rey, estaba con los Maestres de partes de 
fuera: e en esto abrieron un postigo del palacio do 
estaba el Rey, e dixo el fley a Pero Lopez de Padilla 
su Ballesteromayor: 1 Pero Lopez, prended al i"laestre. 1 
E Pero Lopez le dixo: 1 A qual dellos prendere? 1 B 
el Rey dixole: 1 Al Maestre de Santiago. 1 luego Pero 
Lopez de Padilla trav6 del Maestre Don Fadrique, e 
dixole: 1 Sed preso. 1 el Maestre estovo quedo muy 
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espantado: e luego dixo el rley a unos Ballesteros de 
maza, que ay estaben: 'Ballesteros, matad al Maestre 
de Santiago. 1 aun los Ballesteros non lo osaban 
facer: e un ome de la camara del 11.ey, que decian H.ui 
Gonzalez de Atienza, que sabia el consejo, dixo a 
grandes voces a los Ballesteros: 1Traydores, 6que 
facedes? Non vedes que vos manda el Hey que matedes 
al Maestre?' B los Ballesteros estonce, quando vieron 
que el Rey lo mandaba, comenzaron a alzar las mazes 
para ferir al Maestre Don Fadrique ••.• 8 los Ballesteros 
llegaron a 61 por le ferir con las mazas, e non se les 
guisaba, ca el Maestre andaba muy recio de una parte 
a otra, e non le podian ferir. E Nuno Ferrandez de 
Roa, que le seguia masque otro ninguno, llego al 
Maestre y diole un golpe de la maza en la cabeza, en 
guisa que cayo en tierra; e estonce llegaron los otros 
Ballesteros, e firieronle todos •.•• .•• torn6se el 
rey do yacia el :Maestre, e fallole que aun non era 
muerto; e sac6 el Hey una broncha que tenia en la 
cinta, e diola a un mozo de su camera, e fizole 
matar. E desque esto fue fecho, asent6se el Bey a 
comer donde el Maestre yacia rnuerto en una quadra que 
dicen de los Azulejos, que es eri el Alcazar. 115 
At the beginning of the passage, we find Fadrique coming to 
the king and being well received. Suspense is built up by 
his meeting with Dona Nerf.a de Padilla, during which the 
Maestre begins to realize tllat something is wrong. 
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Dramatic tension increases through ti1e l:hlllesteros r 
confusion as to which ,;vraestre, [tne Maestre de Santia6 o 
or de CalatravaJ is to be arrested. 'I'his tension is main-
tained by the hesitation of the Ballesteros in carrying 
out the king's orders and also by Fadrique•s ability to 
avoid his assassins for a short time. The barbaric scene 
is appropriately brought to a close with a description of 
the king placidly eating a meal near the body of his 
brother. 
Another scene of dramatic intensity is tne one in which 
Pedro I orders the dea t11s of those who belped his mother 
defend the city of Toro. The moving element in this case is 
not the murders themselves, but rather tne reaction of the 
queen toner son's barbarity: 
"Ela .Keyna Dona Maria madre de .Key, quando vi6 
matar asi a estos Caballeros, cay6 en tierra sin nin-
gun sentido corno muerta, econ ella la Condesa Dona 
Juana muger del Conde Don ~nrique. B desque la .Keyna 
cay6, estuvo en tierra grand pieza; e despues levan-
taronla, e vi6 las Caballeros muertos enderredor 
de si, e desnudos, e comenz6 a dar grandes voces mal-
diciendo al Rey su fijo, e diciendo que la deshonrara 
e lastimara para siempre, e que ya mas queria morir 
que non vivir. 116 
This sense of drama which is found in the Cr6nica 
del Rey Don Pedro! is an element which is definitely 
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lacking in the succeedini::; chronicles. For Ayala, dr&rna 
is only a means to an end, the end be in6 ttie exaggerated 
insistence on Pedro I s barbaric nature. Where trlis end 
is lacking, the sense of drama is also lacking. 
Battle Scenes 
Ayala's descriptions of battle scenes are extremely 
realistic and exact in detail, with little concern for 
dramatizing the action. Two famous battles which repre-
sent Ayala's typical style are the Battle of Najera, fought 
between Pedro and Bnrique in 1367, and tne Battle of Alju-
barrota between Castile and Portugal in 1385. In both cases 
such factors as physical terrain and strategic position are 
instrwnental in the victory or defeat of tne parties in-
volved. There is very little evidence of glory or heroism 
in either report. 
Najera: "El Rey Don ~nrique, seGund dicho avemos, tenia 
un Real asentado en guise, que el rio Najarilla 
estaba entre el eel logar por do avian de venir el 
Rey Don Pedro e e Principe, e ovo su acuerdo de pasar 
el rio, e poner la batalla en una grand plaza que es 
contra Navarrete, por do los otros venian e fizolo 
asi. E desto pes6 a mucho de los que con el estaban, 
ca tenian primero su Real a mayor ventaja que despues 
le asentaron. 11 7 
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Aljubarrota: "E asi fue, segund que ale;unos avian res-
celo, que las dos alas de la batalla del hey non 
pudieron pelear, que cada una dellas fall6 un valle 
que non pudo pasar, e la avanguarda del hey pele6 
sin acorro de las sus alas .•• 11 8 
It is tempting to suggest that Ayala doos not dramatize 
in either case because in both battles the side which 
be represents is the losing side. Therefore, the losses 
are attributed to natural factors. 
Scenes of Buman Interest 
A few passages of human interest arouse tne syrnpatny 
of the reader for the personage involved, but these are 
relatively rara. One such scene is Ayala's description 
of the pity which the people of Toledo felt for Pedro I's 
wife, Dona Blanca, when it was learned tnat sne was to be 
arrested by the king: 
"E las duer1as de Toledo, quando estas rezones oyeron 
de la Reyna Dona Blanca que ge las decia cada dia, 
otrosi de Dona Leonor de Saldana su aya, ovieron 
muy grand piedad de la Reyna, e fablaron con sus 
maridos econ sus parientes, diciendoles que serian 
los mas menguados omes del mundo si tal Reyna como 
aquella, que era su Senora, e muger del Rey su Senor, 
moriese tal muerte en la cibdad donde ellos estaban. 11 9 
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Here also, however, as in Urn scenes of drama, ilyala is 
utilizing a more literary style of writing in order to 
strengthen his personal viewpoint in tne eyes of the 
readers. 
Only one passage of the cnronicles deals with soldiers 
and their fates, and tnis is found in a report of tne 
Battle of Tarazana fought between Pedro I and the king of 
Aragon: it is a brief sidelight within a long, detailed 
description of the battle: 
11 E ese dia facia grand calor, e ovo 6 rand sed en la 
hueste del Rey, en tal guisa que al6unos omes de pie 
perescieron de sed."lO 
In general, however, Ayala keeps to tne matter at hand, 
without attempting to alleviate dull reports with interesting 
sidelights of hwnan interest. 
Natural Disasters 
Ayala does not deal with natural phenomena, except in 
a very few cases, and wrien he does mention them, it is a 
matter of a few words or lines at the most. There is the 
example of the fear of flood in Seville in 1353: "i:!: este 
ano ovo en -Sevilla muy grandes crescirnientos del rio Guadal-
quivir, en guisa que cerraron e calafetearon las puertas de 
la cibdad, e ovieron muy grand miedo que seria la cibdad en 
grand peligro. 1111 Ayala mentions the eartnquake in Lisbon 
which also hit Seville in 1356. 11 .b este ano fue el terre-
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mote, vigilia de Sant Bartolome, e cayeron las manzanas que 
estaban en la torre de Sancta Maria de Sevilla, e tremi6 
la tierra en muches logares del hegno en aquel dia, e fizo 
grand destroimiento en el Hogno de Portu~al e en el 
Algarbe, e derrib6 la capilla de Lisbona que avia fecho 
12 el Rey Don Alfonso.n 
The plague which decimated the Castilian troops be-
sieging Lisbon is described in somewhat more detail. This 
is not presented as an isolated point of interest, however, 
but rather as an important factor in the failure of Juan I 
to capture the Portuguese capital. 11 Estando el Hey Don 
Juan en su real que tenia sobre Lisboa, la pestilencia 
e mortands.d fue cada dia cresciendo muy fuertemente, e 
morian muchos de los que con el estaban, en manera que 
del dia que mori6 el Maestre de Sanctiago fasta dos meses 
morieron de las companas del hey dos mil omes de aramas 
de los mejore que tenia •.• 111 3 It is evident here that 
Ayala is only interested in presenting tne platSue from a 
rnili tary point of view rather thim from a descriptive one. 
Fiestas 
If one wants to read colorful descriptions of feasts, 
wedding ceremonies, and other events of local color, Ayala 
is a poor example to choose. His presentations of such 
events are mostly distant and lifeless--the product of an 
analytical ratner than an imaginative mind. The most 
picturesque wedding scene in the chronicles is tne cere-
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mony uniting Pedro I and his wife in 1353: 
" ••• el Rey Don Pedro fizo sus bodas con su esposa 
Dona Blanca de Borbon, e tom6la por su mue;er, e vel6se 
con ells en Sancta Maria la nueva de Valladolid: 
e ficieronse muches alogrias, e muchGs justas e tor-
• neos. B iban el Rey Don Pedro e la Reyna Lona Blanca 
su muger aquel dia vestidos de unos panos de oro 
blancos enforrados de arminos, e en caballos blancos: 
••• E iba la Heyne Dona Maria, madre del Hey Don Pedro, 
en una mula, e levaba panos de xametes blancos son 
pen.as veras: 1114 
Other wedding ceremonies in the chronicle are more in 
the style of the wedding of Juan I and Beatriz of Portu-
gal in 1383: 
"E esto fec.c10, otro dia fue el Bey ver la Reyna de 
Portugal, su suegra, e fall6 que salia a el fuera de 
la villa de Yelves a las tiendas que ende estaban, 
e alli traxieron a la Reyna Dona Beatriz, que estonce 
avia de tomar por su muger: e tom6la, e trax6la con-
sigo ese dia para Badajoz, e otro dia se vel6 con 
ella, e alli fueron fechas grandes fiestas, estando 
y los Senores e rlicos omes e Caballeros de Portogal, 
e muchos de Castilla. 1115 
Description for Ayala is unimportant as an end in it-
self. He is capable of fine descriptive and dramatic 
writing when it serves to reinforce his own opinions. 
When this is not the case, Ayala's writinc; tends to be 
drily factual and literarily uninteresting. 
Speeches 
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Ayala's use of speeches is an effective literary de-
vice by which the intercalation of accounts in tlie first 
person give more psycholor;ical insight into tne char·acter 
who is speaking. In the Cronic a del ,:(e-y .uon Pedro _!, most 
of these discourses are directed in some way ae;ainst the 
abuses of the kin~. Enrique of Trastamara expresses his 
fear of the privados; Pedro's mother and. aunt plead with 
him to return to his wife; Alburquerque makes an eloquent 
speech in defense of his policies as privado; and Ferrand 
P~rez de Ayala, the chronicler's father, speaks for the 
nobility in protest against Pedro's misrule. 
In the other cnronicles, speeches serve principally 
to present problems wnich must be resolved, such as deci-
sions of policy. 'l'here are several long discourses pre-
sented in which Ayala seems to be recording his own words. 
One discourse of this type is the irapassioned answer bf the 
Basque nobles to the Prelates at the Cortes of Gu&d.alajara 
in 1)90. Another is the answer of the Gonsejo to Juan I 
about the fate of the king's troublesome orotner, the Count 
of Norena; the speaker for tbe Gonsejo to whom Ayala re-
fers as 1este Caballero' begins with the followin~ words: 
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"Senor: Yo he pensado en esta razon que avedcs dicho 
a los del vuestro Consejo sabre al fecho del Conde 
Don Alfonso; e corno quier que veo asaz peligros en 
ello, yo non querria por cosa del mundo que vos fuesedes 
contra Dios, nin contra vuastra fama, antes querria 
que vos parasedes a todos los peligros que venir vos 
pudiesen. B esta razon es loada e alabada de todos 
los sabidores, que antes debe sufrir ome qualquier 
peligro, aunque sea de muerte, que es el mas duro que 
ser pueda, qua facer cos a mala nin fea. " 16 
The speaker goes on to enmuerate the brutal policies of 
previous monarchs in order to demonstr~te tne evil results 
of such actions. After suggesting that tne matter be decided 
by a legal trial, ti1e speaker ends the discourse with the 
following words: 
"E, Senor, a mi paresce, si la vuestra merced fuera, 
que vos en esta guisa debedes tener el fecno del Conde 
Don Alfonso de que demandastes consejo, e queen esto 
guardaredes justicia e vuestra farna; e si el meresce 
pena, cualquiera que sea, todos los de los vuestros 
Hegnos, e los de los otros Regnos de Christianos e 
de Moros, do esto fuere sabido, ternan que lo que 
ficieredes sera bien fecho; e si fallaredes que non 
meresce pena, avredes guardado todo lo que debedes 
d . . . 1117 e derecho e JUst1c1a. 
Tne moralizinG tone of the speech, and the plea for 
justice in the kingdom indicEite that t.tie spcuker is 
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J\.yala himself. Through his words, we can gain insight 
into his character as a rational hurr1an oein6 horrified by 
the brutality of his time. 
Dialogues 
In addition to lengthy speeches, Ayala creates live 
characters through the abundant use of short dialogues inter-
spersed through len~thy narratives. This tecrinique is 
in which dialo6 ue acids to tne drama or pathos of tnose 
condemned to death by Pedro I. A good example of dramatic 
dialogue occurs in a passage dealing with tne death of el 
Rey Bermejo. Pedro stabs his enemy with a lance while 
speaking the following words: 11 Toma es to, por quan to me 
fecistes facer mala pleytesia con el Rey de Aragon, e per-
der el c as tillo de 1-1.riza." The Noori sh king answers: 
11 10h que pequena caballeria feciste! 1118 In a few brief 
lines we feel the pathetic nobility of the infidel in 
contrast to the treacherous barbarity of the Christian 
monarch. 
Dialogue is also used to present a person's psycho-
logical makeup. Ayala I s poor opinion of .L';nrique de Trasta-
mara Is brother, Don Tello, is evident from the passage 
in which Tello meets Pedro after the death of his rr,otner, 
Leonor de Guzman. Pedro says: 11 .Jon Tello, sabedes como 
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vuestra madre Dona Leonor os muerta? 11 Tello answers: 
"S N h enor, yo non e otro padre, nin otra madre salvo a la 
Vuestra merced. 1119 No t d oner wor s are needed to express 
Tello's extreme cowardice and obsequious ~ehavior than 
this one sentence in which he denies his own mother to 
please the king. 
Letters 
Thougn most of tbe many letters wnicn Ayala records 
in the chronicles serve only as venicles of historical 
communication, tnere are several which are of definite 
literary value. Once again tbe most important letters of 
this sort appear in the chronicles of Pedro I and Juan I. 
There are several letters in the first chronicle 
which are presented as an indictment of tne king's policies. 
One is a letter from Gutier Ferrandez de Toledo to Pedro, 
written after the former has been informed by Pedro's men 
that he is to die. 
"Senor: Yo Gutier Ferrandez de Toledo beso vuestras 
manes, e me despido de la vuestra rnerced, e vo para 
otro Senor mayor que non vos. E, Jenor, bien sabe la 
vuestra merced com8 mi madre, e mis herrnanos, e yo, 
fuimos siempre desde el dia que vos nascistes en la 
vuestra crianza, e pasamos muchos males, e sufrimos 
muchos miedos por vuestro servicio en el tiempo que 
Dona Leonor de Guzman avia poder en el RegDo. Senor, 
yo siempre vos servi; empero creo que por vos decir 
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algunas cosas que complian a vuestro servicio me 
mandastes matar: en lo qual, Sefior, yo tengo que lo 
fecistes por complir vuestra voluntad: lo qual Dios 
vos los perdone; mas yo nunca vos lo meresci. E agora, 
Senor, digo vos tanto al punto de la mi muerte (por-
que este ser~ el mi postrimero consejo), que si vos 
non alzades el cuchillo, e non escusades de facer 
tales muertes come esta, que vos avedes perdido vuestro 
Ragno, e tenedes vuestra persona en peligro. E pido 
vos por merced que vos gu:::1rdedes; ca lea lrnente fa blo 
con vusco, ca en tal ora est6, que non debo decir si 
non verdad. 1120 
Tne pathos of tnis letter frorr1 a knight who, after protesting 
his own innocence and the injustice done him, is still able 
to speak to his king as a loyal subject, is especially moving, 
and charged with dramatic effect. 
The two letters from the l'foor of Granada to ?edro I 
are of great interest, because tney are pure fictional 
creations, inserted by the chronicler to express his own 
views about Pedro I and his barbaric treatment of his sub-
jects. rlyala utilizes such traditional literary foITQS 
as fables and proverbs and wise sayin6 s to emphasize his 
ideas: 
" ••• los males son en caso semejante de las walecinas, 
amargas o pesadas para el que las bebe, e son aborridas 
del, mas ~l que las puede sofrir e atender en penar el 
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su mal sabor esta en esperanza de bien e de salud.tt 
"La manera del i<ey con sus gen tes es seme j ada al pas tor 
con so e;anado, e la 0 rand piedad que na con el, quo 
anda a le buscar la mejor agua eel buen pasta, e 
la grand guarda que le face de los contrarios, asi 
coma lobos; 
" ••• el percebido es el q_ue piensa como salga de la 
cosa antes que contesca; el orgulloso el que piensa 
como salga de la cosa despues que nasce. 11 
"E vuestra manera con ellos [Pedro's foreign allies] 
paresce al onIB que criaba un leon, e cazaoa con el 
animalias, e aprovechabase del; e un dia fallescio 
de comer al leon, e comio a un fijo que tenia aquel 
que le criaba. 11 
11 E los f ec.i:1os de los Reyes e de los Gr8.ndes son con-
trari os de los fechos de los mercaderes; e ellos non 
deben mostrar cobdicia, pues son Reyes, e non merca-
deres. " 21 
Ayala gives greater force to the letter by emphasizing the 
qualities of a bad monarch rather tnan tliose of a good one. 
This sort of king, meaning Pedro, of course, has no respect 
for his people; his followers are as evil as tne enemy; 
his excessive physical appetites are self-destructive; he 
has no respect for laws and is full of cruelty. 
Another fictional letter of tr1is type was supposedly 
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found in Pedro's coffer after his death at Montiel. Pedro 
asks the meaning of a prophecy, supposedly written by 
Merlin, which the l"loor proceeds to interpret. 'l'he propnecy 
is as follows: 
"En las partidas de occidente entre los montes a la 
mar nascera una ave negra, comedora, e robadoro, e tal 
que todos los panares del mundo querria acoger en si, 
e todo el oro del mundo querra poner en su est6mago; 
e despues gormarlo ha, e tornara atrHs, en non peres-
cera luego por esta dolencia. dice mas, caersele 
han las alas, e secarsele han las plurnas al sol, e 
andara de puerta en puerta, e ninguno la querra 
acoger, e encerrarse ha en selva, e morira y dos veces, 
una al mundo, e otra ante Dios, e desta guisa aca-
bara.1122 
The wise Noor interprets the prophecy as referrin6 to Pedro, 
who is so avaricious and cruel tnat he will finally be 
rejected by all and abandoned. 
The letters in the Gr6nica del Rey Don Juan l which 
hold some interest for tne literary scholar are those 
which have some religious importance. One example is an 
emotional letter from Juan I to his subjects about tne 
scnism of the Church: 
"Don Juan por la gracia a.e Dios .Key de Castilla, e 
de Leon: a todos los fieles Christianos salud e 
gracia, aquella que face a los omes venir a conosci-
miento del su Pastor verdadero. Desde el lugar do el 
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sol nasce, fas ta do se pone, parece as az r11ani fies ta-
men te quanta tribulacion es levantada en la Christian-
dad, e quanta malicia el enemigo del hwaanal linaLe 
ha sembrado en el ~antuario de Dios; ca contra 61, 
e contra el su ungido puso asechanzus llenas de 
pestilencie, segund su acostwnbrada maldad, econ fu-
riosos ruegos e comienzos aborrescederos, econ artes 
e engafios feos e malos dan6 al principaz~o e sefiorio 
de los oficios del servicio divinal con malicia que 
se non puede decir, amargando la entegridad e union 
de la F~ e de su religion, e menospresciandola, e 
escureciendola; e asi se puso por romper el atamiento 
de la unidad cat6lica, que con sus artes mortales afo-
gaba la verdad de la devocion del fijo, se esforzo 
e arm6 a contrariar la piedad del padre, olvidada 
la unidad, econ marvillosos enganos de la ce6uedad 
fea e non limpia, para rescevir una esposa fizo llamar 
dos maridos, e para guarda del su ganado en luger de 
un pastor, fizo quistion de dos pastores. asi en la 
dubda del casamiento de la esposa se movi6 quistion 
escura, la cual non se determina; e seyendo mani-
fiesta la herencia, qual de los fijos la debe aver, 
es entre los huerfanos la dubda; lo qual con 0 rand 
dolor es de doler e de gernir, e direrrios asi: jO 
davocion corrompida del pueblo Christiano! j crueza 
arrebatadal ceguedad enganosa sin piedadl 6c6mo se 
escureci6 el sole el guiador lurnbroso de la verdad, 
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e como los carros resplandecientes de luz son tras-
tornados en tinieblas? 6A d6 es, a d6 es la Fe 
de Jesu-Christo? a do esta lu ley eel atamiento e 
el ayuntamiento de la caridad?"23 
Literary effects in the letter are the use of symbolism 
to emphasize the gravity of the schism ( the floe k wi tr1 two 
shepherds and the wife with two husbands) and the use of 
rhetorical questions and exclamations to express shock 
and dismay over the situation of the Church. 
Another letter written in a similar tone is that of 
Clement VII to Juan I consoling him after his defeat at 
Aljubarrota. The author states the fact that many other 
great men have been defeated in battle by lesser men. he 
reinforces his statement with many examples from Biblical 
and Spanish history. Then he shows how an initial defeat 
can lead to an even more brilliant victory, and gives 
several symbolic examples: "Escripto es que en la edi-
ficacion del temple de Jerusalem todas las piedras eran 
primeramente labradas e picadas con martillos, porque 
rnansamente fuesen puestas en la lavor que avia de durar. 
E por este exe.rnplo tiene que aquellos que son a poner en 
la pared e muro de aquel temple celestii:il, que es dicho 
Jerusalem e parayso, primero en este rnundo son atormentados 
e feridos de muches peligros e fortunas, porque despues 
con paz e mansamente sean alli trasladados e puestos." 
Tne Pope concludes by advising Don Juan to dress in "vesti-
duras de salud e de fortaleza e de gracia" in order to 
keep face before his enemies and maintain his dignity 
2)1 as a great kin6 • .,. 
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Several letters of interest because of tneir flamboyant 
Oriental style are those from the Sultan of Babylonia to 
Juan, having to do with the ransom of trie King of Armenia. 
One letter begins with a lengthy catalogue of tne Sultan's 
titles: "El Rey al to regnante, He-y justo, senor noble, 
justiciero, conqueridor, hermitano, defendedor e favorable 
vencedor, mejoramiento del mundo e de la fe, Hey de la 
morisma e de los Moros, averiguador de la justicia en 
los mundos, atendedor de las agraviados, e destroidor de 
las agraviadores e de los hereges e descreidos, conqueridor 
de las tierras e de los rlegnos e de los climes, heredero 
del senorio de los Arabigos e de los Ladinos e de los Tur-
cos, Alexandre del tiernpo, senor oe la guerra, ayuntador de 
las palabras de creencia, sornbra de Dias en la tierra, 
afirmador de la su ley e de los sus rn&ndarnientos, asei::;ura-
dor de las carreras de los ro~erages, servidor de las dos 
casas sanctas, e senor de los Reyes e Emperadores, ensal-
zado Rey de las creyentes, Abulanayche Hagi, fijo del Rey 
de fe, Rey noble defendedor del mundo e de la fe, •• ~" 
ensalce Dias su regnado, e defienda sus gentes e sus ayunta-
mientos e su caballeria." Juan I is referred to wi tr1 the 
following titles: 11 ••• grande honrador, ensalzado, presciado, 
esforzado, el Caballero de prez, el leon Juan, defendedor 
de la Ghristiandad, honrador de la gente de Jesu, corona 
de la ley de Ghristus, defendedor de las partes de los 
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enemigos, ai'irrnador de las 6en tes de la Cruz, fac edor de 
los Caballeros, fermosura de las noblezas e de las co-
r6nic as, amigo de los He;1 es e de los ..:;mperadores, s erior 
de Castilla e de los otros senorios qu0 son con ella •.. 11 25 
The remainder of t.i:ie letter is actually shorter tnan the 
lists of titles of the two monarchs, interesting reflections 
in themselves of the pomp and splendor of the Oriental 
world as Ayala knew it. 
Character Sketches 
One literary feature for which Ayala has often been 
praised is the brief character sketch, which is believed to 
be a precursor to such writers as Fern~n P~rez de Guzm~n 
and Fernando del Pulgar. These sketches generally appear 
in the chronicles as an epilogue to the descriptions of 
the deatns of such important characters as Pedro I, .8n-
rique II, Juan I, Maria de Padilla, and Charles V of 
France. 
Of Pedro's mistress, Maria de Padilla, Ayala says: 
11 .8 fue Dona Maria muger de buen linage, e fermosa, e 
N d" . . 1126 pequena de cuerpo, e de buen enten 1m1ento. The des-
cription of Dona Blanca is sornewha t more complete: 11 £:: 
era esta Reyna Dona Blanca del linage de Francia, de la 
flor delis de los de Borbon ••. e era blanca e ruvia, e de 
buen donayre, e de buen seso: e decia cada dia sus horas 
muy devotamente: e pas6 grand penitencia en las prisiones 
. . n27 
do estuvo, e sufriolo todo con muy grand pac1enc1a. 
lT( 
Ayala seems to have found Pedro's mistress to be a lovely 
and reasonable wor118.n, as can be e::;&thered froi,, llis description 
of her; his sympathies lay, however, witn tne Dueen to 
wnom such a great injustice Lad been done. 
The longest character skate~ is na~urally the des-
cription of Pedro I, whom Ayala accuses of being greedy, 
lascivious and cruel: 
"E fue el Rey Don Pedro asaz grande de cuerpo, e 
blanco e rubio, e ceceaba un poco en la fabla. 
Era muy cazador de aves. Pue muy sofridor de tra-
bajos. ~ra muy temprado e bion acostumbrado en el 
comer e beber. :Oormia poco, e arn6 mucho mu6 eres. 
Fue muy trabajador en guerra. Fue cobdicioso de 
allegar tesoros e joyas, tanto que se fall6 despues 
de su muorte que valieron lc;1s joyas de su camera 
treinta cuentos en piedras preciosas e aljofar e 
baxilla de oro e de plata, e en panos de oro e otros 
apos tarnien tos •.• E ma t6 muc.bos en su Ragno, por lo qual 
~ , . d u28 le vino todo el dano que aveoes oi o. 
A 1 · 1 · · te · "Ag·ora los ya a ends the analysis on a mora izing no . 
Reyes aprended, e sed castigados todos los que juzgades 
el mundo: ca grand juicio e maravilloso fue este, e muy 
espantable. 11 29 
Style 
Aside from those cited examples w:nic.b offer some 
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literary interest, Ayala's style is generally monotonous. 
Characters are reidentit'ied e~ch tirue tney appear in the 
chronicle, and events are often repeated in great detail. 
The reader is constantly overwhelmed with unnecessary de-
tails such as lists of those who fout_)-1t in a battle, 
lineages of the kin6 s of Castile, and other tedious di-
gressions. The sentence structure is ~enerally simple, 
wnile phrases such as ~, otrosi 1:md come dicho aviarnos 
recur incessantly, in the narrative tradition of the Middle 
Ages. 
Most of the interesting literary devices mentioned 
occur in La Cr6nica del hey Don Pedro I and La Cr6nica del 
Rey Don Juan !--perhaps because ~;.yala seews to have !iad 
more feeling for these two monarchs than for tne others. 
La Cr6nica de Don Enrique II is cold and distant, wnereas 
La Cr6nica del ReL Don Enrique Ill is so full of minute 
details as to make it nearly unreadable. 
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24. Juan I., Yr. 8, Ch. III. 
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26. Pedro l, Yr. 12, Ch. VI. 
27. Pedro l, Yr. 12, Ch. III. 
28. Pedro l, Yr. 20, Ch. VIII. 
29. Pedro I., Yr. 20, Ch. VIII. 
1131 
CEAPTER VIII 
AYALA Alm HlJMAN ISM 
The principal evaluation of Ayala amonb historians 
and literary critics hos centered around the chronicler's 
qualities as a Pre-humanist. Before undertaking a dis-
cussion of this subject, it mi6ht be well to cite the basic 
principles of historiography which distinguish the Medieval 
from the Humanist period. 
In ~anaral, mediaval chroniclers believed in a ~ivine 
in terpreta ti on of history in which world even ts were at-
tributed to Providence. Love of chivalry was often more 
important than practical politics. Most events described 
were of equal importance, so that there was little or no 
selection of material. Historians considered themselves 
as belonging to a world order held together by the Catholic 
Church. There was sometimes little distinction between 
fact and fantasy, because of the abundance of legends, 
accounts of miracles and superstitions, and also due to 
the historians' lack of interest in accurate sources. In 
style, dramatic presentation was of secondary importance, 
so that the wealth of detail often overwhelmed the reader 
and distracted him from the main theme of the work. 
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The Humanist writers tended to it;nore Providence 
in favor of a natural explanation of events. Instead of 
describin6 everythin~, tney usually wrote of Great events 
such as wars and revolutions whicn served to exalt their 
country or city-state. Fort.tie i:iumanist, drar,iat:;ic pre-
sentation of history was often as important as the event 
itself. The church as representative of world order was 
unimportant and was therefore ignored rather than attacked. 
Livy was the model which the Humanist historians followed, 
especially for his idea of history as a teacher and moral 
guide of future behavior. Livy 1 s style of writing--full 
of harangues and exhortations to exalt the idea of patriotism 
and heroism--formed the basis for humanistic writing in 
the Renaissance. 
Menendez y Pelayo, following to some extent tbe ideas 
of Ayala 1 s principal biographer, Rafael Ploranes, es ta blisr~ed 
Ayala as a definite precursor of humanism and as a new libht 
in Spanish historiography. His jud~ment is based on the 
fact that Ayala transl1:1ted such writers 1:1s Livy, boccaccio, 
Boethius, Saint Gregory the Great, and Guido di Colonna 
into Castilian, thereby making available for the first 
time works previously unknown in Castile. "Las obras de 
Petrarca y Boccaccio mirados entonces mas bien como eruditos, 
como humanistas y moralistas que como poetas, empiezan a 
correr de mano en mano entre principes, obispos, maestros 
y pr6ceres, ya en copias del texto original ••• ya en traduc-
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ciones que comienzan a DbCGrse dando ejemplo el cancillcr 
Ayala y el ilustre converse, obispo de Burgos, Don Alonso 
1 
de Cartagena." Menendez y Pelayo goes on to ca 11 11.y ala 
the first writer of the i"liddle Ac;e s in wuom ni s tor)' appears 
with the same character of nwnan and social reflection 
which was to appear in the great Italic;1n historical writers 
of the rlenaissance. Ayala, accordin6 to Menendez y Pelayo, 
was trie first prototype of a modern i"lachiavellian hero--
a man who looks after himself without harrnint; ot.i'.iers •2 
Many other critics, such as Benito SAnchez Alonso, C. 
SAnchez Albornoz and Jose Luis Romero, '.nave followed 
in the footsteps of Menendez y Pelayo in their evaluc;1tion 
of Ayala. As proof of Ayala's humanist traits, they cite 
the following: the appearance of ti:le portrait or snort 
biography; his profound observation of human nature with 
psychological and critical insight; the predominance of 
reason over passion; nis definite lack of superstition 
and miraculous tales; tne influence of Livy in Ayala's 
magistral view of nistory and in his style; his historicc;1l 
fidelity; his interest in practical politics; and nis use 
of diverse literary devices--dialogue, speecLes, and 
letters--to give life to tne chronicles. 3 
.More recently, critics .trnve begun challenging the 
authority of Menendez y Pelayo and his followers. One 
such writer is the eminent Medievalist, Robert B. Tate, 
who questions Ayala's qualities as a forerunner of the 
Humanist movement. he states tnat Ayala supported a 
chivalric order of the world controlled by tr1e church 
and nobility, as opposed to a unified monarchy. ,,yala's 
moral tone is reminiscent of tne scnool of Don Juan lVianuel 
rather than of Livy. Tate cites tne influence of the 
'exemplum' literature of the lJth and 14t.n centuries with 
its abundance of brief stories, proverbs and fables, and 
tne character of the wi ze Moorish vizier. 'rate denies any 
influence of Livy on Ayala's style, and maintains that 
Ayala's obsession with internal politics and wars had 
nothing to do with Livy, but rather followed the Medieval 
tradition of Gastilian chronicles from the time of Al-
fonso X. The new interest in social and adrr,inistrative 
themes which Menendez y Pelayo used to show Ayala's 
humanistic interests are according to Tate no proof of 
his humanism, since the humanists eliminated such detailed 
digressions.4 
A careful reading of the cnronicles mcikes it evident 
that most of these critics, whether attacking or defending 
Ayala I s humanism, have utilized those passages of the 
chronicles which tended to support tneir own particular 
views, while playing down the importance of tnose wnich 
weakened their case. It is necessary, tnerefore, to give 
a clear evaluation of Ayala free from preconceived pre-
judices, a task w.t1ich is extremely difficult because of 
the length and breadth of his production and the contra-
dictions in the chronicles themselves. 
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Divine Interpretation of History 
There is no doubt that Ayala c onsi ci.0red world even ts 
to be an act of Providence. He makes it quite clear, 
for example, that Pedro I was defeated by his half-brother 
because it w&s God's will that the people of Castile be 
saved from the tyrant. However, within this broad frame-
work of divine providence, Ayala is realistic in his explana-
tion of historical events and gives causes and effects in 
natural terms. 
Nobility vs. Crown 
It is too simple an evaluation of Ayala to state that 
he represented the nobility in opposition to the authority 
of the crown. There is an evolution of his viewpoint which 
comes about from his disillusion with the members of the 
upper nobility and causes him to ally himself to the interests 
of the lesser nobility and even of tne middle class, as 
well as to the interests of tne monarchy. This evolution 
is, of course, tied closely to Ayala's personal interests 
and opinions of the monarchs involved. As he becomes 
more powerful in the affairs of the govermnent, his 
interests become more and more closely allied to the con-
cept of a strong, centralized monarchy. 
Livy and the Ivlagistral View of .fiistory 
To all appearances, Ayala's moral tone throughout 
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the chronicles is an expression of his own personality 
and has nothing to do wi t11 Livy I s magis tral view of history. 
Livy continually emphasizes the glories ot' tne peat in 
contrast to the decadence of the present--a point of view 
which has no echo in Ayala wh8tsoever. In this respect, 
one must agree with Tate, who places Ayala in the moralizing 
tradition of the school of Don Juan Manuel.5 
Ayala--A Literary Humanist? 
But Tate is unfair to Ayala in his statement that 
the chronicles have a completely Medieval orientation 
because of the abundance of 'exemplum' literature. This 
type of writing appears only in the two letters from the 
Moor of Granada to Pedro I, and is Ayala's way of em-
phasizing his antipathy to the king without expressing 
it directly as his own idea. 
On the other hand, tne followers of iVlenendez y 
Pelayo exaggerate the humanistic characteristics of Ayala's 
style. Diego Catalan's careful study of La Gran Cr6nica 
of ~lfonso XI demonstrates very clearly that the literary 
1 innovations 1 formerly attributed to Ayala, such as haran-
gues, letters, messages and dialogue, are also present in 
the works of the anonymous author of La Gran Cr6nica, who 
knew nothing of Livy.6 
Historical Fidelity 
Ayala's interest in relating the facts in as objective 
a manner as possible is another quality of his own per-
sonality rather than a characteristic of .t1is humanist 
orientation. The humanists were often rather subjective, 
since their motives were patriotic; they wanted to show 
the glories of their own particular countries or city-
states. In this sense, it could even be stated tna t Ayala 
was perhaps even more modern than the humanists themselves, 
since his cold, analytical presentation of tne facts is 
more appropriate to the ideals of modern historiography 
than to humanism. 
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CO.N CLDSION 
Ayala's family position and ties to ~ranee were mainly 
responsible for his short-signted view of the political 
situation of Castile in the second nalf of the fourteenth 
century. rlis antipathy to the brutal justice of Pedro I 
prevented him from realizing that this king was a fore-
runner of the concept of a national, _unified Spain. 
Pedro's defeat and death meant the prolongation of the 
struggle between the nobility and tbe monarchy, which 
Ayala himself was to criticize in the Cr6nica del Rey Don 
B:nrique III. 
Ayala's portrayal of the reign of Enrique II emphasizes 
tnat monarch's military victories while minimizing the 
gravity of Castile's internal situation as exemplified in 
such policies as Las Ivie re edes Bnriguenas. 
In the reign of Juan l, Ayala intelligently opposes 
Juan's policies in Portugal. However, he fails to see the 
harm of Castile I s anti-~nglish stand, which thrust her 
into a costly war over a situation which could have been 
settled in a peaceful manner, had Castile followed the 
prudent example of En Pere of Aragon. The same can be 
said of Ayala's Francophile st8nd in respect to tne Papal 
Schism. 
Ayala demonstrates more modern tendencies in the 
last chronicle, in wnic:r1 he deals with Bnrique III. 
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Here he is united to tne ideals of a centralized monarchy, 
and criticizes tne rapacious policies of tne upper no-
bility which he had defended in the Cr6nica del H.e;y Don 
Pedro I. Likewise, he snows signs of being critical 
of France, particularly of t.i:rnt country 1 s role in trying 
to force Pope Benedict Xlll to renounce the Papal tnrone. 
Tne idea of neutrality in the 1-1.nglo-French strugsle becomes 
much more manifest in the last of tne four chronicles. 
But whereas ti1e chronicles show evidence of evolution, 
historically speaking, the same cannot be said for their 
literary style. The only chronicle which is truly readable 
from the literary point of view is the first. This is 
due to Ayala's greater interest then in dramatic presenta-
tion, which serves the purpose of emotionally arousing the 
reader's antipathy to Pedro I. The last chronicle, on 
the other hand, weighed down by its overwhelming weal th 
of detailed information, is inferior to the otners from 
tne stylistic point of view. It is tnerefore clear that 
Ayala's main purpose is political, and tnat the injection 
of.speeches, letters, dialogue and other dramatic devices 
is secondary to this purpose. It may safely be concluded, 
then, that in this sense, Ayala does not represent tne 
spirit of the hurnanis t, for whom style was almost as im-
portant as content. 
Ayala's traditional place in Castilian historiography 
191 
as herald of the dawn of a new c:lge has been much exag-
gerated, thanks in r;reat part to an unquestioning rec1ding 
of Menendez y Pelayo. The general form and style of the 
chronicles follow paths botn long known and well trodden. 
In simplest terms, Ayala represents to the unprejudiced 
reader the highest expression of tne chronicle tradition 
of the Spanish Middle Ages. 
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Adelantado mayor: Governor in the king's name of one of 
the constitutent provinces of the kingdorn of Castile and 
Leon. He exercised executive, judicial and military 
authority in his province on behalf of the crown. 
Adelantado fronterizo: one holding the governorship of 
a frontier province. 
Adelantado del rey: court official; deputy of the king 
in the latter's capacity as supreme judge. 
Alcalde: local judge with criminal and civil jurisdiction. 
Alferez: standard-bearer. 
Alferez del rey: comrn.ander-in-chief of tne army before 
tne military reforms of Juan I in 1382. 
Aljama: the name used to designate a community of Jews 
or Moors inhabiting a special quarter (barrio) of any 
Spanish city, town, or village. 
Canciller: chancellor. 
Canciller mayor: chancellor of the great seal of the realm. 
Concejo: municipality. 
Conde: count. A title of Visigothic origin revived by 
Alfonso XI as a title of honor granted to individual 
magnates. 
Condestable: the king's deputy as corrm1ander-in-chief of 
the army--a permanent post created by the Castilian and 
Portuguese military reforms of 1382. 
Consejo: council. 
Copero: bearer of the cup, an honorary title. 
Cortes: parliament. 
Mayordomo mayor: the chief officer of the royal household. 
Merino mayor: in certain provinces the equivalent of 
tne adelantado mayor. 
Oidor: title neld by a judge belon3ing to the s~preme 
tribunal of Castile but having jurisdiction in civil 
suits only. 
Repostero mayor: king 1 s butler; an honorary title. 
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